As the world of tires and wings overtook the railroads, the great Gothic city terminals that once echoed with the bustle of travelers and the clatter of baggage carts began to resemble the relics of a fallen empire. “Year by year the railroads have simply been drifting out of the public consciousness,” David P. Morgan, editor of Trains magazine, wrote in 1958. “Nobody hangs around the depot to see the 5:15, assuming it’s still there, and a generation of Americans has never been inside a train.” Without anyone realizing that it would be the start of a postwar pattern in other industries, America let the technological advantage built by the two Budds, Hal Hamilton, and Charles Kettering slowly slip away.
Speed, cost, and efficiency were the three elements that had made the streamliner such a luminous success in the 1930s. Remarkably, all three were undercut or penalized by government policies in the postwar period. For example, Railway Age reported in 1944 that the industry was thinking of fielding daytime expresses that would run between New York and Chicago in 14 hours, a two-hour improvement over the fastest overnight schedules. Cars on these trains would connect with the fleet of West Coast trains at Chicago, ma
The center paragraph, IMHO, seems to codify all that is effecting AMTRAK today.
FTA:“…Speed, cost, and efficiency were the three elements that had made the streamliner such a luminous success in the 1930s. Remarkably, all three were undercut or penalized by government policies in the postwar period. For example, Railway Age reported in 1944 that the industry was thinking of fielding daytime expresses that would run between New York and Chicago in 14 hours, a two-hour improvement over the fastest overnight schedules. Cars on these trains would connect with the fleet of West Coast trains at Chicago, making the coast run in about 36 hours, so that a passenger leaving New York on a Saturday morning would arrive at Los Angeles Monday morning. But the ICC effectively killed this idea before a single train left the station. In 1947, the agency imposed a 79-MPH limit on all passenger trains not equipped with special signaling devices in their locomotive cabs. The rule, which went into effect in 1950, further restricted trains running on lines without other trackside signals to 60 MPH…”
And again, In the third paragraph, it delivers a ‘coup de grace’ [ Legislatively?] to AMTRAK… Today, we have been gifted by Regulators with Positive Train Control (PTC) ; whose cost is still climbing, as its installation, and implementation drags on, past tghe appointed date of activation.
Rather than letting an Industry (with its knowledge of its’ own Operations and Needs) move to a similar point. Regulators and Politicians, opt with a ‘knee jerk’ reaction to a ‘high profile’ situation in a highly visible environment (California). Their sole goal is to make the Public ’
The Sunset Limited did not stop operation between New Orleans and Florida account of the Bayou Canot incident (which WOULD NOT have been prevented by PTC), it was done in by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 which destroyed CSX’s line between Mobile and New Orleans and severely damaged all the communities along the Gulf Coast between those locations.
Of Course, you are right, BaltACD. The point I was after, was that the Big Bayou Canot crash happened in an area that was close to being inaccessible to media, who seemed to make note that it happened; but was then relegated it to what almost amounted to an historical footnote(?). PTC was not going to happen until 2008. see link @ https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0621
The Chatsworth Crash happened in an area that was subject to fairly easy access. The Press News Cycle, made it a 'cause celebre
