I read the report, but I cannot say I absorbed every word of it, so perhaps I am missing something. But from what I gather, some questions and observations come to mind.
The report concludes that part of the cause was that the interlocking operator for the drawbridge issued a verbal instruction that undermined the engineer’s reliance on wayside signals.
While they apparently did establish as fact that the operator issued the verbal instruction, I see no proof that this undermined the engineer’s reliance on the wayside signals. All that the evidence shows is that the engineer failed to heed the wayside signals. There is no way to prove that this failure to heed the signals resulted from the operator’s verbal highball.
Yes, I have no way of proving what happened. I won’t even speculate. But I had assumed that the investigation purported to show facts that could be concluded from the evidence. I did not realize that the investigation draws conclusions as speculation, and then declares them to be fact because they can’t be proven otherwise. In any case, it is as plain as day that the investigation has drawn a conclusion for which there is no evidence.
A similar situation was the Newark Bay Bridge disaster of 1958. A CNJ suburban train came off the NY&LB and plunged over the opening of a raised vertical lift bridge. The ICC accident investigation concluded that the accident was caused by failure to operate in accordance with signal indications. Radio transmissions were not involved but the engine crew worked this route as their regular assignment so they may have expected clear indications with the wayside signals as part of their normal routine.
I believe that this investigation was simply unable to explain the fundamental cause of this accident, and therefore, they did their best to cobble together an explanation anyway. They offered the obvious and undisputable conclusion that the engineer failed to respond to wayside signals. In many past collisions, that has been the fundamental cause without any way to explain why the engineer failed to heed signals. But, in this accident, the investigators went further and speculated as to why the engineer failed to respond to the signals. &
What is Ironic is that 13 Years Prior to one of the Worst Passenger train accidents in the Nations History the NTSB had evidence that Drugs and Alchohal caused Fatal accidents and still refused to act on it. Only after the Colonial Accident on the NE Corridor they acted. Remember that during this time it was nothing for OTR drivers to have a few Beers at night heck from this one lookslike RR workers even drank on the job. Yet they did not act. Only when people DIED that were not Transportation workers did they act. You all know the saying it takes Blood to get action in Washington.
At the time this incident occurred, the DWI limit was 0.10, not the 0.08 that has become commonplace across the country at present.
My understanding is that at present, during a drug test, railroad employees are allowed up ot 0.02 and are judged as fit for duty. I believe this standard also applies to airline pilots. To my knowledge, no one has a 0.00 standard.
OTR is .04 by the FEDS however most if not all COmpanys have a POLICY you get caught with ANY booze in your system YOUR FIRED and if you had an accident YOUR ON YOUR OWN COME LAWSUIT TIME. Even Cough Syrup is enough to get your but Fired in OTR at times. That tell you something.
0.02 is the current legal limit for motorists under 21, as some medicines (cough syrup has been mentioned) and mouthwash either contain small amounts of alcohol or give a false positive indication of 0.01 or 0.02 BAC. A 0.00 standard isn’t possible.
The issue in the case of this wreck is not about employees coming to work with alcohol in their system. It is about consuming alcohol while on duty the day of the wreck. And that could not possibly have had anything to do with a collision resulting from lack of attention.
Taking away a route from an approaching train - also known in some places as “dropping or throwing a red in his face” - is supposed to be not allowed or prevented by the interlocking mechanism. Once an oncoming train has ‘accepted’ a signal indication that would permit a movement - such as by entering into an approaching block or passing a ‘point of no return’ - the interlocking system is supposed to prevent the signal from changing to a more restrictive aspect until either the train has left the block, or a clock/ timer has run some minutes (obviously, not a problem if the signal changes to a less restrictive aspect while the train is approaching). Unlike a highway traffic signal, the train signal can’t suddenly go from yellow to red while you’re still entering the intersection. Several articles have appeared in Trains over the years that are related to this, but the best explanation is in this one:
“The accident that couldn’t happen - collision between CB&Q and RI trains 9/25/64, Montgomery, Illinois” by Shaw, Robert B., Trains, October 1965, p. 23
(accident CB&Q Montgomery RI)
Otherwise, your analysis and opinion of the facts and the NTSB’s report seems to thoroughly explore all of the possibilities, and is well-reas
Bucyrus:
[snipped] Every engineer knows that even when he has a route lined up through an interlocking plant, he has to watch for, and expect that route to be taken away by a change in signal indication. . . .
Taking away a route from an approaching train - also known in some places as “dropping or throwing a red in his face” - is supposed to be not allowed or prevented by the interlocking mechanism. Once an oncoming train has ‘accepted’ a signal indication that would permit a movement - such as by entering into an approaching block or passing a ‘point of no return’ - the interlocking system is supposed to prevent the signal from changing to a more restrictive aspect until either the train has left the block, or a clock/ timer has run some minutes (obviously, not a problem if the signal changes to a less restrictive aspect while the train is approaching). Unlike a highway traffic signal, the train signal can’t suddenly go from yellow to red while you’re still entering the intersection. Several articles have appeared in Trains over the years that are related to this, but the best explanation is in this one:
“The accident that couldn’t happen - collision between CB&Q and RI trains 9/25/64, Montgomery, Illinois” by Shaw, Robert B., Trains, October 1965, p. 23
(accident CB&Q Montgomery RI)
Thank you for your comments Paul. That is an interesting point about the interlocking being capable of taking a route away once given. I don’t know if there are exceptions to this, but my understanding of interlocking plants correlates to what Jeff has mentioned above. That is, that a route can be taken away from an approaching train, but it cannot be taken away and replaced by a conflicting route. Specifically, once a train enters a plant that is lined for it, if the route is taken away, the plant locks up. This prevents a conflicting route from being lined up, which might lead to a collision course.
I did read that article in Trains about the wreck that couldn’t happen. In that case, a technical fault with the interlocking plant allowed it to grant two conflicting routes, which should normally be impossible with a properly operating plant. Wasn’t there some redesign of the track routes underway there that required a revision of the interlocking plant? I seem to recall that the technical fault accidentally introduced in that plant remodeling.
As best as I can recall, there wasn’t a redesign of the routes, but the plant was being upgraded from mechanical or pneumatic to electric or electro-mechanical, etc. The root cause was something like after a switch lever was thrown, a period of several seconds had to elapse before any other lever was thrown, and a note to that effect was taped to the ‘modelboard’ diagram. But if another lever was thrown within that time period, the switch motion would be aborted, but the signal for that switch would still be indicating “Clear”.
Perhaps I’m misunderstanding something, but I’m still troubled by the assertion that even after a train has ‘accepted’ a signal authorizing a move at some speed and is proceeding on that basis, that the signal could be changed to a more restrictive aspect without any advance warning or opportunity to brake the train in a controlled manner (other than emergency). I do agree, though, that didn’t happen in this instance, so the point is moot or not applicable.
Properly, when a signal is taken down it should immediately indicate STOP. The time out clock should then be running for whatever timeout period it is set to…on most main track signals I have ever worked with, that timeout period is between 8 & 12 minutes…for the period the timer is running NO OTHER CONFLICTING ROUTE can be lined. In the operation of a Drawbridge, that would properly mean…once the signal was taken down the bridge could not be opened and no switches in the route changed until the timer has run.
Descriptions in the report, would make it seem that the Operator had never lined the signal in the first place after having told the crew that the route was lined; he then opened the bridge. Had the signal actually have been lined, he would have had to wait for the timeout to be able to line the bridge. If the signal had actually been lined and the timeout period run, the train - even not paying attention to the wayside signal would have crossed the bridge as the operator would not have been able to raise it during the timeout period.
I might add, during my career I have worked with the operator positions at this location while working with B&O interchange jobs that delivered cars to the Whisky Island interchange which locates about 15 car lengths West of the bridge.
[quote user=“Paul_D_North_Jr”]
Perhaps I’m misunderstanding something, but I’m still troubled by the assertion that even after a train has ‘accepted’ a signal authorizing a move at some speed and is proceeding on that basis, that the signal could be changed to a more restrictive aspect without any advance warning or opportunity to brake the train in a controlled manner (other than emergency). I do agree, though, that didn’t happen in this instance, so the point is moot or no
Yes, as Jeff has mentioned, and as BaltACD has confirmed, having the signal being taken away is a moot point in that it did not actually happen in the wreck of OV-8. I did not mean to derail this thread by implying that a signal being taken away played any roll in this accident.
I only mentioned the possibility of signals being taken away in order to make a finer point about the fundamental reason why signals have to be watched continuously if they are clear. I am only trying to distinguish the degree of distraction from the lapse of attention because it is common to associate a distraction with a momentary lapse of attention. In the case of this wreck, the distraction was quite prolonged, as opposed to being momentary.
That very scenario happened back in 1969 at Waxdale (Racine) WI. A college-educated idiot of a Trainmaster decided to do an efficiency test at the automatic interlocking on a southbound CNW train. The train had a clear on the distant s
Instructions on my carrier are, when getting a ‘unexpected’ Stop Signal, DO NOT put the train in Emergency. Make a maximum service reduction to stop the train. Uncontrolled slack action is a big derailment cause.
I’ve had a few control points drop right in front of me. (Unintentional glitches) We too are told in those circumstances to just bring them to a stop, “consistant with good train handling techniques.”
Just tonight they were having signal problems at a control point. The dispatcher warned approaching trains that they may lose a signal, and if they did to just bring it to an easy stop and give him a call.