True. Having it on at that one point by service introduction would likely have prevented the accident.
It is a sad state of affairs when we have to install/construct ‘features’ to operate the train instead of installing/constructing them as an assistance to the operator. Time and again I have traveled on my former division and ‘felt’ PTC operating the train more often than not. I find that distressing.
I’ve had to make a few small adjustments to how I run trains with PTC active. Isn’t distressting to me - just a neccasary action (but yeah, you can’t run as smooth as before). PTC is designed to be overly cautious - a slop factor built in,if you will.
What I found distressing was that the amount of penalty applications indicated poor familiarity with the territory. Automation addiction is a real factor in today’s operations. Electronic devices can and will fail, wayside signage can be vandalized and that folks is the RX for disaster. From my experience and from recent conversations with former co-workers there are folks out there still who should not be operating trains. It is my fervent hope that Amtrak’s ‘luck’ continues otherwise we are in for more human error tradgedies.
I’ve had PTC give me penalties for no reason. System just freaked out going over a switch for some reason. Isn’t always the hogger. Heck, I’ve had it dump me on a clear signal in the middle of nowhere.
Yes that is an added ‘assistance’ but does not preclude proper training and vetting.
Some thing else to consider. All of these safety and backup features do add to the running time. Amtrak’s Metroliners of 1969 had faster or equal running times to the Acela of 2020. I remember being the fireman (1963) on the Merchants Limited eastbound from Grand Central Terminal and the due time by New Rochelle Junction was 5:27P.M. and 30 seconds!!! So much for the ‘high speed trains’ of the future eh?
Yes those are annoying ocurrences but being familiar with the territory these penalties were happening at speed restrictions.
Something to remember. The curve and bridge was not always there. The line was rather straight before I-5 was built. The line was a secondary line ( NP, GN, UP; actual owner who ?) with a rather low MAS ( anyone know ?). When WA DOT planned for the crossing it decided to make the curved crossing to shorten the bridge length. I guess no one anticipated the future use of the route to 79 MPH?
It is too bad the DOT could not get highway funds to straighten the route back to its original alignment. Tried to find before and after topo maps but had no luck.
Have to wonder if the original agreement between owner RR and WASH DOT had a provision that the route would be straightened if the owner RR ever needed to have higher speed trains on the Route. If so wouldn’t such an agreement have survived the sale to WASH DOT ?
Streak,
NP track charts do not support your second sentence. Where did you get that idea from?
Original owner was NP. Basic line was built in 1891 with about .5 miles at Nisqually (Jct with 1914 double track main line) realigned in 1914 to make a junction at Nisqually. There is no evidence on the track chart of a realignment for a highway ever.
Mac McCulloch
After all the testimony, all the investigations, interviews etc. what stands out glaringly is Amtrak’s ineptitude. Amtrak is the cause of this and other human error tragedies. The participants/‘culprits’ are victims, victims of Amtrak’s arrogance. What we have here is the unknowing being hired by the unknowing, instructed by the unknowing, supervised by the unknowing and turned loose on the unknowing, the general public.
Read RFE Beatson’s interview with the NTSB in which he states:" What happened there, as far as I understand, they – initially, no one was qualified as you probably understand. Right. . So the two agencies involved in the territory concerned, one was Sound Transit and one was Tacoma Rail. Sound Transit goes to Lakewood, and Tacoma Rail goes from Lakewood to Nisqually. And as I understand it, you’re in the testing runs, which were done – well, the more recent testing runs, which were done, I believe, in early November. That was when Chris Bradasich was up there with Tacoma Rail and Lakewood – sorry – Tacoma Rail and Sounder pilots, and he himself got qualified through them. I wasn’t involved in any of that. And then, subsequently, with Chris being qualified, he then became the lead qualifier for us. And then, if you like, it was handed down. Once Josh got qualified, he could qualify people. Once I got qualified, I could qualify people."
Does this not offer proof that Amtrak’s hiring, vetting, training and supervisory procedures are dangerous and the major contributory to the Dupont/Port Defiance tragedy?
“All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience”. This was something Amtrak was offered early on and chose not to accept.
Probably yes. And the speed limits preceding the sharp curve should have been lower farther away.
I don’t dispute your observation but a properly trained operator must/would know where he is at all times.
Mac. I spoke wrong. However if you zoom on the attached 194 topo map you will see that the RR appears to have curved around the accident location. It curves around with what appears to be US-99 ? So did US 99 become I-5 at that location.?I Have not located an earlier topo map.
WA_Anderson Island_239826_1940_62500_geo (1).pdf
Streak,
I do not understand what you are trying to say with ‘the railroad curved around the location’. My description would be that the railroad was built with two curves to make an S shape crossing of a small valley.
I am 99.9% sure that one side of current I-5 is on the former route of US 99 in the area where the derailment occurred. I have driven I-5 here many times and have noticed very different designs of the bridges that carry the two track main line over the freeway.
The highway is irrelevant to the railroad location.
Mac
I believe the theory was that the line was relocated during the I-5 construction to increase the angle that the bridge crossed the road. However it looks like it looks like it was that way with US-99 as far back as circa 1940
The point I am trying to make is that the NP track charts do no indicate a line change in this area except a bit at Nisqually to have the original through branch line of 1891 make a reasonable connection to the 1914 built double track main line.
There is no evidence to support the theory of relocation of any part of the S curve.
Mac
Mac
According to the December 1, 1959 edition of the Northern Pacific Tacoma Division Special Instructions, the maximum speeds permitted on the Seventeenth Sub (American Lake Line) were 30 mph for Freight and 35 mph for Passenger. Less than half of todays 79 mph maximum.
It should be noted that in addition to the sharp curve where the derailment took place, this location is also on a significant descending grade. Something that I don’t recall ever hearing reported. Though difficult to read, this can be seen on page 3 of the Condensed Profile found here: http://www.nprha.org/NP%20Track%20Charts%20%20Profiles/Tac%2016th%2017th%2018th%2020th%20subs.pdf
On the profile, near the bottom, you’ll find the curve located at MP 10.1. The bottom line of the profile shows that the maximum speed was 30 mph for the entire decent to Nisqually. Unfortunately, the line, as rebuilt for Amtrak, allowed (still allows?) a speed of 79 mph on 1.5 miles of descending grade right up to the infamous 30 mph curve, most of which is on (if I’m reading the profile correctly) a 1.26 percent descending grade. To permit 79 mph on a steep, descending grade immediately in advance of a 30 mph curve was (and may still be) the height of stupidity.
Allan
Allen,
Your description is correct.
I do not agree with your height of stupidity comment however. There is a point where a brake application, perhaps even a split reduction, will bring a train to 30 MPH at the beginning of the curve. Passenger trains have much higher braking ratios than do freight trains, and are much more consistent in their response than freight trains. This is train handling 101.
The height of stupidity is that ATK supervision did not locate that spot, prove it themselves, and put each trainee in the seat for about six repetitions.
I would also point out that this line segment has many practical markers along it, in addition to the advance speed board two miles out which is near the top of the grade. There is a roadway overpass about where I suspect the application needs to be made, and a 24 hour truck weigh station that is always all lit up on the left across the freeway, in the same area. It is not a tunnel of trees that all look alike. The richness of markers makes the failure to brake astounding to me.
The immediate cause of this wreck was a training failure. I think some of the blame also attaches to WSDOT wanting to get the reroute done ASAP, and ATK working against a published date for a timetable change that incorporated the shorter time due to using the ‘new’ line, plus slowness of the owner to get contractors off the property so training could begin. The politicos and ATK bosses were committed to that start date, period.
ATK management failed to make sure their engineers were properly trained and supervised. ATK had two last chances to prevent this. One was for management to insist on sufficient time to train their guys, that is ignore the timetable change date by a week or two or three. The second failure was to properly train in the short time available, and to have supervision in the cab for first southward run of all engineers. The risk should have been obvious to any professional railroader who saw the line in the flesh,
And that is very true. Problem was that there appear to have been no professional railroaders associated with this.
I noted at the time how similar this was to the earlier cluster involving Amtrak 188, where inattention to situational awareness coupled with poor infrastructure and signaling deficiencies resulted in high-speed catastrophe.
Your point about the six repetitions is good (although I think more over a longer time might have been better if possible – we know it ‘wouldn’t have been’, but still…). But I think I’d have settled for TWO repetitions with full-attention oversight … or one under the anticipated dark operating conditions.
I won’t read the engineer’s transcript again - my ejection fraction is 11 and a-fib too bad to risk the stress because I can’t stop the rage at it - but if you need an objective evidentiary reason why little speedboards and an unrecognizable sight picture don’t justify a 79mph line butt-ended to a hard 30mph curve… protected by a yellow searchlight aspect!.. that alone is really sufficient.
What i find unnerving in the present context is that WSDOT either still doesn’t appreciate the professional-discipline part, or assigned a spokesman who has not a clue even that it might be important, and doesn’t seem to care other than a sort of CYA and shrugging.
I do understand and accept that there is little real concern when professional railroaders operate a line that goes immediately from 79 to 30 without functional ATS. But that was manifestly not the situation with 501, and as Joe points out, until the professionalism can be ensured, 188 and 501 are unlikely to be the last of these utterly avoidable horrors.
When Keolis outbid Amtrak for the operations of VRE’s commuter operations - for a period of a little over THREE MONTHS Keolis personnel were making training runs over the various VRE routes - Fredericksburg to Washington via CSX and Manassas to Washington via NS Alexandria CSX routing. Generally they operated a training round trip with crews on each route each night. On weekends, when VRE did not have scheduled operations, they would operate several training runs on each route during daylight, in addition to the night time runs.
I have no idea how many Engine and Train crews were being trained, however, I fully believe those being trained got multiple trips at the throttle of the equipment they would be operating - both locomotives and cab cars - over the territory and in the conditions they would likely experience.
I could be wrong, however, I believe the Keolis VRE crews are fully qualified on both of the routes they operate.