The NEC was shut down for hours WASH <> PHL due to Regional 175 (due WASH 1110 PM ) hitting two freight T&E employees near “F” tower. No Amtrak or MARC Penn and Camden line service. Service restored about 09:00 AM.
EDIT Unconfirmed reports that train tripped a defect detector and conductor and conductor trainee were walking back to head end after inspecting train ?? later.
Amtrak service between Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia is resuming. Some trains in and out of Washington, D.C., will be operating on restricted speeds. Residual delays are expected as trains return to normal service levels. Service was disrupted due to temporary track closure for an investigation north of Washington, D.C.
Semi misnomer - Amtrak and CSX both use FRA designated channels in the conduct of their business in this area. Amtrak’s channels are not listed in the CSX ETT, likewise CSX’s channels are not listed in Amtrak’s ETT. Railroads have to have separate channels in the same territory so as to keep the conversations understandable between the company parties holding the conversation. However, radios used in the field have access to all FRA channels.
Had the appropriate Amtrak Road Radio channel been known to the CSX crew they could have notified Amtrak of their situation.
The regrettable thing here is that it would appear the two conductors were watching the oncoming train, which was blowing its horn to alert them, without realizing there was another train approaching doing the same thing from behind them. And, apparently, not realizing that the distance between tracks was lessening as they were just getting back to the locomotive…
Not sure radioing from CSX to Amtrak would have precluded either factor of this accident, except circumstantially by changing the relative timing of ‘arrival’ of the two Amtrak trains at the CSX head end. I wonder if engine noise from the CSX consist also had some effect on the conductors’ not recognizing there was also a train behind them.
The NTSB report interjects an aspect of this incident that I had not been aware of. The crew was in the act of setting off a bad order that had been identified by the CSX Mechanical Depts. ‘early warning system’ that goes above and beyond the normal defect reports that the detectors radio the crew themselves. Additionally there was a ‘outbound’ Amtrak train that was in the area at the same time as the inbound train struck the CSX employees.
The early reports that I saw said the train had activated the Laurel DD which is located at mile post BAA 21.7. The incident happened in the interlocking limits of control point F Tower mile post BAA 37.0 - over 15 miles beyond Laurel.
The Mechanical Department in Jacksonville recieves additional data from Defect Detectors over and above the data that gets communicated to crews by the DD’s own radios. The Mechanical Dept. will contact Chief Dispatcher and territory Dispatcher via a CADS message that must be acknowledged by each party so they can regain their ability to use the CADS System. With the distance between the DD that caused the warning and where the train stopped to inspect the defect; it is obvious to me that the DD’s message to the train took no exceptions to the cars. The Mechanical Dept. with its ‘back channel’ data did take exception. Truthfully, this was not a uncommon happening when I was working - frustrating, but not uncommon.
F Tower, where the incident happened, is not the location one wants to be making switching movements - there is Amtrak’s Mains on one side and the Ivy City yard tracks on the other. On the ground it is considered a high crime area, despite having a high level of background lighting, both from the street and Ivy City yard.
Does not CSX have special instructions (NS, P&W, CP, all who run freight on Amtrak-owned property dispatched by Amtrak, for that matter on Metro North as well) that would have prevented this accident? Something about checking with the Amtrak dispatcher before demounting from a train on Amtrak RoW? (Or Metro North dispatcher on MN RoW?)
Dave, it would not have mattered here. The two CSX tracks here happened to be parallel to the Amtrak ROW; this was not CSX operating in Corridor trackage. From what I can tell, the CSX employees were only incidentally and accidentally on “Amtrak property”, perhaps thinking they were watching out for one approaching Amtrak train without recognizing there was a second one behind them. If you look at the picture on p.2 of the interim report, you can get an idea of the kind of ballast-prism structure the crew would have been walking on. As noted, they were by the first platform adjacent to the power and might have been somewhat distracted both by the idling engine noise and by moving out to where they could climb up on the locomotive for what I believe would have been the next ‘act’ of setting out the detected bad car(s).
RME: We then have a more general problem. There are more and more locations where freight railroads have tracks parallel to Amtrak, commuter railroads, high-speed heavy rapid-transit, and light railroads. Freight crews should receive special warnings to say off the “other railroad’s” RoW, since the freight railroads’ dispatchers have no knowledge to transmit about movements on these “other railroads,” and some of their trains can be both quiet and fast. I think that lesson has been taught by this tragedy, and I hope it is learned.
Knowing the territory, I am at a loss as to why the CSX conductors head was not on a continuous 180 degree swivel - forward looking for Amtrack and rearward looking for Amtrak.
I suspect Amtrak engines are equipped with forward facing cameras (most CSX engines are). If and when that video is released it should be illuminating as to what actions and/or inactions the CSX personnel were taking.
In my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that ‘spots’ the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety.
When I looked at plans for the Richmond to Raleigh part of the SEHSR, I notice that the segment between Centralia and Petersburg has the passenger track laid with 30 feet between it and the CSX A line. I can now see the wisdom of this move, and wonder if there will be a recommendation for the same thing regarding CSX and Amtrak’s NEC tracks.
As a former corner worker with the Oregon Region of the Sports Car Club of America, let me clarify that the flaggers stand facing each other and looking over each others shoulders. The blue flagger (responsible for alerting drivers that they are about to be overtaken by a faster car) faces the oncoming traffic (“uptrack” in corner worker parlance), the yellow flagger (responsible for alerting drivers to possible track obstructions beyond the corner station) faces “downtrack”. When the yellow flag needs to be displayed the yellow flagger pivots 180 degrees and the blue flagger runs around him to retain the over the shoulder positioning. At no time should the flaggers be “back to back”.
In the area this incident happend - there is no room to provide track separation what with commercial development along New York Avenue (US 50) on one side and the Ivy City service facility on the other side. While my knowledge is no encyclopedic - to my knowledge this is the first time one company’s employees were struck by another company’s train. Track structure has been relatively the same since Washington Union Station was opened in 1907.