On April 2, 1973, eastbound SSW 9063, an SD45, was in the El Monte siding waiting for a U25B west (of unknown number) to pass on the main. Instead, on a clear green signal, it entered the El Monte siding at speed, and a block or two further west collided with the stopped 9063, the U25B shearing the SD45’s cab completely off. The next day this forumist went to the site and saw the unforgettable carnage firsthand. One never forgets seeing the aftermath of such an incident. Ironically, another SP SD45, a westbound on June 25, 1973, entered the Indio Yard (Calif.) on the main, at speed, with red intermediate block signals and rear-ended a standing freight on that main. In that incident, the cab was sheared off too! Soon afterwards locomotives started to be ordered and delivered with anti-climbers, preventing cabs from being sheared off!
Were crews able to get off before impact? In what way would anti-climbers have affected these two collisions?
Euclid:
On the eastbound SSW 9063 in the siding waiting, the head brakeman I believe was already on the ground for the roll-by. The engineer (unknown if he was also on the ground) and head brakemen saw what was happening and ran from the scene. The SP U25B crew rode it out and were killed.
If the two lead locomotives had been equipped with anti-climbers, the U25B would not have climbed the SD45, and most likely would have remained upright. Of course, at that speed the U25B was traveling, it may have been a lost cause for the crew.
With fatalities involved you should be able to find the Governmental investigation and its results on line; be that ICC or NTSB.
Thanks for that information. I was curious as to how the anti-climbers would perform in a head-on collision, even if they are intended to interlock to prevent one locomotive from overriding and shearing the cab off of the other. Collision force would still have to go somewhere. One possibility would be that the two opposing locomotives would bypass each other side to side, and deflect by turning to opposite sides.
Another possibility would be that the locomotives would come together and buckle in a vertical plane with the front of each locomotive remaining aligned with the other side to side, but each with its front end tilted upward at an angle. Either of these reaction
BaltACD:
For many, many years I’ve known of and actually read many of those public reports on fatal train wrecks, including the El Monte, Calif. incident. You might want to take the time to read the reply to Euclid below …
Euclid:
In 2008 a Metrolink commuter train and a UP freight head-on crashed at Chatworth, Calif. near Los Angeles. It was on a curve, and both lead units at impact went out from the curve and ended up upright and side-by-side.
The NTSB report on that incident indicated witnesses claimed to see the Metrolink had a green signal a mile away, but since the NTSB could not duplicate a green signal, they suggested those witnesses were ‘unreliable.’ Railfan witnesses unreliable? Who is the NTSB trying to fool? Ever since that report, I never saw the NTSB quite the same way.
In that light, an NTSB report on the juicy Bertram, Calif. UP wreck down in the Salton Sea area should be coming out soon. News reports on that incident from many news sources at the time were the most incompetent hatchet jobs I’ve ever seen! Somehow I don’t believe the full truth will be reported by the NTSF on that incident either and it will join the Chatsworth incident cloaked in the mysterious …
I lost full faith in the NTSB much earlier. The derailment and fire inside the CSX Howard Street Tunnel in the Summer of 2001. The NTSB’
Recall that the engineer was communicating by cell phone with some railfans. The incident led to the banning of all cell phones, and similar devices, from the cabs of locomotives. It’s now one of the first things inspectors check.
I would question the railfan’s “observations” as well under the circumstances.
One of the eyewitnesses was reported in some sources as being the conductor as he boarded the train. Inaddition to a couple of railfans. Too bad they didn’t take a picure as it left.
They could not get the signal system to duplicate a clear or proceed signal. The position of the signal and that of the sun at the time did not cause a condition that may make an aspect to appear differently. The computerized signal logs did not contain any failure or anomaly in the signal.
They did have a new computerized dispatching system. A spokeswomen immediately and before anything else was known on the day of the event said the engineer was at fault. She was later fired for doing so.
While I mostly think it was the engineer’s fault, part of me does have some doubt. A new system, some eyewitnesses, and immediately placing blame on a dead employee makes me think that they may have, and new about, bugs in their new system. I bet once more evidence against the engineer came out, they breathed easier at the commuter authority.
I believe it’s easier for the general p
In response to the three above posters concerning signals, I post-respond very, very evasively in the hope that true railroaders can somehow read between the lines and discern what I’m saying and why! But signals have a certain super magic to them and will go from green to red to yellow, etc., etc., etc. in no set order. Did you get that railroaders? I personally saw the super wild phenomena in San Timoteo Canyon on the west slope of Beaumont Hill here in Southern California over twenty years ago not too long after the UP-SP merger. And THAT phenomena I believe the NTSF doesn’t want people to know about. Railroaders that can discern what I’m saying I strongly suggest to them that they keep it to themselves, and you know why too!
Railroaders and railfans have a safe upcoming holiday season!
Suggest you actually read how that type of searchlight signal actually functions, including how it goes through ‘red’ for every change as a safety feature.
Overmod:
Your suggestion about reading up on searchlight signals I knew all about over 50 years ago. The signals mentioned were the color light type that did not have moving parts.
So these were three-light heads with the aspects flashing on and off in complex patterns? Interesting to see what could produce actuation of the relay combinations to do that. I don’t see any way that problems with track inductance or conductance could produce this, especially if the system was using different AC ‘tones’ and vane relays or their equivalent.
You might as well go ahead and describe the super wild thing you observed, as there is no sense in hint-hint-hinting about it as if it is some highly-classified government secret.
So this was observed at least a decade before the start of the conversion to use PTC?
A signal pumping like that is rare, but happens. I’ve seen it a few times. You report it to the dispatcher and a signal maintainer checks it out. Because a signal continually doing that obviously has a defect somewhere in the circuitry, it’s not as bad as a false clear.
False clears are rare, but do happen. And they take a report of one very seriously. I’ve only seen one once, before I was working for a railroad about 45 years ago. Since working I’ve heard of a few, and most of those were when a cab signal failed to show it’s most restrictive aspect when block conditions should’ve caused it to do so.
Jeff
OK, that signal changing situation was widely misunderstood and should have been said quite differently. My gross error. Those strange signal indications that I saw were humanly controlled. The signal would display yellow for a while. Then red for a while. Then back to yellow again for a while. Then green. That occurred deliberately by UP workers! Such occurs when signals are being tested in a controlled environment. The fact that the NTSB possibly slanderously said witnesses that saw a green signal were unreliable didn’t take that into account, at least not publicly! It would seem that the NTSB and the railroad itself would not want that possibility widely known, and that the controls to do that are right in the signal box!
The above post should not be confused with the situation post that first started this thread. In that incident that wreck was caused by a serious wiring error that infected the whole SP system.
I can’t even begin to comprehend what you are talking about.
Signal testing is a thing. So is local control for various reasons.
It occurs to me that this sounds suspiciously like someone setting an engine crew up for a banner test.
Signal Maintainers are required to do periodic testing on ALL signal appliances on their territory. When testing at a Control Point the tests are conducted with the knowledge and permission of the Control Operator (Operator or Train Dispatcher) testing will be done so trains are not affected.
When a new Control Point or a revised Control Point are implemented as a result of a Signal Suspension all routes and and the expected signal indications are tested exhaustively BEFORE the location is place in operation.
Railroads take the operation of the signal systems very seriously.
How do you know this wasn’t caused by blocks dropping and then clearing up again a moderate distance away? This could be caused by another train doing some switching or changing direction a couple blocks away, or perhaps MOW equipment without insulated axles, or even some trespasser getting their ATV stuck in a way that touches both rails.
Signal testing in CTC territory is done with the dispatcher and maintainers working together.