A young woman was killed late Friday evening at a normally protected Amtrak crossing in University Park, just south of Chicago. Apparently, a track repair crew forgot to reactivate the crossing signals according to the story:
http://www.southtownstar.com/news/2176650,042010uptrain.article
Read about the accident the other day online. Was surprised today to hear that the signals were left disabled. I know I always approach all crossings, including crossings with signals, as though a train is approaching and am always prepared to stop since I never go by what the crossing signals are doing. In this case, even though the drivers should check the tracks before crossing, it sounds like CN could be in trouble over this since it was their workers that had disabled the signals and not a mechanical failure.
Kevin
There was an incident a while back which was very similar. It was a rural crossing and a car full of kids (or at least a couple). While there may have been arguments that the teens should have seen the train coming, the key sticking point was the crossing protection having been disabled and the signal maintainer returning after the accident (but while authorities were still on-scene) and trying to pull the shunt.
That said, it’ll be hard to defend in court…
Wow! Saddening tragedy. Poor Amtrak, although innocent will likely be included in the multi-million dollar lawsuit that may come at it from the lady’s family. Canadian National is going to sink in this one. Likely the guy in charge of that track maintenance crew is going to be grilled as well. No winners in this case.
Disabling malfunctioning crossing protection while awaiting parts to repair it, or taking the protection out of service during major track work are not uncommon occurrences.
There are procedures to be followed first of which is to notify the Train Dispatcher so that the appropriate ‘Stop & Flag’ train order can be issued to all trains operating over the crossing(s) that have disabled crossing protection. If this was done, and the train order was issued to the train involved then the responsibility flows to the train crew involved. If it wasn’t done, the onus is on the Signal Maintainer. If the Maintainer got the appropriate information to the Train Dispatcher, but the Dispatcher did not get it to ALL the affected trains then the onus is on the Train Dispatcher.
Hello,
The Chicago Tribune is now reporting that the CN crew witnessed the crash:
"Believing they had fixed malfunctioning railroad gates and warning lights, Canadian National Railway workers let an Amtrak train pass through the intersection at full speed as a test, only to watch it barrel into a car on the tracks and kill the driver behind the wheel, according to sources involved in the accident probe.
Investigators interviewed a CN worker who saw the line of vehicles converging on the University Park crossing as the Chicago-bound train approached at 78 mph, then ran toward the SUV driven onto the tracks by Katie Lunn, a Chicago dance instructor.
Desperately hoping to save her, the worker got to within about 30 feet of Lunn’s car when it was broadsided by the passenger train Friday night.
‘The CN crew came back specifically to test the crossing system with that northbound Amtrak train at about 9:30,’ said a rail safety investigator who spoke with the CN technician who tried to save Lunn, 26, who lived in Lincoln Park. "
Full story:
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/04/university-park-amtrak-crash-lunn-canadian-national.html
CC
Well, I don’t know what actually happened in this accident. But it suggests a pattern I’ve seen before. When a signal crew “deranges” grade crossing or wayside signal circuitry (which is what apparently happened here), railroads have very precise testing procedures which are supposed to be followed to make sure the signals are working properly before the signal crew goes away. One of the other notes in this string suggests the signal crew let the Amtrak train go through at track speed to verify everything was working properly. That suggests that they didn’t do all of the required testing and were taking a short cut. If they had done all of the testing, they would have known whether a train would actuate the signals. Of course, you’re right – if a “stop & flag” order were issued to the train crew, and they didn’t obey it (or the distpatcher didn’t convey it to the crew), then the signal crew wouldn’t have the primary responsibility. But my guess is that the signal crew simply didn’t do all of the re
[:(] The young lady killed in that accident was from Fort Dodge Iowa A real Iowa connection here Larry
Question**: When testing a crossing this way shouldn’t there be someone on each side of the gates to flag autos to a stop maybe with a fuse at nights? That way if circuit does not work cars are stopped anyway? Of course maybe only the one maintainer was there.**
Falcon48 - I have not before seen or heard the use of the term ‘‘deranged’’ in the context of disabling or ‘‘un-arranging’’ railroad grade crossing signals - only in the more common context of a severely mentally unstable or ill person, etc. But sure enough, a quick Google search discloses that it has been used in the railroad signalling literature and references as at least as far back as 1903. And here’s the first 2 meanings under a definition that I found on-line that corroborates your usage of it, per: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deranged
1. To disturb the order or arrangement of.
2. To upset the normal condition or functioning of.
I was wondering the same thing too as blue streak 1 mentions above earlier today - until the correct operation of the crossing signals was tested and confirmed, why wasn’t this crossing being flagged, and with a fusee at night ? The number of personnel shouldn’t have been an issue - when a conductor is ‘flagging’ across a crossing as part of normal switching operations, or when a crossing is subject to a ‘flagging order’, there’s only 1 of him/ her then, too, and that’s enough to get the job done.
Putting a far more cynical and devious spin on this, I can see a plaintiff’s attorney essentially claiming that the railroad’s employee
The Chicago press is rightly having a field day with this one:
BY RICHARD ROEPER Chicago Sun-Times Columnist
You read about the promising life and the many accomplishments of 26-year-old Katie Lunn, how beloved she was by so many, and your heart breaks.
But nobody outside those who knew and loved her must feel worse about her tragic death than the Canadian National Railway track crew that was working on the crossing last Friday morning.
“A track crew inadvertently turned off the gates and warning lights at [the] rail crossing,” said an online report from the Chicago Tribune.
" ‘This was human error,’ said an investigator, who asked not to be identified.
If that’s true, the nightmare gripping Katie’s loved ones is even darker. Some accidents, while so devastating that you never really recover from the loss, just can’t be prevented. This does not sound like one of those accidents.
The CN crews reportedly were working to fix a flaw in a signal system that left the lights still flashing and the gates in place well after a train had cleared, creating traffic delays. They thought they’d fixed the problem – “but they actually deactivated the warning system, creating an unprotected crossing that provided motorists no indication of oncoming trains, officials said,” according to the Tribune.
An investigation is ongoing, but I’m trying to figure out: How can there not be redundant safeguards in place? On the human side, how do you walk away from a job like that without making sure everything’s working again? How do you not conduct a quick test to ensure the settings for the barriers, lights and bells are good to go?
Let me clarify my question. If the CN maintainer wanted to test the signal at speed ( I can see the maintainer’s resoning that the crossing gate system might have worked at slower speeds but not 79MPH) then there should have been someone to flag the crossing when the Amtrak train reported 1 mile from crossing. There may have been reports of the gate system not working at 79 MPH speed.
Is this procedure done whenever any crossing is modified for a higher track speed than original speeds ?
edit: maybe the short Amtrak train did not shunt the crossing system where as a heavy freight might?
I don’t want to sound like I am piling on the victim in this crash, but it raises a perplexing question. Drivers are supposed to yield at grade crossings no matter whether the signals and gates are activated or not, and no matter whether the signals and gates fail to activate upon the approach of a train.
The crossbuck alone requires a driver to yield, and for a driver to yield, a driver must know that no train is approaching before the driver crosses. That is the law according to the FRA, Operation Lifesaver, and the state DOTs.
While there may be some hair-splitting over what it means to yield in merging situations where no collision occurs, it is 100% clear that if a driver gets hit by a train, that driver did not yield.
Therefore, in cases where a driver gets hit by a train at a grade crossing where the signals have failed to activate, that driver has failed to yield, as the law requires.
So, who is at fault in such a collision? To most p
When, oh when, are people going to accept the fact that they really do have personal responsibility to take reasonable precautions in such instances and stop blaming the big, bad railroads?
Civil cases don’t necessarily work out they way. In order for that defense to work, it would have to be shown that everybody else did exactly what they were supposed to do. I think the term is contributory neglegence. It might be employed to try to mitigate the award, but when those kinds of cases go to a jury trial, the jury usually gets to set the award. I am placing my bets on a big award for the plaintiff.
By the way, there may be some exceptions, but Amtrak’s contracts with railroads indemnify them from damages due to anything involving an Amtrak train. It is likely that Amtrak will have to pick up the tab for this one.
Bucyrus, I’ve often thought the same thing. One of my biggest peeves is when I read of a car/train collision at crossings that only have crossbucks, but the press reports as being “unprotected.” I guess going by their line of reasoning, most road intersections are also “unprotected.” Most only have stop or yield signs.
Still, since there are warning lights/gates the railroad is going to have a higher degree of liability. My question is in the way the media is reporting this. Are they just reporting the news, or are they tainting the jury pool. I see this with almost all criminal cases too. If the media likes the victim, reporting is slanted against the accused. If the media champions the accused, the victim is reviled to just short of saying the victim deserved what they got. (I suppose I, and others, are also a bit guilty of this, hence the Darwin Awards we are so willing to give out.)
Jeff
Well, in this case it is the railroad’s fault, since the railroad’s employees turned off the safety devices. If the crew was at the scene waiting to see if the gates worked, they should have flagged the crossing. Remember, these guys apparently thought the gates were working when in fact they had turned them off. Pretty negligent.
Depending on the location, the term “inadequately protected” would more accurate. If I were you, I would be careful with the use of phrases like the “Darwin Award” even if it is an inside joke. If lawyers get hold of that, it could be used to influence juries, convincing them that engineers view road crossings as an opportunity for sport.
Who says Darwin Awards are only handed out for railroad crossing accidents? The news is full of stories about people who get themselves into predicaments, then blame everyone but themselves. Or the next of kin blames everyone else.
You are right about one thing, though. Lawyers are usually involved.
Jeff
Certainly there is negligence on the part of the railroad, but the driver broke the law by not yielding. How can this not count? The yield requirement is not suspended just because the signals are inoperable.