I asked Steve Sweeney what happened to thread on train securement, which has been deleted. He replied that it was the fairest thing to do considering their other obligations, but didn’t explain what the reason was. He didn’t tell me that I had done anything wrong, although I don’t remember if I had posted anything in that thread. If any of you did get explanations that said there was something wrong with what you posted, I’d appreciate it if you wouldn’t do it again, since that will probably cause the moderators to decide to punish those of us who want legitimately to discuss this.
There were several posts, some of which gave me headaches, which seemed to try to explain a lot of the advantages and disadvantages of various ways to keep a stopped train from rolling. I thank the fellows who took the time to explain it, and hope you’ll try to recreate your well thought out explanations.
I don’t remember anybody mentioning chocks. The 500 ton gorilla in the room of course is the Lac Megantic disaster. In one of those threads I think I remember asking what would a couple of chocks have done, somebody replied that the chocks would have been turned to splinters. Could somebody explain why, or what would a sufficient number of chocks be to secure a given number of railroad cars, and why other methods might be better than using chocks?
In my layman’s opinion I think it’d be a lot easier to tell if somebody’s set chocks, and one could tether them to the carbody, so one would not need to carry them, but rather secure them to the carbody when they’re not using them. That sounds to me like an easier thing to do than set and release handbrakes.
The TSB report of the MM&A runaway mentions chocks as a defense against runaways, although I think Overmod is correct in his assessment of the practical problems chocks pose. Actually, I am surprised that the TSB report mentions them, although they do so only as a generic comment about various means to secure trains, and not as something that would have been practical for securing long trains on mainline grades.
I think it is more important to make a distinction between degrees of risk. Many trains are secured where a runaway would have a good possibility of doing little damage. And many trains are carrying loads that will cause little collateral damage if they should derail. But the complete opposite of these innocuous conditions was the MM&A oil train parked atop the grade leading into Lac Megantic.
Here the stakes were way too high to rely on a system affected by the variables of the number of handbrakes generally assessed to be sufficient by a variety of reinforcing means and human judgment. For such a risky proposition, a modern, 21st Century securement method is called for.
As I understand it, the flawed interpretation of securement at Nantes was including the independent brakes as part of the securement and test, and failing to do both steps of the test. Whereas, including the locomotive handbrakes in the securement was permitted under MM&A rules.
I think that the most reliable securement would be a full-train, power parking brake with a single point control than can be locked. There would be no issues with limited manpower, limited time, or people being tired or lazy. There would be no issues with how many brakes to set, how tight to set them, how well they work, how steep the grade is, or what the weather is like. There would be no false impressions. There would just be one simple control that says “ON” or “OFF.”
On 11 December 2011, as freight train LIM-55 was descending a long steep grade, the locomotive engineer, unable to control the train speed using the dynamic and automatic brakes, applied the emergency brakes at Mile 68.00 of the Wacouna Subdivision to stop his movement. One hour later [just after the engineer finishing applying what he thought was a sufficient number of handbrakes to hold the train - PDN], the train ran away, descending the grade for a distance of almost 15 miles and reaching a maximum speed of 63 mph. The train finally came to a stop at Mile 52.80. No one was injured and there was no derailment."
The lessons learned: 1) Inspect, fix, and apply (use more torque) the handbrakes more aggressively (the report is rife with embarrassing results of post-accident tests on all of these aspec
Found it! Page 45, Feb 2012 Trains. Called an MED, or Mechanical Emergency Device, it is a clamp that is connected by a short chain to a stub-ended air brake hose. Simple, cheap, effective, reliable, and quick. Seems to me to be the best way to add redundancy.
Otherwise, I think the securement “problem” doesn’t really exist.
Here is the actual text of the NPRM. (Why there was no link to this anywhere in either the BLET piece or the FRA press release that it references is a mystery to me.)
It has often been said here that if the securement rules are followed, there is no danger. However, it appears that the regulating authorities are a long ways from accepting that premise.
The new rules call for the railroads to develop a process for verifying that the hand brakes applied are sufficient to hold the train. I thought we already had a process.
Here is a quote mentioning the application of handbrakes being applied to locomotives as part of the securement. I have not read the entire report, so somebody might want to check me on the context:
The regulations also require railroads to develop a process or procedure for verifying that the hand brakes applied are sufficient to hold the equipment with the air brakes released. When dealing with locomotives and locomotive consists, § 232.103(n)(3) establishes specific additional requirements: Show citation box
All hand brakes must be fully applied on all locomotives in the lead consist of an unattended train.
For those who do not care to wade through the entire document, here is the FRA summary [my emphases]:
“Prevent trains or vehicles transporting specified hazardous materials from being left unattended on a mainline track or side track outside a yard, unless specific securement requirements are followed.Develop a plan identifying such locations or circumstances.Verify securement by qualified persons; and ensure that locks on locomotive cab are secure. Include securement requirements in job briefings.Perform additional inspections by qualified persons when emergency responders have been on equipment.Install locking mechanisms on locomotive doors and repair them in a timely manner.”
Had the first and/or third emphasized point been the rule and actual practice in Canada, Lac Magantic would not have occurred.
I’ve been proceeding on the assumption that a ‘safe’ procedure for securement involves:
Apply the ‘sufficient number’ of handbrakes to the cars to pass a proper shove test
Perform proper shove test to assure train (locomotives and all) will not move. Apply more handbrakes if the test fails. Do not keep the independent brake applied when doing this test!
Apply handbrakes on locomotives (both as additional ‘insurance’ and in case the locomotives become separated from the train under some circumstance).
I don’t see anything substantial changing this. The language of the NPRM appears to require ‘verification’ of brake application with another ‘qualified individual’, but the language also states “FRA believes the communication will take 15 seconds of two qualified individuals’ time, or 30 labor seconds.” so with respect to single-man crews this isn’t particularly more than verbal confirmation that securement is ‘assured’. Somewhat fascinatingly, any procedure to actually document that the verification was done (as is presently required under Order 28) is not going to be required.
Note that any unattended train MUST have its brakepipe pressure reduced to zero and the trainline left open - 232.103(n)(2), So all the fancy systems that would apply the air brake if the train starts to roll away – breakaway hoses, RFID/GPS devices, valves that dump the air if all the locomotives in a consist go down – become essentially meaningless for unattended trains. Am I the only one who finds this somewhat disturbingly like the Government rules for denaturing alcohol?
I don’t know if everyone will notice, but this memorandum was included in the discussion o
Yes, that runaway report for the QNS&L is very interesting. It is a truly amazing revelation. While we sit here and debate the adequacy of train securement practice, the premier authority in Canada says it is a flawed concept that cannot be relied on.
I posted it in previous discussions last year, but the point was lost in all the bickering here. What stands out is the unreliability of Rule 112 which is essential to public safety in preventing disasters such as Lac Megantic. The most amazing admission of the TSB of Canada regarding the flaw with Rule 112 is this quote from the QNS&L report. My emphasis added in large font:
“Locomotive engineers who apply hand brakes do not receive any definitive feedback to confirm that sufficient brake shoe force was attained. Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112. Other railway companies in Canada have enhanced CROR Rule 112, on high-grade sections of track, by putting into place procedures detailing the application and the number of hand brakes required. Without specific instructions that take into
“Note that any unattended train MUST have its brakepipe pressure reduced to zero and the trainline left open - 232.103(n)(2), So all the fancy systems that would apply the air brake if the train starts to roll away – breakaway hoses, RFID/GPS devices, valves that dump the air if all the locomotives in a consist go down – become essentially meaningless for unattended trains.”
Does this mean that the brakes on all cars would be left fully applied, or that the air would be bled slowly enough that all cylinders would be empty? The latter makes no sense. If the brakes are left applied, then it’s highly unlikely that there would be a need for the devices you mentioned to dump the air as with enough handbrakes to hold the train plus the application of all automatic brakes it’s highly unlikely that train is going to move, and as has been mentioned on one of these threads, the air brakes can hold for a month or more.
