Lots of talk in our discussions regarding “deferred maintenance.” Often, an untrained eye can see it and know what it is…just by looking at lousy track with weeds growing, etc.
How is deferred maintenance determined quantifiably? Is there a dollar value placed on the work that needs to be done? It seems to me that when quantifying DM, one must first determine the standards or conditions required for the track in question. For example, it seems that it would require considerably more to keep a section of track such as the Northeast corridor or the Powder River Basin joint line, than it would a 25mph branchline in a high and dry environment.
Does DM reflect the amount of $$$ required to have the lines in question reach the level needed to handle the traffic for the line?
While we make a lot of fun about CSX’s problems on this forum, does anyone have any supporting data that would indicate that CSX is indeed deferring track maintenance?
The ‘New CN’ has pushed deferred maintenance to a new level. No supporting data needed here, removing the rose coloured glasses should suffice. Pushing 37 years of track level work and almost as many years in taking pictures, I’ve seen enough degradation of the system since CN was privatised, to last a life time. And the rot has steadily accelerated since E.H. Harrison became CEO. About the only thing that keeps him in line is the threats from Transport Canada to shape up and spend money on subs such as the Kingston, Bala, Halton, York and Oakville in and around Toronto or face severe speed restrictions. He’s saving a bit with costs on the Oakville Sub since the GO system on the line is being upgraded with taxpayers funds.
Well, if you accept that one picture is worth a thousand words, try this…and this LOL! Man, you can almost feel the texture.
Actually if you refer back to the issue of trains magazine focused on “the battle for Conrail” there is a piece in there about how the Conrail CEO wanted to work out the merger with CSX using as little cash as possible because he felt the money would be needed to remedy CSX’s extensive neglect…
And his opinion seems a credible source, especially as reported in a reputable magazine like Trains.
I would think that the amount of deferred maintenance on a given line could be measured by the number of slow orders in place, or the percentage of the territory covered by such orders. These would, by definition, reduce the maximum allowable speed below that shown in the timetable. Of course, there comes a time when timetable speed is reduced for the entire line–the number of slow orders might go down, and the railroad could argue that nothing is being deferred; it’s just been downgraded.
Ed, it may be possible to make a determination (albeit still subjective) regarding deferred maintenance by juxtaposing the trend of the operating ratio. The lower the OR, the greater the likelyhood of deferred maintenance…
You can defer all you want to. The day your trains stop and unable to earn a dollar is the end of days for your railroad. You just want to make sure that you are not with the company and has successfully disconnected yourself from that company before that day comes.
Im beginning to think that the railroads cannot afford to upgrade and maintain thier rails. If they would to try, I fear the Stock Market and Shareholders will suffer.
I am not sure if DM can be quantified. Under an ideal world, there would be no slow orders, except for those which pop up due to local timely conditions, such as the weather causing a broken rail. Even that could be avoided, say if the rails were replaced on a yearly basis. What level does an organization, any organization plan and invest for future needs? Perhaps the risks and rewards involved dictate that. My guess is that American Airlines holds it’s equipment to higher standards than Union Pacific, but that might be wrong.
Somewhere I have seen there are FRA track classifications, perhaps someone can link us up to those. What determines the class (and therefore the speed limits) of a section of track? My guess is the amount of tonnage (or quantity of trains) plus the types of traffic moving over a section. For instance there are three lines thru my town, CN’s Toronto - Chicago mainline, NS’s Fort Wayne - Chicago mainline and CFE’s line (ex PRR). CN and NS have crews working daily, both track and signal maintaining the ROW. Both handle about 30 trains a day, give or take 5 or so. Both are 60mph lines and are generally at that level. Very few slow orders.
Someone has determined the level of quality for those tracks and has dictated that it be adhered to. Thirty years ago one would see trains rock and roll as they passed. Even on the “good lines”. I just dont see it anymore.
I am rambling and that means it is time for sleep, but I will leave with this question…are today’s mainlines suffering under DM? I personally dont think so.
Or better yet, name a section of track that absolutely scares you to watch a chemical train pass by.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has established five track classes and the criteria that must be met for each. These classes range from Class 1, on which freight and passenger trains CANNOT operate at speeds over 10 and 15 mph respectively, to Class 5 on which freights can run up to 80 mph and passenger trains up to 90 mph. It is the responsibility of each railroad to set the class for each of its line segments and to conduct regular inspections to make sure that the track meets the standards established for that class. When an inspection determines that a portion of track fails to meet the requirements for its set class, the railroad must either PERFORM THE REPAIRS required to bring it into compliance or RERATE it to the next lower class. Reports of the inspections conducted by the individual railroads are subject to review by the FRA. Additionally the FRA has an ongoing audit program of independent track inspections using its own equipment and personnel to verify the railroads’ compliance with the Track Safety Standards (TSS) requirements. Findings of non-compliance with the TSS can result in the FRA embargoing (shutting down) a line or imposing steep fines on the owner railroad company. This is just a brief overview of the TSS program and there are many exceptions, time limitations, special conditions, etc. contained in the complete program. Needless to say FRA inspectors will be on the scene of an accident resulting in death, serious injury or haz-mat endangerment to verify that the trackage at the point of the accident meets the standards for its set track class.
Many of you may recall the the infamous FRA track inspections on various CSX lines of 3 or maybe now more years ago which found that road to be in serious non-compliance with the TSS. With the threat of big fines hanging over their head, the CSX did a 180 on its former practices and greatly increased the $ budgeted for MOW. They are still
I understand that maintenance for today’s Class 1 railroads is obscenely expensive, but it is so ironic that while CSX has to pinch nickels & dimes on track/roadbed maintenance, this is the same corporation that rewarded the outgoing “John Snow” with 200+ million dollars. How many miles of Class 3 and Class 4 track could that amount repair or upgrade?
I realize that executive pay is structured according to the corporate economy, but these pay packages for corporations with mediocre performance records should have stockholders scratching their heads.
hmm csx has constant crews from garrett east to willard.they waited along time until the diamond at deshler was almost a “V” before it was replaced.now all the crews are trying to play catch up from the deferred maintenance and do the routine maintenance too.
I don’t know that there is any direct report of total funds spent on track structure, but I think something could be extracted from this site at the STB. Click on the “Statistics of Class One Freight Railroads” link. It would probably take some major number crunching to get a clue, but there might be enough data there to get dollars into track structure per mile. Viewed over a period of some years with a railroad to railroad comparison might provide an indication as to who is keeping up and who is falling behind.
I have heard suggestions that the Wall Street analysts of the time of Penn Central’s dive did not look for or know to ask about track condition and maintenance. Just like deterioration of track, Penn Central’s financial problems snuck up on them.
The data mining effort might produce some answers, but I think it would take some time to get anything of some certainty. In the absence of anybody offering compensation for the work, I am going to take a pass.
CSX didnt get ride of SNOW…GWB appointed him to a governement postion… secetary of the US tresusery… Take a look at most of the new paper money…you will see his name there…
