The FBI has checked for fingerprints on the “locked switch” that lead to the Graniteville disaster. Is this normal for the conductor or brakeman to lock the switch from it’s normal position(allowing all trains to continue passed it on the main line) to the position where a train is in process of being swiched onto a siding? Or do they merely throw the switch and latch it, then after the train has crossed the switch- throw it back and padlock it ?
As you know the switch was locked toward the siding that allowed a train from the main line to divert off and crash into the rear of a train parked on the siding.
Back in the 80’s I was a Safety Engineer for the Kwikset Lock Company. When I was at a safety convention I overheard my counterpart for the Santa Fe
state that he was glad that the union had finally agreed to cut the crew size. He felt that requiring 5 or 6(I don’t know the exact number)men on a crew was keeping the railroad from being competitive.
The standard crew of the past may have been a safer work situation. Cutting the number has only seemed to increase accidents caused by worn out crews. BUT maybe they would still be tired no matter how many were on the crew.
Anyway the main point is this: Do they or don’t they have a standard procedure for checking themselves(i.e. the crew)? For example, someone is responsible for throwing the swiches when necessary. Is there someone else on the crew who is supposed to either physically check or verbally check to see if the switch has been thrown back?
Accidents are always a sequence of unfortunate events that link together at the wrong time. In the case of Graniteville, based on the standards of training of correct railroad operation, what events probably occurred that caused such a horrific result?
No one likes to admit human error, but in most transportation accidents, that has been the leading cause. I sincerely feel for all the people who suffered and lost loved ones becau
The only advantage the full crew would have had here over a two-man crew is that the “extra man” would have stayed at the switch to line it back. And, in a two-man crew, the groundman should have done so anyway with the size of their movement. A three car walk is going to be much shorter than the round-trip walk from where they stopped and the switch.
There are two types of locks in use. One, when unlocked, does not permit the key to be removed unless the lock is “locked”. What that requires during switching is that each time a lockable switch is lined, it must be lined and lock. If you are “aceing them out” over such a switch, such a feature is much worse than a pain and delays the completion of the work. The other type permits the key to be removed while the lock remains open, and then the lock can be used as a hook to keep the switch properly lined. When the crew is done with the switch, the then lock it.
The NTSB loves type one. But I have a bad feeling that if NS was using such a lock at Graniteville, it could be part of the cause.
mark what is keeping that truck on his side of the road… a 6 inch line and a promise to stay on his side of the road. the ns rules are like the gcor rules almost word for word.
Here is a direct link to the FRA Advisory concerning switches issued after the Graniteville crash. As you can see, there are specific rules and procedures towards the end for railroads to follow by amending their operating rules. FRA is following up with all railroads to assure compliance.
LC
http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/Safety/Advisories/sa_2005_01.pdf
Thanks Mark and Limitedclear for all the good information. The link with the FRA advisory made good reading.
I regret even mentioning crew size as I could see after I wrote it that it was probably not a factor here. I know that I would hate to be the one who forgot to reset the switch. He or she must be tortured with quilt.
The FRA advisory recommends that the engineer be used to verify that the conductor has reset the main line switch back to it’s normal position. BUT I hate to see another form added, as Mark pointed out, they could be filled in later, and would depend on whether the conductor really did reset the switch or merely thought he or she did. Hey, I can easily forget if I did something. So maybe the paper work idea is good, if it is filled out when the engineer verifys the switch position.
Another ideas?
This happened in dark territory too, right?
Have to admit that I don’t really like the extra paperwork. I’ve seen too much paperwork over the years which says exactly what it should say…
The BNSF and UP rules are good, though – not surprisingly; if someone asks you – or you have to tell someone – just which way you left a switch, it’s going to jog your own mind to think about it just that little bit more. You might give the expected answer without really thinking – but if you’re not sure (even subconsciously) your mind will say to you: eh? is that really right? And you’ll check it. Just human nature.
yes it was on dark territory all around Augusta is DTC
kevin
what is DTC?
As they say, your memory is the second thing to go, and i can’t remember what the first thing was.
I knew what DTC meant, but now it escapes me. Something about Track Control. May be Direct Track Control. Help me out here, guys and gals.
Joe is right,
DTC, Direct Traffic Control…
Authority, direction, speed, and control points and special instructions are transmitted via radio to the crew by the dispatcher or control operator.
The crew copy it down, repeat it back to confirm.
With a good, on the ball operator, DTC is a very fast, efficent and safe way to move a lot of trains in dark territory.
Ed
Maybe I have heard this before but it has escaped me, I know all about CTC, DTC, and PTC; What in the world do you mean by ‘dark territory?’
Isn’t dark territory an area without switching lights?
Or is it just radio contact only?
I am sure Ed or Mark will have the answer for that. It would be good to define the other acronyms used in this discussion topic: CTC, PTC and TWC.
Thanks in advance for all your info.
I know this question has probably been answered 1000 times, so sorry to be trite. But when the Amtrak passenger train went into the river because a bridge on CSX’s track (I am sorry the exact name of the train wreck eludes me at the moment) was not in the right position due to a tug boat hitting it, wasn’t the track controlled by either ABS or CTC?
How was it that the signal failed? Shouldn’t it have automatically been red if the rails weren’t connected completing the circuit?
Gabe
A barge knocked the bridge off it’s supports, but the rails did not break, so the track circuits were intact.
This is analogous to a sun kink, where the the rails are still intact but the track is out of alignment - clear signal - train derails.
Thanks Don, I didn’t know the rails were still intact.
Is there anything that helps avoid derailments by sun kink? I am told they often lay rail in hot weather so as to avoid this problem, but is there anything else?
Thanks again,
Gabe
Railroads patrol track like mad and drop speeds proportional to tonnage after the temperatures rise above the equilibrium temperature established for laying rail. In hot weather, poor train operating/ brake handling combined with heatcauses troubles where trains trigger sun kinks under the train.
all these new terms that are being used on here its hard to keep up. joesap1 says dark territory is with out switching lights what are switching lights?
mark i know this and you know this i wanted him to exsplain himself . someone else might have thought the spring switch markers was a signal in replace of standard switch stand markers. being these are electric lights . these lights dont tell you which direction you are lined it tells you the condition of the points. just because a spring switch marker is red dont mean you are lined into the siding. means the points are not fitted up to the rail for the main line.
Mark going train chasing Saturday I will be on Taylor Street where the CSX and NS join it is at the end of 6th Street
kevin