A Critique of the SOUTHWEST CHIEF bus-bridge plan

As forum readers probably know Amtrak has proposed to replace the SOUTHWEST CHIEF from Dodge City, KS (or in a slightly less horrific variant from La Junta, CO) to Albuquerque, NM with a “bus-bridge” for 550 miles effective January 1, 2019. This is being blamed on the fact that the BNSF/former Santa Fe mainline over Raton and Glorietta Passes lacks Positive Train Control (PTC). But except for 80 miles in the Rail Runner commuter district west of Lamy to Isleta, NM the line is legally exempt from the PTC requirement. In the Rail Runner segment an extension to 2020 is expected to b e ok’d well before December 31, 2018. But even if this were denied the “bus bridge” would need to be barely 80 miles from Lamy, NM through Albuquerque to either Belen or Isleta, NM.

The article below reflects my critique of this plan in much greater detail. This will appear in the “Callboy” magazine of the Mass Bay RRE next month and is also posted on multiple rail-focused Facebook groups and to the sites of newspapers along the SW CHIEF route.


I would expect the ridership to dwindle down significantly after the “bus bridge” plan is implemented. Amtak likely is depending upon that, as well.

There is absolutely nothing in this proposal that should lead to anything less than the expulsion of Anderson in disgrace.

Also, the whole busses and stub ended trains thing is one of the dumbest proposals I have seen. So many other much cheaper options where the passengers stay on the train and the train safely operates over track once a day.

In the most draconian scenario, just discontinue the train West of Kansas City and use the extra equipment elsewhere.

Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined.

I think he is still trying to preserve the National LD Network. Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause…will cost Amtrak probably several times what it’s annual operating subsidy is for the train.

If that is his real concern then just yank the plug on the train West of KC or reroute via Newton and OKC to DFW and yank the Texas Eagle / Heartland Flyer both.

If he is that risk averse - time for him to shut Amtrak down in it’s entirety. Every wheel that rolls is a potential catastrophe.

I do not understand your point about “little used track section”. The track either meets standards or it doesn’t. The probability of washout has nothing to do with traffic density, but agree that if passenger trains are the only traffic on the line, then a passenger train is more likely to find it.

You are right about liability, but that attaches when you run the train and is largely independent of trafic density on a line segment. In fact, I would argue that likelyhood of an Ax and consequences increase as traffic density increases.

As Balt points out in his adjacent post, every train start is a potential disaster, just like starting your automobile is. Chicken little is in charge at ATK!

Mac

The view that Amtrak’s attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is somehow some sort of attempt to save the National Network is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.

An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals).

The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed.

And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here’s a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage–all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy.

VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT.

ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT.

DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME.

CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA.

EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR.

CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train’s most used stops–Glenwood Spring

Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.

Except in this case there is precedent. Amtrak tried it this way with the Phoenix line and it led to sabotage and a derailment. So it does not surprise me if when the same case occurs again elsewhere on the map they are more cautious.

The Cardinal and Sunset Limited are still running and neither really should be based on any comparisons to other LD routes sanity check. No attempt to kill either of those two trains yet. So I don’t see any evidence of this.

Further, Amtrak has not yet publicly backed away from any proposal by states to pay for expansion yet.

[quote user=“Railvt”]

The view that Amtrak’s attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.

An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals).

The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed.

And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here’s a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage–all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy.

VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT.

ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT.

DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME.

CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA.

EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR.

CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train’s most used stops–Glenwood Springs, CO and Grand Jct.

Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. There was a very slight (2000 riders) decline in the last year only, caused by Amtrak’s failure to restore the third coach during peak holiday seasons, despite near daily sell-outs over segments like Kansas City to Chicago.

The “dramatic cost increases” that Amtrak claims are false as well. They admit that their share of the threatened section is only about $3,000,000 per year, but further ignore BNSF’s repeated promise to pay for 20 years of Class Four 79mph maintenance once welded rail is fully in place over the line. A large part of that is in the Tiger Nine grant’s $25,000,000 which Amtrak has effectively torpedoed by refusing to pay its $3,000,000 match that was specifically promised as part of the grant application.

This superb analysis from Abe Zumwalt at the Rail Passengers Association goes into the full spectrum of reasons for supporting the SW CHIEF and debunks myths posited by Amtrak’s management. Feel free to repost and use this at will!

Carl Fowler, RPA Vice Chair

Fact Checking the Amtrak Proposal to Replace the Southwest Chief with Bus Service in Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.

The Southwest Chief would effectively cease to exist if the proposed bus bridge from Dodge City, KS or La Junta, CO to Albuquerque is implemented. While presented as a decision based in concern for passenger safety and cost reductions, the plan would make passengers less safe, dissipate the service’s economic impact across the corridor, and—given the resulting collapse of ridership and revenue—effectively save no tax dollars on operational expenses.

The plan to truncate the Southwest Chief with a bus bridge would also shift costs to states that have the most to lose from its truncation. In its presentation on the proposed bus bridge, Amtrak points to plans for service expansions in Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma as evidence of its commitment to the region.

However, the cost of these services would be borne by the states under PRIIA Sec. 209. While the continued presence of the Chief would in fact facilitate the development of these services with valuable passenger connections, the development of these urban corridor services shouldn’t come at the expense of rural communities that currently depend on Amtrak National Network service.

The bus bridge will worsen the performance metrics Amtrak is using to justify this truncation without lowering taxpayer costs.

The Chief’s ridership trends are steady: Amtrak’s earlier statement that the number of passengers using the Chief is “steadily declining” is false. Ridership volume in FY 2017 was down only 1% from its peak in FY 2015;

Is that just to maintain the track or does it include…

snow removal costs, dispatching costs, inspecting of the line prior to each Amtrak passenger train run, free overtime when Amtrak is not running on schedule, etc, etc. Also, say an Amtrak locomotive fails and they cannot make it up the grades, where is the nearest staffed crew change point with a spare locomotive and crew? Are all those costs covered by the BNSF agreement? What about inflation, does BNSF swallow inflation beyond what they estimated or do they pass the hat again? I have not seen the verbatium agreement itself to see exactly what BNSF agreed to pay for. However, I think your expecting a LOT if you think that agreement is all inclusive of all costs with protecting Amtraks schedule.

Most of that is irrelevant though. Amtrak is just asking for a business case for financial sustainability of the train over the next 20 years.

Back when the SWC hauled Mail & Express it was close to covering its “above-the-rail” costs. The problem then and now is that is not the goal set by the in their own eyes reform types for the National Network.

They still believe that passenger trains have to finance their infrastructure, equipment, and operations from ticket revenue. Highways come no where close to self-financing their infrastructure from the fuel taxes collected only between exits let alone covering government borne accident costs. Instead the use of locally financed streets is also taxed, thus leveraging funds toward highways. It was what was needed to get modern highways at low fuel tax rates, but it is a leveraged investment that can skew markets.

What is needed is an agreement on a equivalent level (to highways) of public investment in the below-the-rail infrastructure, large-loss insurance, and terminal costs of passenger rail atop which a business case is made to run a service on ticket revenue.

This same situation is why of course we both have no rail service to Phoenix, AZ and why we cannot agree to reinvest in National Network equipment to cash in on the large potential for more revenue above the fixed costs of running a route.

Additionally, why could two through cutoff cars not be operated accross the Kansas City transfer or the Williams Jct non-stop? The transfer times are either fairly early or late. All the infrastructure is there, with two through running station tracks at KCT and a crew base nearby in both cases. The Missouri River Rail Runners have to run with a minimum axle count of 30 axles

Every Amtrak track access contract includes reasonable payment from Amtrak for maintenance above the standards needed for freight only. BNSF have been candid that they want to keep Raton as (if nothing else) a safety valve. They have not proposed outright closure. Before the Tiger Grants began the deepest threat was to go to Class Three dark territory. Of course their view could change, but they have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Tiger process.

Even after current New Mexico Governor Martinez reneged on the promise under previous governor Bill Richardson to buy the line to the Colorado state line, they kept things up very well Indeed with no Federal funds yet for New Mexico they’ve been replacing the semaphore signals still in service near Las Vegas, NM.

By the bye on snow removal, engine pilot wedge plows have sufficed in recent years. The climate could of course revert and even if it doesn’t there will I’m sure be a deep snow year eventually, but this is not an issue anything like it was decades ago. Even the Moffat Line hasn’t seen a rotary in decades.

I am exploring if the net cost to all levels of government (state and federal) would increase if the SWC was split as proposed with the 70% loss of revenue. So little variable cost is taken away and of course additional costs would be added in to start trains in the middle of the old route. This might go agains the text of the current CFR language as the intent was to reduce cost to governments.

Makes me wonder if the better course to follow in the west would be to run a UP-like City of Everywhere train out of Chicago twice a day; to Omaha, Denver, SLC. Then split to Vegas-LA, Reno-Sacramento-Oakland, and Boise-Portland-Seattle. Run the Sunset daily as hookup to Texas Eagle at San Antonio. Either keep the Eagle via Little Rock-St Louis, or run Dallas-OkC-Wichita-KC.

In the midwest, focus on the Midwest Initiative routes.