http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/01/23-engineer-sues-amtrak-over-fatal-cascades-derailment
Cue Joe to say “I rest my case!”
[:)]
Hopefully Brian will post this Newswire story openly here so non-subscribers can read it. The story is that the engineer who crashed the Cascades Talgo on its ‘maiden run’ is suing Amtrak for “insufficient training”.
It is possible to read the comments on the Newswire story without access to the article itself. So far the readers are not very sympathetic to the engineer.
My suspicion is that this is almost purely a legal ploy, and I look forward to further informed discussion on this.
Court documents, and any trial (if it comes to that) could shed some interesting light on exactly what the training consisted of. It seems like I’ve read some references to the nature and extent of the training, but none were first-hand, IIRC.
The training issue to watch with the most scrutiny will involve the known great danger of having a long downhill section at 79mph terminated by a hard 30mph curve. I am still aghast that any agency responsible for passengers would consider designing such a thing, let alone building it out, let alone inadequately training people how to navigate it in the dark. But given all that, how much training, and how much emphasis, was placed on the importance of not overrunning the end of that stretch, especially with a lightweight articulated train with a heavy dead engine on the back end?
I’m not going to prejudge the findings, since (as with everyone else) I don’t have the details of the specific Amtrak training. But I do not think even technically-deficient attention to the severity of that concern, in the training materials, even begins to excuse the lack of attention and common sense required to produce an accident of the magnitude observed.
Mod:
Mod: Alignment and original railroad were there long before the “Agency” saw the light of day. Interstate alignment that physically hemmed the curve - in was there before appearance of the “agency” (Even though the “agency” is directly related.) When you leave bus people in charge of a railroad, you get this type of a mis-matched result. (note: I’m agreeing with you.) Plenty of other places in the country where this is happening - follow the money. Lawsuit will not absolve locomotive engineer of his culpability in this.(he’s got company)… The decision to leave the physical curve where it was goes pretty high up in the chain. NP/BN were not running passenger trains there and the trains they ran went at a considerably lesser speed.
Throughout the news coverage, there was the claim that Amtrak did not adequately familiarize crews with the new route. The accident seems to bear that out. But we have discussed vetting new employees to see if they have the right stuff, so to speak. The right stuff might be said to be just common sense. The presumption is that the right stuff cannot be trained or learned, but rather it is in a person’s nature.
So people lacking the right stuff cannot be adequately trained, and should not be hired in the first place. In my opinion, this engineer lacked the right stuff. Anyone who was confronted with the situation he faced should have had the common sense that his lack of knowing his location required him to slow down. Instead, he sped on and hoped for a good outcome.
He knew he was inadequately trained, and yet he sped on with the feeling that it his ignorance was Amtrak’s fault. He should have never been hired.
I’m not excusing anyone, but it seems I read there were two extra people in the cab because of it being the inaugural run. (Dignitaries?) I wouldn’t be surprised if distraction was a big issue.
Maybe I’m remembering that wrong. ??
It sems to me there should have been only the engineer (WITH proper training) and one very experienced (on that line) BNSF* engineer, and maybe a Road Foreman of Engines.
(*I can’t remember if BNSF ran freights there, or a short line. Maybe an engineer from the shortline would have been better.)
To make my view a little clearer: I have little complaint with there being an obligate 30mph hard restriction on that route (and the alternatives to replacing it so expensive as to be ruled out). In fact, looking at the physical plant in overhead view you can see how the alignment has been made to allow the greatest possible radius on the bridge itself, and I see no reason not to believe the approach and departure spirals weren’t optimized. The thing that is appalling is to have the long straight stretch at 79 terminate directly at entry to that curve, rather than have at least one block at some kind of permanent restricted approach, signaled appropriately with color lights and not little smashboards slantboards.
Much will probably be made of how the line and its signaling were designed around PTC, which ‘should have’ been running as part of a “completed” Washington DOT project, and (just as with Amtrak 188) stopped the train timely when the PIC screwed the pooch. I do not see how that changes the need to have clear transition from high speed to ‘approach’ with full one-block warning – which I think is a large part of the situations MC is describing.
Moreover, since we made the (idiotic, in my non-professional opinion) choice to make PTC an overlay on physical signals… the physical signals should have been built out as restrictive by default. They could always be fitted with green or yellow aspects ‘later’ as PTC took over the job, silly as it might be to show ‘no restriction’ for 79mph approaching a Dead Man’s Curve – but the safe course would have been followed.
I can see the lawyers at work. Engineer is told to take the train to Portland. He does not know the route but thinks the signals will guide him. (Wrong) He has a clear signal so he takes off and goes 79mph. And as the song in the MUSIC MAN says “YOU’VE GOT TO KNOW THE TERRITORY” but he did not. Does that make him responsible for the accident? Partly. Does AMTRAK have the responsibility to assign a qualified engineer to operate its train? ABSOLUTLY! Was he qualified? NO. What would have happened if he had said. "I am not qualified. I can’t take this assignment? Pressure? Loss of income? I think he bears some responsibility for not having the moxie to say “I am not qualified. I can’t take this assignment” Who at Amtrak is responsible for assigning him? That chain of command is what to me puts the responsibility on AMTRAK. AMTRAK provided the train and the engineer and represented to the owner of the track (Sound Transit) that they were using trained personel to operate their equipment. They DID NOT.
Now the engineer has to make the case that he had no choice but to take the train, that AMTRAK made him take the train and that he had no choice but to take the train. And that since he did as instructed, AMTRAK owes him for improperly training him. Did he take the train knowing he was not properly trained? How do you know when you are trained? Can he win that gambit? Stay tuned. As 243129 has argued, AMTRAK has a lousy safety culture and this reinforces that claim.
It’s more than Amtrak with the awful safety culture. Most transit is that way as well.
[quote user=“Electroliner 1935”]
I can see the lawyers at work. Engineer is told to take the train to Portland. He does not know the route but thinks the signals will guide him. (Wrong) He has a clear signal so he takes off and goes 79mph. And as the song in the MUSIC MAN says “YOU’VE GOT TO KNOW THE TERRITORY” but he did not. Does that make him responsible for the accident? Partly. Does AMTRAK have the responsibility to assign a qualified engineer to operate its train? ABSOLUTLY! Was he qualified? NO. What would have happened if he had said. "I am not qualified. I can’t take this assignment? Pressure? Loss of income? I think he bears some responsibility for not having the moxie to say “I am not qualified. I can’t take this assignment” Who at Amtrak is responsible for assigning him? That chain of command is what to me puts the responsibility on AMTRAK. AMTRAK provided the train and the engineer and represented to the owner of the track (Sound Transit) that they were using trained personel to operate their equipment. They DID NOT.
Now the engineer has to make the case that he had no choice but to take the train, that AMTRAK made him take the train and that he had no choice but to take the train. And that since he did as instructed, AMTRAK owes him for improperly training him. Did he take the train knowing he was not properly trained? How do you know when you are trained? Can he win that gambit? Stay tuned. As 243129 has argued, AMTRAK has a lousy safety culture and this reinforces
There was one other person (a conductor) in the cab with the engineer. The engineer later said he had not felt distracted due to another person in the cab with him. Recordings of their conversation have been published. I don’t have them in front of me, but as I recall, it was interesting to hear the engineer complain to his conductor about how the company acted on other occasions to send him into territory he had never been in before. In their conversation, this topic came up in relation to them wondering if they knew the territory well enough for run they were about to make.
As I recall, the discussion began before the train had departed from its origination, and continued off and on right up to the point of disaster. The last transmission was the engineer saying something like, “Aw we’re dead” as his engine was about to walk off the edge of the curve and drive through the woods at about 80 mph.
As I read the transcript about the engineer complaining about how Amtrak had previously sent him into territory he was unfamiliar with, it portrayed a mindset that seem to fit perfectly with what happened on his dreadful first run of this train. In both cases, this engineer holds his employer responsible for sending him on a route that he was not entirely qualified for. The
Thanks for straightening me out on that, Euc. I guess what I was “remembering” was that there had been talk of the training runs having had more than a couple of people in the cab at one time.
Could someone explain a few things to me about how speed restricions were communicated (or supposed to be communicated) on this line.
I think the overall speed limit was 79. How was the engineer supposed to know (other than visually and by is memory) 1) where he was, and 2) what the speed limit was at each point on the line.
Also, I have read the (not yet in service) PTC being an “overlay” on the block signals. What does that mean, exactly? Without having much knowledge of these things, my instinct is that OM is correct about overlay (whatever that means) being a bad idea. I say that, because I thought PTC was supposed to an addtional, independent, layer of safety.
Finally, OM mentions “smashboards.” My understanding of smashboards was that they are now-antique things that physically smacked the train (or trainman) to warn of clearance issues ahead. Does that also mean, currently, a simple speed-limit sign next to the tracks? And is that all that engineer had as a guide on that stretch?
To remember better, there’s no better approach than look at the docket:
(Note that this as provided conflates information about Cayce with information on this accident - do not think you have the ‘wrong’ listing because you see CSX references…)
The transcript of the interview with engineer Brown is on p.8. Two interviews with relevant RFE on p.9. I have not reviewed many of the other exhibits here but some of them should be of interest. Note the points already being made in the questioning that too many people in the cab during training might interfere with view out and hence acquiring a sense of ‘where on the railroad’ he was, especially after dark.
(1) is the reason for route knowledge and qualification. (As recounted by Mark Twain in Life on the Mississippi, in a somewhat more rigorous context). There is not yet a reliable inertial-navigation system provided on locomotives, although that is technically possible both through GPS and other technology. Note that Steve Brown was familiar with operations on many lines in the area, probably including the ‘pre-rebuilding’ version of this line. Part of keeping a safe lookout is to keep track of where your train is, and (just as with Bostian on 188) you need to be sure not to confuse one part of the route with another – something that happened back in the day, too; see the N&W Tug Fork accident with a class J as a case in point.
(2) the speed limit is known generally from timetable, referenced to mileposts, but is also provided on this line by slantboards that show freight and passenger speeds. A problem is that these are intended more as formal indication rather than anticipation: we have had discussion on these in the 501 accident threads
What the ‘overlay’ implies is that the signal system and all its considerations are still the ‘rule’ for train management, and the functions of the PTC system are ‘overlaid’ on that framework rather than replacing it (as for CBTC).
This is not necessari
Thanks for all that, OM.
I’m having to run out the door right now. But once I’ve digested what you wrote, I might have a few more questions.
As to “slantboards,” each road had its own idea as to the form of speed signs, However, whatever the form, the signs indicate the maximum allowed speeds on a given sector, with a consistent format–usually with the highest speed at the top and the lowest speed at the bottom. I noticed signs with three speed limits between Seattle and Portland: Talgo, other passenger equipment, and freight. There are also signs which indicate that the speed may be increased. Some roads simply have the speed limits posted on them–and engine crew KNOW that the upper number is for passenger and the lower number is for freight.
If you know the territory, you know where the speed signs are, and you observe their instructions carefully.
PTC does not use the signal system to enforce permanent or temporary speed restrictions. The overlay of the signal system only pertains to track occupancy. Whether that occupancy is due to a train/equipment in the signal block, an open hand throw switch or a broken rail. Using the existing signal system PTC (current version) ‘knows’ there is something within the signal block, but not exactly where it is.
PTC track data base ‘knows’ where the speed restrictions are. The PTC display shows “Next Target”, what the allowable speed is and counts down the distance to it. The next target is the next condition and speed required that will be encountered that is less than the current maximun authorized speed. The next target condition can be due to a speed restriction (permanent or temporary), block signal indication, or limits of authority. (Speed for limit of authority is 0 mph.) The count down begins as early as 6 miles, or when reaching the first target speed condition and then the distance to the next slower target speed when less than 6 miles. I’ve had the count down distance because of circumstances be a few hundred feet.
The system calculates stopping distance and the display provides a visual display of warning distance and stopping distance. It is constantly updated and changes as speed and/or throttle/braking force is changed. The system gives a warning when it thinks you will be overspeed for a particular target. It counts down how many seconds before it will make a penalty brake application. The count also recalculates. It’s possible as you are slowing to stop and hold the count if it detects that the train is slowing enough for the system to wait on taking action. If while slowing it determines you will slow or stop without any automatic action, the warning will disappear. If, for example, you release brakes or start applying power, if it determines you wi
[quote user=“jeffhergert”]
PTC does not use the signal system to enforce permanent or temporary speed restrictions. The overlay of the signal system only pertains to track occupancy. Whether that occupancy is due to a train/equipment in the signal block, an open hand throw switch or a broken rail. Using the existing signal system PTC (current version) ‘knows’ there is something within the signal block, but not exactly where it is.
PTC track data base ‘knows’ where the speed restrictions are. The PTC display shows “Next Target”, what the allowable speed is and counts down the distance to it. The next target is the next condition and speed required that will be encountered that is less than the current maximun authorized speed. The next target condition can be due to a speed restriction (permanent or temporary), block signal indication, or limits of authority. (Speed for limit of authority is 0 mph.) The count down begins as early as 6 miles, or when reaching the first target speed condition and then the distance to the next slower target speed when less than 6 miles. I’ve had the count down distance because of circumstances be a few hundred feet.
The system calculates stopping distance and the display provides a visual display of warning distance and stopping distance. It is constantly updated and changes as speed and/or throttle/braking force is changed. The system gives a warning when it thinks you will be overspeed for a particular target. It counts down how many seconds before it will make a penalty brake application. The count also recalculates. It’s possible as you are slowing to stop and hold the count if it detects that the train is slowing enough for the system to wait on taking action. If while slowing it determines you will slow or stop without any automatic action, the warning will disappear. If, for example, you release brakes or