“Give Amtrak more money, they will lose more money”
This is a tautology because we only “give Amtrak money” to make up what the fares don’t cover, but if I understand a tiny bit of Latin, I think you are saying that. Obviously, if we “give Amtrak more money”, Amtrak will be able to run more trains and serve more passengers.
The real question is if there is any economy of scale. Can we double the Amtrak budget and serve four times as many passenger miles? Many around here argue that Amtrak is “underfunded” – what does that mean? You give Amtrak some money, they run trains, you give them less money, they run fewer trains. I think the argument is that Amtrak is starved for money, that if you give them a little bit more money there will be a lot more or better service. I have argued that there is evidence against that position – the Vision Report for starters.
“We need LD trains for those who can’t fly.”
Actually, the “accomodation” aspect of Amtrak and especially the LD trains might make more sense than the saving oil resources or relieving highway congestion arguments in support of those trains. The LD trains actually don’t make sense from those frequently advanced reasons for trains. It is actually a powerful argument – who is against allowing people otherwise restricted in their mobility to visit loved ones, go on pleasure or business trips, etc.? But if
One question (which might be best for another thread): could you point us (me) to your assessment that the Vision Report is ecvidence against the “bit more money = lot better service” proposition?
Very well played, Mr. Oltmann. I must confess, however, that in my younger days I may have played into one or more of these. My logic was something like, “I am a lifelong railfan. I like trains. I’m the progeny of a railroad historian. I must know what I am talking about, right?” It is amazing how perspectives can change when one starts doing this for a paycheck.
The Vision Report proposes spending about 10 billion/year over a 50 year period (about the time Amtrak has already been in existence) to build out from passenger trains carrying .1 percent of current passenger miles to reach 1 percent of current passenger miles.
I see this is very roughly a 10-fold increase in Amtrak support to achieve a 10-fold increase in passenger miles.
The Appendices of the Vision Report come up with these numbers by evaluating the European experience, where they have a much larger passenger train network but they spend more money on it too. These data suggest to me that Amtrak is not that far from a linear curve of where you spend proportionately more money to get proportionately more train service.
Amtrak, which is a quasi-governmental corporation, gets a lot of things right. The key question, however, is whether it is as efficient and effective as it could be?
A government corporation, especially if it is a monopoly, is not compelled to be as efficient and effective as a competitive, private business. It does not have any competitors to whom dissatisfied customers can turn to. It is the only game in town.
Successful business people understand that a business should only expand capacity if there is a compelling indication that potential customers will use the increased outputs. This is why market research is a critical factor in determining whether there are likely takers for the expanded capacity.
Following WWII the nation’s passenger railroads spent the equivalent of billions of dollars upgrading their passenger trains. They turned out some beautiful trains. However, by 1955 or thereabouts, it was clear that people were fleeing trains for cars and planes. And nothing the railroads could do stopped that trend. Accordingly, those who believe that the problem for trains, especially the long distance trains, is inadequate capacity are burdened with the task of showing why what did not work following WWII would work today.