CPRail got out of piggy back completely recently exept for Toronto to Montreal. And they got out fast. I wonder why? ps; I’m not new to this forum but it won’t accept my old titel. So now I’m CNR
One other thing about this double stack vs piggyback debate, and it plays into the perception that US railroads favor foreign producers over domestic producers - While most dry vans are still manufactured in the US and North America, most domestic containers these days are manufactured overseas. Thus, the railroads’ preference for COFC over TOFC ends up favoring foreign manufacturers over US manufacturers.
It’s bad enough that differential pricing schemes always cross subsidize foreign importers at the expense of captive US rail shippers. Now the railroads are adding to that anti-US aspect by favoring domestic double stack over TOFC.
PERCEPTION is the correct word here…what is that famous socio/politico rule of thumb…“Follow the money”. The railroads are going to do what they calculate is in their best interest, which often equated to the often maligned “Bottom Line” of thier profit/loss statement. Sometimes it will be the monthly statement that rules, others the annual. Depends on how forward thinking the management is, and what kind of pressure they feel from the board of directors…or, what kind of pressure the board of directors percieve from the stockholders. So the railroads are not “Forcing” trucking industry to do things because of an ulterior motive…it is a financial motive. They offer a service to the trucking industry, both COFC and TOFC. They are priced differently, and both are priced so the railroad can make a profit. They may not even offer the same margin or return to the railroad. The customers will decide which they will use, based either on lowest cost or greatest convienience. That is why the hot shots cost more, there is more percieved value, from increased service level. When the shippers find a better way to do things, they will turn to that, or use that to renegotiate with the railroads to change the rate structure.
There’s 95,000 53’, 102" wide containers in UMLER.
These are the backbone of the domestic stack service.
As far as I know, most of these can’t be stacked more than two high, so shipping them on container ships is problematic. Also, I’ve never heard of 102" wide OR 53’ foot containers moving on container ships.
JB Hunt’s came from Wabash National. Scheider has some, too. From their press release.
Container features include:
· Same load configuration as a van trailer
· Ability to be double-stacked when used on the rail
· High-durability, lightweight painted/galvanized steel that is rust-resistant to protect transport of food, garments and other sensitive cargo
· Easy loading, reduced product damage and smooth, clean look of non-corrugated, plywood-free interior sidewalls
· 109 ½ inch interior height for greater loading capacity
· Authorization for use on any railroad
I guess it must be cheaper for the railroads to ship COFC, due to the fact of what futuremodel stated in regards to railroads perfering to ship overseas containers instead of domestic. I do have a question as to why, it is cheaper to ship COFC vs. TOFC?? I’m a bit stumped here. Maybe this is one of the reasons why I don’t seen anymore TOFC here in Philadelphia, it’s mainly COFC. Some of the only times I see TOFC, is in a mixed consist here in Philly.
For one reason: that way UPS can use the trailer on either over-road trucking service or on TOFC train service. Every BNSF Z train in UPS service I’ve seen go through Stockton, CA essentially are standard UPS truck trailers mounted on spline cars.
This is why I sometimes wonder why didn’t UPS work with Wabash National to develop a low-weight/high-strength RoadRailer trailer that can carry the type of loads UPS normally carries. That way, this specialized RoadRailer trailer could either be used in over-road trucking service or tied together in a long RoadRailer train on long-distance runs.
Two good reasons I can think of off the top of my head:
The piggy back service did not start out as piggy back, it grew into piggyback. The railroads offered UPS a cheaper way to get the 28’ pups from spot to spot, they tried it, and liked it. When they stop liking it, they can go back to the triples behind a cab.
Cost. The cost of the road-railer would be borne by UPS. The cost of the Flat is born by the railroad. The extra mechanical complexity of the roadrailer means it costs more, and is good for only one thing. One thing that might make this an interesting option to consider, is if it is quicker to get road railer units from the arriving track over to the sort facility, or would result in a shorter time to build a train, thus allowing a later arrival for the departing train.
An article I read in Trains last year, I believe, talked about how the TOFC’s are loaded on and off the flats, taken to a UPS sorting center nearby, everything inside is sent inside to be resorted, and the trailer is refilled and sent back to the railyard for the trip in the other direction. WIth a straight TOFC, any trailer can be used for any mode. WIth road-railer, those units would be reserved for strictly rail use, or they might end up with all the road railers out on the highway somewhere and not have enough roadrailers available for the traffic. Just my [2c].
The question of the time split between road and rail is the primary driver IHMO for the existance of 53’ plate vans in TOFC service. The large over the road guys are looking to move loads in any direction possible using standard equipment if at all possible. By adding a few hundred pounds of structural upgrades, if that, to a standard OTR dry van they can have a intermodal option for the move but also move the trailer by road with little penatly and actually a stronger trailer body.
Perhaps the railroads have given up on the train vs trucks war. The BNSF even throws a party every year to show their appreciation to all the truckers they
There are very, very few “captive shippers”. The GAO says about 6%. There aren’t enough of them to cross subsidize much of anything.
And there is no “cross subsidy”. The railroads aren’t going to haul for a loss, and if it’s not moving at a loss it’s not being subsidized. Now some freight natually has a lower mark up (margin) than other freight. But that doesn’t mean a thing in and of itself. A railroad can make more money hauling freight at a 10% mark up than it does at a 200% mark up - it depends on the volume.
Double stack rates are lower than TOFC rates because of two things: 1) the intermodal market is very competitive and there is a downward pressure on rates - so costs savings tend to get passed through, and 2) the expense of moving freight on the rail by double stacked containers is significantly less than moving freight TOFC. The perfectly natural result of these two things is that double stack rates are lower than TOFC rates.
There is nothing prohibiting a trucker from putting a high cube van on a train. He’s not going to move it for the same price he can get on a double stack, but the trade off is for the trucker to analyze.
The biggest drivers are equipment cost and teminal track capacity. A 5 platform spine car costs about as much as a 5 platform well car, so stacking can save about 1/2 in equipment costs. Loading track capacity is also a high cost item when it comes to expand a terminal, so stacking can help defer capital expenditures - and capital is in tight supply on all the RRs
Quote of note from Bill Greubel, Chief Executive Officer at Wabash: “It has become increasingly clear that corrugated steel boxes from China and Korea adequately satisfy customer requirements at prices significantly lower than our container offering.”
That leaves Schneider, until they decide to pull out. Anyone else left in the US to manufacture domestic containers?
Wrong. Dead wrong. The GAO is using non specific data not necessarily related to the railroads’ actual customer base. They, like you, count the existence of even a nearby gravel road as proof that said shipper has the option of trucking to counter the captivity to one Class I rail offerring. The GAO, like you, either cannot or will not allow for modal differentiation in determining best use analysis of the nation’s transportation system.
In retrospect, how did they even come up with the 6% figure? Did they actually find some producers inaccessable to truckers?
We’ve been through this time and again, and the same dense skulls continue to classify the different modes into the same broad catagorization for the sake of muddying up the issue. Of course, if there were no captive shippers, there’d be no differential pricing, would there?[;)]
Differential pricing is a cross subsidy. They are one a
In 1981, Union Pacific noted that 5% of its shippers contributed 80% of its revenue. No correlation between shipper numbers and revenue.
The number of captive shippers is not the same thing as revenue contribution extracted from captive shippers because captive shippers make a substantially higher revenue contribution to the railroad. In 1996,
Over 31% of railroad industry revenue was generated by “captive rail traffic;”
Captive rail traffic accounted for 600 million tons;
Captive rail traffic produced $11 billion in revenue for the railroads;
Movements of captive rail traffic came from 129 industry groups, broken down as follows for the top five:
STCC
112 … Bituminous coal or lignite … $3.52B
371…Motor vehicles or equipment…$1.1B
281…Industrial Inorganic or Organic chemicals …$1.5B
282…Plastics materials or synthetic fibers…740M
011…Field crops…$607M
“Amount and Characteristics of ‘Captive Rail Traffic’”. [Abstract of June, 1998 study conducted by L.E. Peabody & Associates, Inc.]
These figures date from when GAO estimated that captive shippers accounted for only 4% per cent of all rail shippers.
At the current GAO estimated 6%, a proportionate increase in the revenue percentage extracted from captive shippers sugggests that, currently, the 6% of shippers that are captive are supplying 46.5% of the revenue received by U.S. railroads, or $18.2 Billion of 2004’s industry freight revenues of $39.1 Billion. Net industry operating income in 2004 was $5.4 Billion, less than one-third the amount that only 6% of the shippers were generating.
Quote of note from Bill Greubel, Chief Executive Officer at Wabash: “It has become increasingly clear that corrugated steel boxes from China and Korea adequately satisfy customer requirements at prices significantly lower than our container offering.”
That leaves Schneider, until they decide to pull out. Anyone else left in the US to manufacture domestic containers?
The study cited by Mr. Sol concludes that traffic is “captive” if it exceeds a revenue to variable cost ratio of 180%. I looked at what Sol wrote and wondered how “motor vehicles” could be captive. I worked for a motor vehicle man