An out of service train hit an outbound blue line train head to head at the Harlem Ave. Station this morning. 35-50 people injured dependent on the source. Talking heads centered on why it was going opposite direction on outbound track.
CTA recently (last 5 years or so) rebuilt the signal system for most of the Blue Line to allow for bidirectional signalling with ATC, so reverse moves are allowed but should have been signal protected. That particular stretch has been ATC equipped since at least the mid 1970s.
Harlem Avenue station is the first station east of Forest Park. It is sandwiched between the eastbound lanes of the Eisenhower expressway and CSX’s former B&OCT, which at that location is CN’s former Wisconsin Central (Soo Line) entry into Chicago.
Apparently an operator on the station platform saying the emergency warning system was beeping in the in service train. CTA comment out of service train may have been stolen but operator had CTA uniform and key to operate train. Speculation on my part possible scuicide?
Here is Chicago Tribune story. http://my.chicagotribune.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-77607145/ Rgds IGN
Video shows the train unmanned leaving the yard. They have no idea what happened or why at least two auto shut down sequences didn’t stop it before the collision. Looks like a run away at this point.
There is a history of one of the 5-section articulated “Multis” that were specifically built in 1935 for the 14th Street - Leffferts Avenue “13” rush hour service, where they used the old Fulton Street unrebuilt elevated structure on Pitcan Avenue, and also handled all the off-peak Canarsie service, with the rush hour service on that line (“L”, formerly “16”) served by the 69-foot “steel standards,” going out of control in its last days running on “M” Myrtle-Chambers service. The operator notified the Broadway-Myrtle towerman, who had lined up the route, and the train ran non-stop thorugh the Myrtle Avenue station, through the switches off the Broadway line to the grade up to the Myrle Avenue elevated and finally got stopped after a few stations toward Metropolitan Avenue. And nobody ever figured out how this happened.
Here’s an update on the NTSB investigation:
BTW, in response to the tangential ramblings by Paul M., I consider the CTA and its Democratic board also overly political and rife with patronage workers.
The broken glass had hardly come to rest and some lawyer is claiming that CTA was operating its trains, In a negligant manner."
NTSA hadn’t even issued a preliminary report. Their final report won’t be out until this time next year.
Does having a law degree make one omniscient? I rather doubt it.
Chuck (Grumpy old retired MSgt)
As a result of the Shakman decree, political patronage hiring has decreased to minimal levels, especially at the lower levels.
Should we expect to see this portrayed on an upcoming episode of the Good Wife?
This isn’t about litigation-hungry lawyers. It is the NTSB:
"Federal railroad experts investigating this week’s Blue Line crash said Wednesday their early findings have led them to consider emergency recommendations to the CTA, a move that would signal concerns of a future accident. Investigators didn’t elaborate on those findings or what any recommendations could entail, but that consideration came even as the CTA reopened the Harlem station, where the accident occurred, and normal service along the Blue Line resumed Wednesday.
Officials from the National Transportation Safety Board, which is leading the inquiry into Monday’s accident involving an apparently empty and out-of-service train, were collecting what they called “perishable evidence” at the crash site Wednesday and expect to finish on-scene work by Saturday. The agency’s overall investigation is expected to take a year and result in a report on the crash’s probable cause.
NTSB investigators began testing the electronic and mechanical systems on the four rail cars for anomalies that would help explain how the parked cars, which are more than 30 years old, were suddenly set in motion and traveled a half-mile during Monday morning’s rush period, an investigator said.
After it left the Forest Park yard, the out-of-service 2600 Series train somehow made it through two track interlockings without being stopped by metal “trip” strips that stick up out of the ground. When tripped by a train that is going against the intended direction set by CTA personnel in a control tower, the strips are supposed to activate a lever on the side of the rail cars that throws the train into an emergency stop.
The “ghost train,” as some CTA rail employees dubbed it, also avoided other "fail-safe’’ protections. It reached an estimated speed of 20 mph before slamming into an in-service train that was stopped at the Harlem station, CTA officials said. A preliminar
If I am reading between the lines correctly - the unmanned cut of cars that got out on the live track and struck the live train was a group of ‘shop’ cars that had been stored at that particular yard for a week or more pending future movement to a CTA repair facility. With the cars being ‘SHOPS’ it is not unreasonable to expect whatever ‘automatic’ signal equipment CTA uses most likely was no operative on these SHOP cars.
The results of the full investigation should prove interesting.
An update. The out-of-service cars’ power was on.
Safety board investigators raised concerns about the need for the CTA to improve protection against unintended train movements, saying that unoccupied CTA trains are “routinely left powered-up while stored and with the brake setting that would allow movement.’’
The runaway four-car train was parked in the yard, at the western terminus of the Forest Park branch, with power to the propulsion system, lights and other equipment activated for possibly days before the incident, said a source close to the investigation, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The new developments surfaced as the NTSB issued two “urgent safety recommendations’’ Friday addressing “the need for redundant protection to prevent unintended train movements on the CTA system.’’
From the Tribune article: ““After each stop, the train started moving again because the master lever on the operator console had been left in a setting that allowed the train car brakes to recover and reset from the emergency brake application and proceed through a mechanical train stop mechanism after a momentary stop,’’ the NTSB report accompanying the recommendations said.”
Could someone explain the function and operation of the master level in detail? Automatic recovery from an emergency stop sounds like something extremely undesirable.
In the original systems used in NYC, the motorman would have to go down onto the tracks and manually reset the tripped lever. As late as 9/11 a motorman trying to back his train out of the tunnel had to go down to the tracks and reset each tripper as he tripped them. He could only move 60’ at a time before he was tripped again. And the train was 10 cars long, and who knows how many trip arms he had to move past.
Automatic resetting involves a time delay, but presumes that there is an operator at the controls. An operator passing a signal at danger is tripped, exclaims deleted language and then proceeds when the brake recovers without going down to the tracks. Obviously, he would not allow the train to proceed if the railroad was not in his favor.
What LION is missing on CTA equipment is why could the motors be energized at all without hand of the motorman holding the controller in the operating position. Without that the train should be BIE.
ROAR
Somebody left (or put) an operating key in the forward position. Unless the controller handle has a spring return it could be left in a running point. More surprising is no dead-man control.
Another runaway and no derail ? ? What are these rail companys thinking ? My trip over many miles of UP & BNDF showed derails at almost any place of a possible runaway including two way runaways…
Well, there is a deadman control. One in every cab in fact.
But, except for the operating cab, they would all be in the DEAD position.
So clearly a train CAN run with the controller in the DEAD position, but not --supposedly-- in a car with the controller turned on.
But apparently the DORKS at CTA have removed the locking pins from the reverser handle so that an operator could leave the switch on, and still leave the train. (To keep the HVAC running). NOW NOBODY knows what cabs are on and what cabs are off.
Train comes into terminal, operator leaves cab with reverser forward. Next T/O enters opposite cab, and runs train. Why does not dead man in other cab, with active reverser not stop train? Because somebody put tomato sauce (or some other intervention) into the system so that it would work without having to go back to the other car to correct things.
LION thinks CTA has problems waiting to explode on them. Is not RAILROAD of LION.
ROAR
Obviously that is why the NSTSB issued emergency orders.