Well, I appreciate the sentiment. I’ve had a hectic several years of “too much to do” and less and less inclination to do it. Now, finally retired not by choice, I do, finally have some time to spare!
Best regards, Michael Sol
I just don’t understand the writer’s passion to stomp on the fond memories of the fans of the Milwaukee Road Pacific Extension. There is no other reason for the way he approached the subject.
[quote user=“TRR”]
Since I have no idea where you “get your information,” I will try and keep this brief and adressed to your key, salient, point. Your contention is false. The Anaconda Company, the Milwaukee Road, and the Montana Power Company shared the same ownership. Start there. The controlling owners of the Anaconda Company controlled the Milwaukee Road for 20 years prior to their acquisition of the ACM (Anaconda Copper Mining Co). In the book, “Frenzied Finance, The Crime of the Amlgmated” (1907) by Thomas Lawson, Lawson noted, in detail, the animosity that H.H. Rogers, in particular, had for Financier J.P. Morgan, who was the key financier of… James J. Hill, and the GN and NP. Lawson examined Rogers’ actions in 1901, with the collapse of the Northern Securities Company, meant at that time to bring a truce in railroad competition and building, by constructing a general holding company to include the UP, GN, NP, and MILW. One of the handicaps was that all of Northern Pacific’s assets, including the vast Land Grants, were tied up by its 100 Year Bonds, that Morgan had been forced to issue in order to get the “otherwise worthless railroad” out of its 1893 Bankruptcy (it’s second one). James J. Hill had, however, gotten effective control of the NP at that time. Hill was well known for exploiting any power he had to impose high freight rates. That was one reason he never took a salary from the Great Northern: at the sacrifice of his own customers, he made sure the GN always earned a healthy profit. One of the legacy “sayings” of farmers in Minnesota was “After the grasshoppers, we had Jim Hill.” It became clear to William Rockefeller and H.H. Rogers that the Northern Securities Company was not going to offer any protection on rates out of Montana for what was to become one of the world’s largest copper producers, as well a timber owners. They directed the Milwaukee Road to commence surveys to serve Butte in 1902. And the first two s
Why would you find conversations between the identical owners of both companies in the “business records” out in Montana? Those conversations and those decisions took place at “26 Broadway, New York City.”
William Rockefeller does have limited records at the “Rockerfeller Archives, Tarrytown, NY.”
Best regards, Michael Sol
As stated you can Google the history of the Anaconda Mining Corp online and it contradicts a lot of what you state including the alleged tonnage that the Milwaukee handled from Anaconda Mining in Montana.
How many have you personally spoken with, and who were they? Perhaps I can help you out! [:D]
Best regards, Michael Sol
What does that “Google data” specifically state?
Best regards, Michael Sol
“Googling: Anaconda Mining” brings up this website:
https://www.anacondamining.com/
“Creating an Emerging Gold Producer in Atlantic Canada”# # Point Rousse Project
The Point Rousse Project (the “Project”) is located within the Baie Verte Mining District, on the Point Rousse/Ming’s Bight Peninsula, in the northern portion of the Baie Verte Peninsula, approximately 6 km northeast of the town of Baie Verte, in north central Newfoundland, in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador."
Well, thanks for the entertinment anyway! But, you are correct. In having nothing to do with anything I wrote, it does more or less “contradict it!”
Best regards, Michael Sol
There sure is a lot of snarkiness in this thread…
Well, relying on “actual data,” we do know this:
Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 1,008,971 100.00
1977 651,866 64.6
The same analysis, Lines West:
Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/Indexed
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 140,000 100.00
1967 141,000 100.71
1968 142,000 101.43
1969 148,000 105.71
1970 156,600 111.86
1971 173,700 124.07
1972 186,400 133.14
1973 198,100 141.50
1974 172,200 123.00
1975 156,700 111.93
1976 202,500 144.64
1977 199,900 142.79
So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: “That line is the lifeblood of this Company.”
This does not illuminate the high value, long haul nature of that traffic, most of which was 1) high v
Michael Sol: I know relatively little about the PCE. However, I am glad you have returned, as these fora need some energy, even if controversy is a byproduct.
[quote user=“TRR”]
CMStPnP
I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations.
Well, relying on “actual data,” we do know this:
Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 1,008,971 100.00
1977 651,866 64.6
The same analysis, Lines West:
Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/Indexed
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 140,000 100.00
1967 141,000 100.71
1968 142,000 101.43
1969 148,000 105.71
1970 156,600 111.86
1971 173,700 124.07
1972 186,400 133.14
1973 198,100 141.50
1974 172,200 123.00
1975 156,700 111.93
1976 202,500 144.64
1977 199,900 142.79
So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finance, Curtiss Crippen shot down Worthington Smith in 1975: "That line is
It would be interesting to EVER see these same questions posed about … competitors!
In any event, here is the breakdown, 1977:
Lines East (not including the traffic interchanged at Galewood): gross revenue, 7,210 miles of line, $209,667,502. Earnings per mile: $68,443.
Lines West, gross revenue, 2,296 miles of line, $192,554,074. Earnings per mile of line: $91,257.
By way of comparison, BN had, in 1975 (the only Moody’s I happen to have handy) earnings of $55,144 per mile, but I would guess, given the substantial rate increases the ICC was allowing, due to the rampant inflation of that era, that by 1977 BN was more likely averaging $75,000 per mile. [Moody’s Transportation Manual, 1976, p. 351].
Best regards, Michael Sol
Well, that is comparing, Lines East, 7,210 miles of line (76% of the system mileage) with Lines West, 2,296 miles of line (24% of the system mileage). To be “equivalent,” Lines East should have been carrying FOUR times the traffic as Lines West. It wasn’t.
Best regards, Michael Sol
Oh I doubt it, you have already convinced me your not serious about defending any of your comments here and are just putting forth another fantasy for readers to indulge in. Have fun.
Key points here…
Was the PCE paid for by this point or was the debt for it still carried on the books? If the debt for the PCE was largely still on the Milwaukee’s books those profitability figures per mile need to be adjusted downwards quite a bit.
GN’s
World’s longest and most useless branch line
“gross revenue”, so how much was the Milwaukee losing per year in operating the PCE and servicing the construction debt?
[quote user=“TRR”]
CMStPnP
I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations.
Well, relying on “actual data,” we do know this:
Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 1,008,971 100.00
1977 651,866 64.6
The same analysis, Lines West:
Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/Indexed
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 140,000 100.00
1967 141,000 100.71
1968 142,000 101.43
1969 148,000 105.71
1970 156,600 111.86
1971 173,700 124.07
1972 186,400 133.14
1973 198,100 141.50
1974 172,200 123.00
1975 156,700 111.93
1976 202,500 144.64
1977 199,900 142.79
So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Northeastern and all Midwestern railroads, and Lines West, during the same period, growing by 43%. THAT is why an exasprated retired President, VP Finan
[quote user=“ns145”]
TRR
CMStPnP
I think the stat I heard from the 1950s was 2-3 through freights a day plus the passenger trains. Show me the written testimony from operations of this windfall traffic, maybe a few first person accounts from operations.Well, relying on “actual data,” we do know this:
Lines East (of Miles City): Carloadings, indexed:
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 1,008,971 100.00
1977 651,866 64.6The same analysis, Lines West:
Milwaukee Road Lines West Carloadings/Indexed
Year Carloads Percentage
1966 140,000 100.00
1967 141,000 100.71
1968 142,000 101.43
1969 148,000 105.71
1970 156,600 111.86
1971 173,700 124.07
1972 186,400 133.14
1973 198,100 141.50
1974 172,200 123.00
1975 156,700 111.93
1976 202,500 144.64
1977 199,900 142.79So, there you have Lines East collapsing over the ten year period, by 36%, confirming the experience of the Nor