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Burkhardt speaks out on Quebec derailment
When the engineer, who was it seems the whole train crew, was reportedly jailed, I thought of some of the LO-very-L confluences of law enforcement and engineers on duty; but the of July 9th letter (was its author Fetters?) reporting that the train was stopped at Nantes at 11 PM and the engineer left the train to get his rest at 11:25 PM was as inconsequential as Super Storm Sandy on Long Island’s South Shore.
Let’s watch him after the stop: full-service train brake application, put his 'stuff" in his grip, gets off the engine (lead of five about, say, 60 foot long locomotive units, then, where the hand-brake wheels are on that side, of 11 60 feet long tank cars, he ties it down: at the next tank, climb up to the wheel/lever, twirl or crank, for most of a minute, then climbs off resume walking to the next…
when, after walking 300 feet of his engine and 600-700 feet of his train, pausing intermittently to tie a handbrake climbing on and off a car, he crosses over and walks up the other side accessing handbrake whhels on that side…
"til he gets to his last unit of his engine: climbs on, enters the cab, isolates it, punches the ENG STOP, opens the Main Battery switch, exits and secures the cab. goes to and applits handbrake, then repeats that three times: the middle three units) 'til ommittg at t Left running an air compressor would restore and keep effective the engine’s independent brake power braking power.for all units.
Who would claim walking climbing on and off and over 1200 feet of train and engine, applying 16 handbrakes, killing engines, preserving batteries, securing cabs lasted 25 minutes from final stop until relieved. Then he picked up his gtip and left.
Perhaps Burkhardt should be in police custody for sub-standard operating practices, sub-standard training/train handling practices and being a sub-standard CEO. And why is the engineer in police custody? That decision should be made by the STB or whatever the Canadians have that investigate rail accidents. Or is Burkhardt taking the politicians’ way out and using bait and switch with someone else so he doesn’t look bad; which makes him look as guilty as sin, and he probably is.
I think I heard Ed begin to throw his engineer under the proverbial bus by publicly stating he has doubts as to whether the engineer followed company policy as it relates to setting the prescribed number of hand brakes on the train cars (as opposed to the locomotives). I am glad I’m not in the engineers shoes as somebody is going to get crucified over this and from what I’ve just heard it is beginning to look like the engineer is being “elected”.
Propane storage tanks near one of the buildings? This becomes even more interesting. To the point where I would suspect eco-terrorist activities even more so. For all practical purposes, the freight railroads don’t have security outside of their yards. The crew probably did set the brakes. But what is to stop somebody else from tampering with the brakes after the crew departs? The answer is, nothing. The solution is to either require a crew with the train 100% of the time or stop parking trains unattended outside of the yards.
Note to writer:
“Burkhardt adds that the incident is now likes at the company’s insurance limits.”
“…however, he doesn’t not believe they are responsible for the accident.”
While tampering has not been established in this case it certainly outlines opportunity for the would be terrorist.
Rail security across the land is a joke as evidenced by the sea of graffiti covered equipment. The railroad has now become the playground for trespassing vandals. So, is it wise to run hazmat trains with so little manpower? Is it wise to leave hazmat unattended?
As asked earlier is it reasonable to ask a single crewman to be responsible for walking the length of a mile long train in the midlle of both nowhere and the night? Put at least two crewman on the front end of these trains and a crewman in a caboose on the rear. One man crews are proving to be grossly inadequate.
could this signal the rebirth of the little red caboose…at least for hazmat movements.A crew member at the rear of the train could have easily applied the brakes once it started to roll. Increased labor costs?..no doubt. But when offset by the legal challenges which are sure to follow,never mind the human suffering,it may be a small price to pay.
He didn’t say the Engineer was in police custody, he said the Engineer was under police control, meaning he was told not to leave the area.
They really needed to hire a crisis PR firm at the outset of this incident…While I am sure each RailWorld line is a separate entity, I wonder if that railroad will ever recover.
Ed’s press conference was the second disaster for his company.
The rail industry often stages trains for various reasons and has rules and protocols to prevent such accidents.
Still lack of clarity of what happened that caused this railway disaster.
I’m trying to understand what the actions of the Fire Department in Nantes with putting out a unit fire had to do with the subsequent run-away. Was the train being held in place by a significant contribution of the airbrakes versus adequate handbrakes set? Did the leak-off of air after the prime mover was turned off refer to locomotive independent and not the train brakes? However, Burkhardt said the locomotive handbrakes were set. Makes little sense.
Ed Burkhardt comments during the press conference were unbelievable. Can’t imagine a CEO publically stating such conclusions before completion of even initial investigation.
Victims:
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I’m imagining the corporation’s lawyers cringing … also, the Red Bull advert that precedes the news clip is too tacky for words.
Burkhardt is being roundly panned by the Montreal media as an arrogant, pompous, unrepentant opportunist, who is throwing his employees, the community, first responders, etc., all under the proverbial bus to save his own ass. Frankly, he makes me ashamed to be a railfan. Yes, railroad security is a joke. 800-numbers to far-off call-centres (this call was made to Farnham…many on CP are handled in Calgary) that don’t know the area and the terrain, and who can’t advise correctly the local response units – plus, why didn’t they get the engineer out of his bed to go back and look after his train??? Railway “police” are nothing more than mall cops who are rarely seen and who seem more interested in harassing legitimate photographers and/or giving a hobo a beating than in reducing vandalism and serving their local communities. Any municipal or provincial or federal law enforcement officer that I speak with laughs whenever the words “railway” and “police” are linked.
Try walking 240 cars in a single person crew environment in -25C temperature in knee-deep snow on a heavy descending grade where you must apply one handbrake for every three cars before you even think of recovering the air after an emergency brake application. QNS&L locomotive enginemen do this routinely, and have been doing it since 1997. It has not been painless either. I know, I worked there from 1970 to 1997, when I left the railroad for greener pasture despite being less than 3 years from retirement.
Are single person crews appropriate for trains operating with hazmat? Were the appropriate risk assesments performed prior to adopting the securement practices we have seen mentioned in the media. I suspect that there is a lot of information that we do not have in this tragedy, so I personally think that it is up to the TSB investigation experts to find out what happened and why. I wish them the best of luck because, having been privileged to be one of their number for 10 years, I know what they are facing. This is the toughest investigation that the TSB has faced since Swissair 111, and the findings resulting from this investigations have the potential to change the entire segment of hazmat transportation by rail and the way we look at it.
My thoughts and prayers are for the victims and their families, and for this devastated, close knit, small community
There are a lot facts missing in this report. I can’t believe they are running one man crews on hazardous trains. Why would you leave the train on the mainline before a relief crew arrived?
Correction: The explosions of the propane tanks were caused by the derailment. They didn’t explode all by themselves.
I 2nd WILLIAM W QUICK’s comment - Trains should do a complete story on this tragedy. The story should include a diagram and time line, as well as review the rules governing securing the train.
He sounds like the Tony Haywood of this disaster: Well meaning, trying to set things right, obviously stung by the personal criticism, but completely out of his depth and nowhere near the right person to be handling the PR.
If I were in charge (thankfully I’m an armchair would-be train company owner, rather than a real one) I’d:
- Put my best henchmen in charge of handling the legalities and insurance. I do not need to do that.
- Get there ASAP
- Concentrate on working with local officials and disseminating known information. Fingerpointing, even at one’s self, doesn’t have to happen now.
Good CEOs are figureheads, and are good figureheads at that. They don’t micromanage, and they especially don’t during a crisis, they bring the right people together and let them do their jobs. Telling the world you care is fairly low down on the list.
This is the beginning of the end for the MM&A. They will not recover. Also, watch for draconian legislation in both the US and Canada that will hamper the ability of railroads to move hazardous cargo. Lastly, watch for new rules that prohibit the operation of one-person trains on the road. This horrible accident is a watershed moment for the industry.