How do government inspectors determine brake violations?

Trains Magazine General Discussion
1

The following appeared on the CBC news website yesterday.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/mm-a-railway-had-repeated-brake-violations-on-the-books-1.2534131

The article noted that MM&A had been cited for several brake violations prior to Lac Megantic. Just how would they determine such violations given that the regulations don’t specify how many hand brakes need to be applied? Do inspectors climb aboard parked trains and count the number of hand brakes applied or do they observe crews from a distance and then determine that a train isn’t properly secured? If a train is not moving and with brakes applied, how would one determine that the applied brakes are in fact insufficient?

2

Most likely these violations were about the condition of brakes on cars - brake shoes thinner than the minimum dimension. Brake piston travel longer than the maximum permitted travel.

I haven’t seen any FRA Inspectors energetic enough to climb cars to see if the hand brake is securely applied - although they may observe if the hand brake operating chain is tight. Just having a tight hand brake chain does not mean you have an effective hand brake, especially if the car has failed the brake shoe dimension or piston travel tests.

3

Quote from the linked article in first post:

Handbrake uncertainty

The documents obtained by Enquête show at least eight warnings were issued to MM&A by Transport Canada between 2004 and 2012 concerning Section 112 of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR).

That section requires that a number of handbrakes be applied and a traction test conducted before trains are left parked to ensure they’re secure.

Some of those violations were issued for incidents at the Nantes, Que., station, where the train that rolled into Lac-Mégantic had been left for the night.

4

To answer the question posed by the thread title, “How do government inspectors determine brake violations?”

In terms of inspecting for proper handbrake securement (which is the topic of the linked article), the inspectors would need to pull on the train with the locomotive. If there were cars secured with no locomotive attached, the inspectors would have to bring their own locomotive.

There may also be a minimum requirement for the number of handbrakes to be set. Inspectors could find a violation if the fewer than the minimum number of handbrakes are set. For that conclusion, they could just look at the handbrake chain and linkage. They would not need to pull on the train to find that type of violation.

However, even if more than the minimum number of handbrakes were set, there could still be a violation if the cars were found to move too easily when pulled.

It would be very interesting to see what those violation reports say if they are available to the public.

5

In case anyone is wondering: I doubt this disclosure is intended to be an informative statement of fact. It’s an attempt to make the railroad look like a habitual repeat offender before the case is tried. And it certainly is working: I wonder if one in a hundred readers understands that CROR doesn’t specify what number of brakes ‘adequate’ is, or that a traction test is more a feel-good exercise than additional objective proof the train won’t roll…

Yes, I’d like to see the actual details of these eight citations, including precisely what voilations were involved… and what the penalties and subsequent follow-up by the Canadian government were. Not impossible that, if some of this disclosure is political grandstanding, it might backfire if Canadian enforcement was lax, flawed, or negligent…

6

It is a purely subjective determination, unless the carrier has a specific number of hand brakes that, by rule, must be applied, then the decision as yes or no, secured or not secured, rest totally upon the inspector’s personal opinion.

50 cars sitting in a flat land siding with two hand brakes….if it has been sitting there a day or two and has not moved, it is secure, but if that carrier has a rule that requires one hand brake for every 5 cars in a train, then it isn’t secure.

Most carriers have, in their own safety rules, a rule that has a minimum number of hand brakes that must be applied to standing cuts of cars or trains left unattended.

And of course, there are the rules in both GCOR and Norac, which basically state that when a cut of cars with engines attached are to be secured, the engineer will do a service reduction on the air brakes system, and a crew member will apply a “sufficient number of hand brakes to prevent movement”…after that, the engineer will release the air brakes, and the train will be observed for a minute, if no movement is observed, the engineer will do a full service reduction to the air brake system, and the locomotive will all have their hand brakes applied.

If movement is observed, the engineer will again do a service reduction, and the crew member will apply additional handbrakes, until such time as movement is controlled.

For a cut of cars without engines attached, the crew members must apply sufficient number of handbrakes to prevent movement, and observe the cut of cars for a sufficient amount of time to determine than no movement will occur.

Now, a lot has been made in previous thread s that this rule is unsatisfactory, in that it does not give a specific number of hand brakes to be applied, which is true, but the intent of the rule is obvious.

It is written this way to ensure

7

What the inspectors are inspecting is most likely NOT whether the cut is secure, but whether the securement process was followed. Did they set the air brakes? Did the crew set hand brakes? Did the crew release the air brakes? Did the crew wait a minute? Dis the crew set the brakes and set handbrakes on the engine? In short, the inspectors inspect compliance with the rule, not the effectivelness of the rule.

Effectiveness is a different process with different people in a different venue…

8

I agree that the intent of the rule is obvious, however, I would like to clarify a point about those previous handbrake threads by Bucyrus.

Neither he nor anyone else on the forum said that the TSB rule on train securement was unsatisfactory because it does not require a specific number of handbrakes.

It was the TSB of Canada that said that. They came right out and said that on high grades, it is impossible to verify securement by the use of the push-pull test. They said they want a better method of train handbrake securement, and they lamented that without calling for a specific number of handbrakes, the rule and procedure is too subjective.

As far as I know, the TSB has not yet resolved the issue by changing the rules.

Of course, while the securement procedure is the same in the U.S. as it is in Canada; and the securement rules similar in both countries; the position of securement being inadequate, is solely the position of the TSB of Canada.

Frankly, I am amazed that they went public with that position describing an inadequacy in train securement.

9

So the inspectors are lurking in the bushes…and if they observe that the securement process was not followed do they just leave and file their report or do they confront the crew to ensure the train is then tied down in keeping with regulations?

10

Oh, boy. Another Bucky handbrake thread.

I know of a crew on a freight railroad that was dinged by the FRA inspector because they did a Class 1 by walking one side of the train for the set and the other for the release. They should have walked twice around the train (which is why we like to do inspections with two crewmembers). Memory fails me on specifics, but I think they were challenged immediately by the FRA inspector.

And they do enforce the stricter of the rules, when there is a difference between the railroad’s rule and the federal reg.

11

Yep, because every handbrake on every train at every location in every weather condition performs exactly the same.

Nothing more than a bunch of people that apparently have no real concept of that which they are supposed to be regulating. They need to be dependent on what a book says. I. Am. So. Shocked.

[#dots] << my shocked face.

12

Actually, they did say that the effect of handbrakes does vary a lot, and they said that the way people apply them varies too. So they gave the impression that they do not feel that just specifying a number of handbrakes is enough to solve the problem.

It seems to me that they have boxed themselves in by announcing that there is no effective way to reliably secure a train, and not having a new method that is reliable to introduce. To me, that seems like a big deal. I mean a big deal that they said it. No wonder they did not want to talk to the public about anything to do with train brakes last summer.

But I just wanted to clarify that point because I am not sure if it was ever understood by anybody here in previous discussions.

In any case, these new revelations about MM&A found violating securement rules in the past is pretty interesting.

13

How about applying ALL the handbrakes? Sure, the effectiveness of handbrakes vary, some are new, some are old, some don’t work as well as others. But what more can one do than to apply them all? Setting a regulatory minimum would be problematic…what if the minimum is eleven and your train is a locomotive and two boxcars? Then you don’t have enough handbrakes and you’re automatically in violation even when all are applied. Applying them all might take too long, I’ve already thought of that… but how long is too long when you potentially prevent something like Lac Megantic? Maybe add a third or even a fourth person to really long trains… that would improve safety and create jobs.

14

The sad thing is that the more perceptive of the regulators realize that they know nothing, but won’t be allowed to get out in the real world and learn. That would take money away from useless junkets by upper management.

15

Euclid

The TSB cannot change the rules. Transport Canada has the authority to do that and has indeed done so by a series of Minister’s Orders. Here is one. there are, I believe, others.

Emergency Directive Pursuant to Section 33 of the Railway Safety Act

Safety and Security of locomotives in Canada

To: Companies Listed in Appendix A

Section 33 of the Railway Safety Act (RSA) gives the Minister of Transport the authority to issue an emergency directive to any company when the Minister is of the opinion that there is an immediate threat to safe railway operations or the security of railway transportation.

On July 23, 2013 following the tragic events in Lac-Mégantic, an emergency directive was issued to all railway companies and all local railway companies. On the same day, an order was issued under section 19 of the Railway Safety Act, requiring those same companies to formulate rules respecting the subject matters covered by the emergency directive.

Given that no rule has yet been approved or established under section 19 for the companies listed in Appendix A, and in the interest of ensuring the continued safety and security of railway transportation, I am of the opinion that there remains an immediate need to clarify the regime respecting unattended locomotives on main track and sidings and the transportation of dangerous goods in tank cars using a one person crew to address any threat to the safety and security of railway operations.

Therefore, pursuant to section 33 of the RSA, the companies listed in Appendix A are hereby ordered to:

  1. Ensure that all unattended controlling locomotives on main track and sidings are protected from unauthorized entry into the cab of the locomotives;
  2. Ensure that reversers are removed from any unattended locomotiv
16

Charlie,

Thanks for that clarification of the roles of Transport Canada and the TSB of Canada. I understand the points about the rules having been changed in response to the Lac Megantic wreck. The changes do help prevent a securement accident involving oil trains such as Lac Megantic, but the basic securement rule (#112) has not been changed.

The emergency directive issued on 7/23/13 by Transport Canada reiterates this existing requirement:

“Ensure that their company’s special instructions on hand brakes referred to in Rule 112 of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules is applied when any locomotive coupled with one or more cars is left unattended for more than one hour on main track or sidings;”

However, the TSB of Canada has earlier stated that it impossible to reliably execute this procedure of Rule 112 because the core element of that rule—the push/pull test—cannot assure that the securement requirement has been met by setting handbrakes.

So Transport Canada says to be sure to properly execute Rule 112, and the TSB of Canada says that is impossible.

17

Euclid

Keep checking the Minister’s Orders. Under the Railway Act they govern and will govern, even when the TSB final report is released. As the Transport Canada Deputy Minister said IIRC in the order I quoted, more emergency directives will be forthcoming, I expect most likely as TSB interim findings are released. That’s how we got this order re: locomotive securement I posted and I’m quite sure as other TSB findings are released, the Minister will act accordingly. Very Canadian way of doing things…act and regulations.

Stay tuned…

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC