Any number of GP7’s and GP9’s have accomplished the same feat, consider IC’s Paducah rebuilds. The SW14 rebuilds from Paducah were originally NW2’s, SW7’s and SW9’s, and many have resold for service to short lines and industrial users.
One point not caught by the people who suggest that a problem with the Diesel-Electric portion would not prevent using the locomotive as a straight electric, is things like changing out a power assembly while the locomotive is going down the tracks, I don’t think so. You wouldn’t be able to repair the locomotive while its is being used in the other mode.
Part of the availability statistic measures frame, carbody, truck, brake service which is common to both systems. And this should mitigate to some extent the statistical 76% availability measure. However, the unit cannot exceed the statistical availability of the Diesel-electric locomotive. And this is part of the problem of a dual-mode system – it loses the advantages that the straight electric provides, and in that case, what’s the point? That unit needs to be refueled and lubricated. An Electric locomotive that needs to be refueled and the engine lubricated, even for part of its journey, loses key advantages of Electrification.
“Availability” is not a measure limited to
On the FL9 versus the Fairbanks Morse engine issue - I remember reading somewhere (probably TRAINS) that EMD threatened New Haven fairly overtly that if they chose the Fairbanks Morse engine, a lot of the GM cars going by New Haven would be switched (to trucks I guess).
Again, the FL9 eventually proved itself to be a hell of a locomotive, but the story, if true, speaks to GM’s (and later GE’s) ability to sway buyers their way.
ALCO, Baldwin, Fairbanks Morse, and others, weren’t also huge railroad clients, like GM and GE were. (Fact that GM made a superior product, also helped, don’t get me wrong - but it’s an interesting aside.)
Non-issues. RRs regularly tow dead power hundreds of miles at a shot with no adverse effect. Surface tension of the oil film&n
I have no doubt that there is a difference between a one-time tow, for however many hundreds of miles, and a daily characteristic of operation. Can’t see an analogy between a 400 mile tow once in a while, and a regular daily 600 mile run, up to 200,000 miles per year. These just aren’t comparable. There is a 50,000% difference in the cycles, assuming one tow cycle per year, compared to the operating cycles.
Even if the tow cycle was once a month, the engine would have to last 4,166 years to experience the equivalent exposure to non-operating vibration and buffeting motion that the engine experiences in a single year of normal operation.
This is an extremely poor sampling comparison and simply cannot be the basis for a valid conclusion.
This is refering to an operating locomotive, operating on a trolley while the diesel eng
Futuremodal,
I believe that max speed of the FL9 in the Wikipedia entry is wrong and kind of low. The FL9’s had a 59:18 gear ratio and with their old D55 or D67 traction motors that would have given them a max speed of around 83 MPH not just 70 MPH.
The FL9s, built for The New Haven, went over to the Metronorth Commuter Railroad, CT Dept. of Transportation, and Amtrak. They remained in service, working passenger trains, to Grand Central Station from Albany, Waterbury, New Haven, and Danbury for 50 years.
Other Main Line locomotives were traided off to Local and Regional railroads to continue to work for years on lighter duty.
Just one more point. The FL9 never took power from the catenary, only the third rail.
It ran on diesel power in Catenary Territory from New Haven CT to Mt Vernon NY and then dropped the 3rd rail pickup shoe wher the Catenary ended. The shoe dropped and retracted under power, if the engineer remembered.
[quote user=“MichaelSol”]
Well, a locomotive can only be in one place at one time.
Maybe an example.
Milwaukee Train # 261 generally arrived in Harlowton at 9:45 p.m. powered by 4 SD40 locomotives, 12,000 h.p. At Harlow, a 6,000 h.p. Little Joe electric was put on. The SD40 had a 1,020 ton rating from Piedmont to Donald, the ruling grade on the run, at 18 mph. The Joe was rated at 1,440 tons at 25 mph. on that grade. The train on April 28, 1972 was limited to 50 cars, 3500 tons. The Joe was taken off at Avery and the train ran on with the Diesel engines to Tacoma arriving at 4 a.m. 31 hours later. At Avery, the Joe could be turned and run eastbound on 262 in the afternoon. Basically, it was that Joe running over the three mountain ranges on the Rocky Mountain Division that gave both 261 and 262 their fast times. Train #262 likewise left Tacoma with a four unit SD40.
So, the “train cycle” for #261 and #262 involved two sets of four SD40s, eight total, and a Little Joe Electric that swung between the two trains for the Rocky Mountain Division run. The co
Well, that brings me to another supposition. Since the Milwaukee was an unabashed FM customer, at least for it’s Olympian Hiawatha, I wonder if they ever considered producing a version of the dual mode P-12-42 aka “Speed Merchant” that could run under Milwaukee’s 3kv catenary, rather than using the Erie-builds the whole way from Chicago to Seattle? Did the OH ever use Joes as helpers for the FM-powered version, or was the three unit FM consist sufficient across the system?
Would that same cost differential apply regarding the Erie-builds vs the Speed Merchants?
Oh, I doubt it was mandatory. On March 29, 1973, notes show that E78 came in on #261TC27 at 12:01 p.m., was turned, inspected, and left on #264, a 5500 ton train, at 4 p.m… Happened to be that #264 was the next train out, rather than #262. E71 was placed on Advance 262S29 as it was leaving Avery about 40 minutes before #261 arrived.
However, in the example of the four hotshot trains each way, the fleet numbers of 32 SD40-2s and 4 Joes were what made it work. The individual SD unit ID numbers or Joe ID numbers weren’t necessarily relevant from the standpoint of making an economic calculation, as specific locomotives were also cycling through other trains as well.
The cost of building the catenary was an obstacle, but not the cost of maintaining it.
One of the compelling arguments General Electric made to MILW in 1972 for completing the “Gap” was that the use of a continuously electrified section would increase the normal efficiencies associated with electrification. With the two separated sections, maintenance costs per hp were about 47% of the costs of maintaining an equivalent Diesel-electric horsepower. This was high for a heavy electrification and due to several factors including the cost of operating two separate maintenance facilities, two separate fleets, and relatively shorter runs by the electric locomotives. By making a continuous section, and as long as possible, GE estimated that MILW could get its electric power maintenance costs down to the expected 30% of equivalent Diesel-electric horsepower.
I have the GE Econometric program used in the study, and as a “for example” input the cost of a dual mode locomotive and compared that to the cost of full Electrification, Harlowton to Tacoma, and compared that to full Dieselization as well, making a variety of assumptions regarding growth rate of traffic, inflation, and utilizing real costs of diesel fuel and electric power, 1974-2004, assuming a 15 year economic service life of the Dual Mode locomotives, and for a regular Diesel-electric, and 30 years for the straight electric, as well as a 9% annual interest charge or lease service charge. This assumed a 2.7% annual traffic growth over 30 yea
FM must have a real taste for irony since the Speed Merchant (P12-42) was an even more specialized application than the FL9. Only four of them were built (2 for NH, 2 for B&M) and only those on NH had third-rail shoes. They were not suitable for any purpose other than pulling Talgo or similar trains.
Similarly, the Baldwin RP210H used a torque-converter drive to presumably eliminate many of the complexities of a standard electric drive. The addition of third-rail shoes and other control equipment to the NH power negated this theoretical advantage.
Question for Michael Sol: Were the box-cab electrics on MILW also equipped to run in multiple with diesels in a fashion similar to the Joes?
[quote user=“MichaelSol”]
I have no doubt that there is a difference between a one-time tow, for however many hundreds of miles, and a daily characteristic of operation. Can’t see an analogy between a 400 mile tow once in a while, and a regular daily 600 mile run, up to 200,000 miles per year. These just aren’t comparable. There is a 50,000% difference in the cycles, assuming one tow cycle per year, compared to the operating cycles.
Even if the tow cycle was once a month, the engine would have to last 4,166 years to experience the equivalent exposure to non-operating vibration and buffeting motion that the engine experiences in a single year of normal operation.
This is an extremely poor sampling comparison and simply cannot be the basis for a valid conclusion.
This is refering to an operating locomotive, operating on a tro
Yes, a similar system was developed by H.R. Morgan in 1957 and allowed the Boxcabs to MU with Diesel-electrics.
Ha!
It is true that I stopped renewing my membership in the Surface Chemistry section of the American Chemical Society in 1984. I was practicing law at that point, and wasnt’t going back into the field. However, during my ten years with the USDA, and my reason for having that particular membership, was because one of my odd duties – didn’t consume a lot of day to day work – at USDA was to be a primary investigator at the Metallurgical Fatigue and Surface Chemistry Laboratory. Tell me all about the engineering and stress on metal of vibration and environment.
My supervisor only had a BA in chem, whereas I was finishing a doctorate in chemistry and had the bachelor Chem E and so she did the administering and I did the chemistry. This involved study of surface erosion dynamics and stress application to various metals and alloys in various environments, determining effects both by periodic examination through hundreds of thousands of stress cycles using a Carl Zeiss Metallurgical microscope as well as measurement to failure through fatigue testing under varying levels of stress.
You are just guessing, whereas I do, in fact, bring a specific background in metallurgical analysis and testing to my conclusion based on specific professional experience in design, testing and evaluation of metal fatigure and surface erosion.
I’m not going to write a dissertation here, nor respond specifically to your condescending remark, but you almost have the key, you are just holding it backwards.
It is indeed a matter of energy.
And you do not, nor will you ever, have the sample necessary to reach the conclusion you feel strongly about, unless somebody dedicates a diesel locomotive to hauling around, starting it up and shutting it down two or three times a day while rollin
Some comments on the history and evolution of the FL9
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It is true that the initial idea by NH management for a dual power locomotive back in the early 50s was to take some load off the railroad’s Cos Cob, CT power plant. But by the time the EMD FL9’s were actually ordered in 1956 this strategy had changed completely because the RR was under control of a severely misguided management that considered the whole idea of electrification obsolete and was determined to replace all existing diesel and electric passenger power with FL9s.
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NH was not short of electric locomotives when they ordered the FL9s. In fact they retired a number if fine straight electrics before their time.
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Both FM and Alco issued to the NH a proposal for a dual power locomotive. However, at the time the strategy was under the control of a manager who was fanatically pro-EMD and wouldn’t hear of any other builder’s designs. No looking for bears behind trees on that one, those are the facts, pure and simple.
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The FL9’s have had an utterly amazing career for a number of owners. Really amazing when you consider how badly they were neglected in midlife by a couple of bankrupt owners.
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Before Metro North replaced them with the GE “Gennie” units the DC power option was non-functional on just about all of them, and they were operating on diesel into GCT, despite laws to the contrary. A few are still running on MN today, but not into GCT.
Despite their long service lives, all the research on their history supports that they were originally born due to a totally misguided strategy. The New Haven blew away tons of capital on this — capital they didn’t have in the late 50s, and no doubt that strategy hastened the company’s bankruptcy.
I remember vaguely one of your posts from a while back when you discussed the decision making involved in the eventually abandonment of the Milwaukee electrification. You had worked on this first hand if I remember correctly, and the analysis you and your coworkers came up with showed that maintaining the electrification was preferable to abandoning it, yet management chose the latter supposedly due to the economics of standardization.
One question: What was the analysis of the electric locomotive situation vis-a-vis remaining useful service life of the Joes et al and the cost of buying new electrics to replace the 50 year old boxcabs during the discussion of whether to continue the electrification or not? Can we assume the Joes still had 20 or 30 years left in them in 1974? What about the cost of replacing the older electrics (assuming they needed replacement)?
One thing I’m getting at is that a dual mode locomotive would not necessarily have been superfluous to the locomotive market if electrification was ended, since they could be stripped of their electrification equipment and still ran as straight diesel-electrics. But if Milwaukee bought brand new electrics, they were stuck with them with no resale possibility if electrification was abandoned a few years later.
Another comparitive consideration is the recent plethora of new locomotive designs, aka hybrids, gen-set
Well, I have three, four inch thick binders with memos and studies, MILW CMO, Electrical Engineer, VP-Management Services, Puget Sound Power & Light, Montana Power Co., Washington Water Power, LW Wylie, HR Morgan, EMD, GE, and an independent study arguing about this. Even H.F. Brown was consulted. Hard to make a cogent summary as they were all over the place.
By 1972, the Boxcabs were retired. E29ACB, E50AB and a C unit, E45ABCD, and I recall E37 or possibly E-39AB