You can download it from here: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=464846&docketID=61332&mkey=96974
I haven’t found a way to link the pdf directly.
Documents regarding 501 are now in this docket: https://t.co/E48qUFYYSq
Regards, Volker
Jim200,
Thanks for providing that information. So at a little more than 660 feet from the point of derailment in the curve, the train was traveling at 80 mph. At that point the engineer made an 11 lb. reduction and traveled another 175 ft. before the speed began to drop from 80 mph. So he was 485 ft. from the point of derailment in the curve when the train began slowing from 80 mph, toward the required speed of 30 mph.
I wonder if an emergency application at 80 mph, 660 feet from the point of derailment, would have slowed enough to have prevented the derailment.
I would like to know if Amtrak trained this engineer to use the service application that he did instead of using an emergency application, as he said in his interview.
I would also like to know if the service application would have decelerated just as quickly as an emergency application, as the engineer claims he was taught by Amtrak.
As I recall, initially, the NTSB said that the engineer reached for the independent brake and made an application, but never touched the automatic brake. Was this report in error from misinterpreting what is shown on the video?
The engineer said that he did not feel the brake application he made take hold, and this raises the question about an equipment failure. However, he was only a few seconds away from disaster.&nb
“the engineer made several 10 psi reductions in brake pipe pressure, but the brake cylinder pressure remained at 0.0 psi. However, the speed shows that the train was braking, which would indicate problems in brake cylinder data.”
Zero p.s.i. brake cylinder pressure would indicate that the engineer used the ‘bail off’ feature for whatever reason.
What I find most disturbing is that when he realized that the train was is in imminent danger he did not apply the brakes in emergency. If not doing so was part of his training that would be nothing short of criminal.
My understanding, and I could be wrong, this was the engineer’s first experience with the Charger type locomotive. If it was the first experience, he has no knowledge base to draw up in how the locomtive and train will respond to control inputs. Without experience, everything he experiences becomes a level of information overload.
So - the engineer had operated ONE Southbound training trip at the controls of a different locomotive than he was operating on the derailment train, a locomotive he had not operted previously.
[quote user=“Euclid”]
Jim200,
Thanks for providing that information. So at a little more than 660 feet from the point of derailment in the curve, the train was traveling at 80 mph. At that point the engineer made an 11 lb. reduction and traveled another 175 ft. before the speed began to drop from 80 mph. So he was 485 ft. from the point of derailment in the curve when the train began slowing from 80 mph, toward the required speed of 30 mph.
A clear indication that he had no idea where he was.
I wonder if an emergency application at 80 mph, 660 feet from the point of derailment, would have slowed enough to have prevented the derailment.
It should have been a natural reaction when he sensed the danger.
I would like to know if Amtrak trained this engineer to use the service application that he did instead of using an emergency application, as he said in his interview.
If they did I would consider them criminally responsible.
I would also like to know if the service application wou
A clear indicator of poor training and poor supervision is it not?
Also clear evidence of political pressure as the Charger locomotive was WSDOT’s ‘baby’ and their desire to have it on the inaugural run.
Caving to political pressure without regard to safety. I would hope it would be but I highly doubt that will be brought out in the NTSB report.
Damn phone!!#%÷×+%
[quote user=“Jim200”]
Euclid
The key point I would like to know is the derailment speed for that train entering the curve, and whether maximum braking starting upon the engineer’s relization of the circumstances, would have prevented the derailment.
I would like to know whether the brake application was mostly ineffective, as the engineer has stated, and if so, why?
There is a lot of info in the locomotive event recorder graphs in the link below, but it takes time to understand the squiggly lines. Figure 2 shows the trip from Seattle versus time in 50 second increments, and shows that the engineer slowed from 70mph to 30mph in about 60 seconds and accelerated from 0.0mph to 77mph in about 140 seconds. It also shows that the engineer made several 10 psi reductions in brake pipe pressure, but the brake cylinder pressure remained at 0.0 psi. However, the speed shows that the train was braking, which would indicate problems in brake cylinder data.
Figure 3 shows that in the last 10 minutes and about 14 miles, the engineer made about 28 changes to the throttle as he was trying to maintain a top speed which varied from 76mph to 83mph with four times below 79mph and seven times above.
Figure 4 makes the data in the last 3 miles even easier to read. Near 1.5 miles from the end of data and the locomotive at 80mph, the engineer reduces throttle from T4 to T2 and it takes 7 seconds for the tractive effort to reduce. At 3/4 miles and 81mph the engineer reduces the throttle from T2 to Idle in four seconds, and it takes 8 seconds for the tractive effort to go to zero. Two seconds after Idle with the locomotive at 82mph, the engineer applies about 8 ps
[quote user=“jeffhergert”]
Jim200
Euclid
The key point I would like to know is the derailment speed for that train entering the curve, and whether maximum braking starting upon the engineer’s relization of the circumstances, would have prevented the derailment.
I would like to know whether the brake application was mostly ineffective, as the engineer has stated, and if so, why?
There is a lot of info in the locomotive event recorder graphs in the link below, but it takes time to understand the squiggly lines. Figure 2 shows the trip from Seattle versus time in 50 second increments, and shows that the engineer slowed from 70mph to 30mph in about 60 seconds and accelerated from 0.0mph to 77mph in about 140 seconds. It also shows that the engineer made several 10 psi reductions in brake pipe pressure, but the brake cylinder pressure remained at 0.0 psi. However, the speed shows that the train was braking, which would indicate problems in brake cylinder data.
(Apparently the NTSB reorganized their website and this link on the 501 locomotive event recorder doesn’t work)
The lack of pressure in
Thank you for your ‘tech support’.
"he said that he had been taught by Amtrak that the service application would stop the train just as quickly as the emergency application. "
That is absolutely untrue!!
I am assuming that you mean what is untrue is the claim said to have been made by Amtrak that the service application would stop just as quickly as the emergency application. If that is so, why do you think Amtrak would make such a claim? They may hold that as an erroneous belief, but it seems so basic to understand that there is a reason for the emergency application being available. The reason is the occurrance of an emergency. If the service application could get the job done as well as the emergency application, why have the emergency application function available?
So, is there some other possible reason why Amtrak would hold the erroneous beleif? Is it possible that they see some downside to an emergency application, and would prefer not to use it? I think that may be possible. I am not saying that they would be correct in that position, but I think it is possible that they have convinced themsleves that the emergency application should be avoided. Of course this all assumes that the engineer was accuately describing what Amtrak had told him about the service application being equivalent to the emergency application.
You assume correctly and if that is true Amtrak should be held criminally responsible.
I already posted the air brake requirements frm the PRIIA 305-005 specification about 10 pages back:
Full-service, air only for a single locomotive from 125 mph, the stopping distance shall be no more than 9,000 ft
Emergency, air only for a single locomotive from 125 mph, the stopping distance shall be no more than 8,000 ft
And: Pneumatic priority shall be given in emergency and dynamic priority in service rate applications (blended braking)
That translates to brake decelerations of 1.27 mph/sec for full service and 1.43 mph/sec for emergency application, air only.
The Talgo Series 8 cars have brake decelerations of 2.3 mph/sec in full service and 2.7 mph/sec in emergency. See page 32:
www.whsra.com/sites/all/files/Shannond/20111103%20Talgo-Western%20High%20Speed%20Rail%20Alliance.pdf
I can only see on paper that the difference between full-service and emergency brake deceleration is much smaller than I expected. How blended braking fits into the picture I don’t know.
Volker,
I do recall you posting that information a while back. I am convinced that the emergency application is typically faster, but Amtrak’s alleged statement to the contrary makes me at least wonder if there could be an exception for certain trains. I doubt that there is, and I also believe that Amtrak may have never told the engineer of 501 that the two braking application will produce the same effect. But also, as I mentioned earlier, I think anyone might find reasons to have preferred to use a service application instead of the emergency application when faced with what would constitute an emergency situation. We have had discussions about that point before in the General forum.
Maybe this will all come out in the NTSB report, but I am just framing questions at this point. So I ask what the difference is in stopping distance for two different brake applications with the locomotives and rolling stock that made up #501.
Here is another question: I understand that the service application takes more time to propagate throughout the train, whereas, the emergency application propagates faster because each car dumps its share of the brake pipe charge. But with each of the two applications, what is the maximum amount of brake cylinder pressure that results?
I looked at page 32 in the link on Talgo equipment where it gives braking deceleration. I assume this is with maximum application to an individual car brake. When applying this information to a whole train, would there not also be an additiona
" When applying this information to a whole train, would there not also be an additional time advantage for the emergency application due to its quicker setup from car to car throughout the train? "
Absolutely.
I reposted the decelerations trying to base the discussion, why the engineer said/concluded full service and emergency application have the same effect, on some data.
The Talgo Series 8 differs from other trains that it is quite short, 672 ft without locomotive, and has disk brakes on all wheels but not unusual for passenger cars.
I found information about brake propagation rates in two different sources.
How true I don’t know.
I think the Talgo brake data are correct for all brakes applied only.
Regards, Volker