I read where Milwaukee Road, in 1964, had introduced the innovative XL Special and Thunderhawk priority trains on the transcon between Chicago and Tacoma, Washington. Any body know what these were, and what made the “innovative”?
They were trains #261 westbound (XL Special) and #262 eastbound (Thunderhawk). Their claim to fame was a high speed schedule. If I recall, they were scheduled 55 hous for the run. I also seem to recall that this was faster than the passenger schedule. In the beginning, they often ran with GP-30s.
[%-)] They had two different names for the train, depending on which direction it was headed?
Yes. The westbound and its eastbound counterpart were actually considered to be two trains, as opposed to one train that runs in both directions. That was typical railroad practice since each train must have its own identity to control its rights over other trains. The westbound and its eastbound counterpart would have to meet, so they could not have the same indentiy. In this case, the two trains had names as well as numbers. The operating men never referred to them by name, however.
I don’t know what their speed limit was, but I think their schedule broke some kind of national record. I grew up near Hopkins, MN and hung out at Tower E-14 where the Milwaukee crossed the M&StL. I had heard about these new trains, and I just had to see them even though they ran west late at night and east early in the morning. I biked over to the tower about 4:00AM and got there just as #262 rang in. That surly was the fastest moving freight train I have ever seen. I am sure they were doing 80 mph at least. Slamming over the flangeways of that crossing at t
I don’t mean to throw this thread off topic, but it seems that whenever I would read about the thunderhawk trains I would also read about ‘dead freight’ trains. Where these revenue trains? Or where they just movements of empty cars, similar to a baretable move in intermodal?
The XL and the Thunderhawk were the hotshots. My understanding was that they were intended to beat the competition NP and GN in terms of schedule. Prior to their introduction, the Milwaukee ran time freights #263 and #264 on the coast line. Those still ran after the introduction of #261 and #262. They also ran a way freight as an extra that went west one day and east the next. I think you could call that a dead freight. It made a lot of setouts and pickups along the way. It usually ran with 3 or 4 GP9s and sometimes was over 200 cars. I often heard it called the way freight or drag freight.
I always liked the growling GP9 era on the Milwaukee. #263 and #264 always had five and often six GP9s. Sometimes they had 7-10 of them.
Solz,
A “dead freight” was the nickname given to unscheduled freights on the MILW PCE (I’ve never seen that moniker used on Eastern Division trains)- pretty much a dead freight was an extra that had no assigned train number.
In regards to the XL Special and Thunderhawk- they were also notable because they were dedicated merchandise trains specifically geared towards the newer larger freight cars like autoracks and high-wide type loads. In the years before the XL’s inauguration- the MILW undertook raising the ceilings on their tunnels on the PCE to accomodate this anticipated traffic. The XL and Hawk were the dedicated trains to haul this high value cargo. Business got so good for the XL that they had seperate Twin Cities and Chicago sections of the train (termed 261-TC and 261-C to identify origin point)- the train was also extended to the Portland gateway when that opened after the BN merger. In the fall of 1974 when the Milwaukee Road renumbered all of their freight trains #261 became #201, and #262 became #200- shortly thereafter the XL and Hawk monikers were dropped.
Was it that Milwaukee Road marketed toward high-wide type loads better, or were NP and GN not able to haul them?
At first I believe MILW was the first to undercut their tunnels to allow trilevel racks and hiwides to the coast- NP was limited by the low clearance of Stampede Tunnel, and I think GN hadn’t the clearance either- there is an article in one of my old Milwaukee Railroaders about the undercutting project and the XL Special service- perhaps I should dig that out tonight…
In 1962, GN’s fastest freight (via CBQ), Chicago to Seattle, was 94 hours. NP could do it in 97 hours, notwithstanding the burdens of grades and mileage. 328 ICC 474. NP’s bigger problem for the high value auto traffic was that it couldn’t haul the triple level auto racks coming into service.
Milwaukee Road’s fast freight in 1962, #263, ran its schedule at 77 hours – which already beat GN’s fast freight by 17 hours.
NP and GN had testified in 1963 that one of the merger benefits of the Northern Lines merger of a “single line haul” would have been their ability to run an 84 hour “fast freight.” 328 ICC 328. This, they claimed, was a compelling benefit of the merger – they would finally be able to offer “comparable” schedules with Milwaukee’s profitable premium service out West. They could almost match #263 and the ability to do this and to offer it was an important marketing tool, they felt, for a key class of shippers.
So, the Milwaukee’s XL Special, the new #261, at 55 hours in October, 1963 was just incredible by existing standards. Look at it from GN’s perspective – this was a 2200 mile run at almost half the running time of GN’s premium service – or nearly twice as fast. And that still included #263, which was kept to its original schedule running 17 hours faster than GN’s hotshot. MIL
Well, my [2c] as far as Milwaukee innovations has to be the electric-diesel synchronous control(?). The ability to co-run electric locomotives with diesel’s MU’d into the lashup shows us a railroad with a real can-do attitude. I’d bet these Milwaukee engineers could’ve come up with a steam-diesel, steam-electric, or even a steam-diesel-electric synchronous controller if need be. If railroads had been able to MU diesels to their existing modern steamers (as consists grew longer and heavier) without the need for the extra engine crews, it may have saved most of that steam until the end of it’s usefull service life.
MILW 261/262 were scheduled fast(with a limited tonnage and pickup schedule), but had a hard time maintaining that schedule. As noted, the secondary transcon trains was 263/264 and at times 265/265, with ‘Dead Freights’ thrown in. Power shortages in the late 60’s, and the need to add tonnage at times really affected the schedule. Even with the dedicated ‘TC’ sections there was a problem as the train moved west. Finding rested crews when you only have 6 trains a day on the PCE always caused problems. By the 70’s the railroad was in such bad shape they could not compete with BN. The CB&Q/GN #97/82(West Coaster) many times would beat the Milwaukee offering. And considering that the GN held most of the shipping/port contracts in Seattle, it really did not make a difference if the Milwaukee arrived early. I worked for the CB&Q in the late 60’s, and #97 usually beat #261 up the river. 97 was transferred to the GN in about 20-30 minutes(around midnight) and was out of GN’s Union Yard before 6 AM on it’s WB journey.
MILW 98/99(The Roaring 90’s) were a dedicated TOFC train between Chicago and the Twin Cities in the late 60’s. This train was expedited and was handled over the road quite fast. Management did a great job of monitoring it and made sure it kept it’s schedule. The later ‘Sprint’ trains extended the limited train length concept in the 70’s. The dedicated consist Sprint trains were innovative…
The ‘electrification’ and use of ‘Little Joe’ engines with GP9 diesels was not a technical marvel. The control stand on the electric had a ‘pin’ that was inserted and it engaged a diesel 8 step contoller below it to ‘MU’ the diesels. 261/262 got a ‘Little Joe’ to lead the 4 GP40’s or later 3 SD40-2 engines over the Rocky Mtn division. Other trains got a pair
I was just perusing the week’s average train speeds on another site-mid to upper 20’s MPH. Compared to 77 hours for 2200 miles (28.57MPH) and 55 hours (40MPH) over 40 years ago, when I was only…well never mind that part. Almost incredible! And 656 miles of electrification-truly a company willing to “think outside the box” and put their money where their mouth was, at least for a long time. Michael, you have referenced, in the past, a 1970’s study about upgrading the PCE to FRA Class IV (is IV the right level?) track. Would there have been any realignments necessary to attain those speeds? How far advanced were those studies-any proposed freight schedules?
Growing up surrounded by the C&NW green & yellow, my glimpses of the MILW’s black and orange were always something exotic to me. I wish I’d had a chance to really learn how much before it all went away…sigh.
Michael-what do the numbers and letters marked in blue signify?
From their inception through 1970, these trains had a 92% on time performance. After that, demand for services required not just the additional C & TC sections, but heavier tonnages on all the hotshots. Schedules did indeed slow as a result – of business!
Indeed, from that 1963 train #261 with a 3,000 ton limit, and the existing #263, which had a 4,000 ton limit if I am recalling correctly, by 1972, the MILW was carrying a minimum of 12,000 tons daily on Westbound hotshots which were consolidated in two versions of #261 and #263. Had they kept to the 1963 tonnage limits, MILW would have been running in 1972 a #261(1), #261(2) and #261(3), as well as a #263(1) and a #263(2).
A lot of other threads have talked about having a faster scheduled train running on the same lines as all the other trafiic can snarl up a railroad. For example, the (?)BNSF UPS train experiment a couple of years ago, that was featured in Trains Magazine. Didn’t this same thing happen on Milwaukee Road with the fast freights?
This was not supported by direct conversations (and even sworn testimony) by 1) The Port of Seattle, 2) the General Manager MILW Lines West, 3) the General Manager Lines West GN, 4) the Vice President – Seattle Region, BN. I spoke to all three (the GMLWGN became VPSRBN). MILW was the primary rail service for the Port of Seattle. POS testified extensively on this point to the ICC and to the Federal District Court in 1979 with detailed historical presentations as well as tonnage figures. The Port of Seattle publicly stated that the Port and the Milwaukee Road had always had a “special relationship” because of Milwaukee’s position as the dominant carrier.
Bill Brodsky, now retired President, MRL, has been quoted in publications (and I have talked to him about it as well) as stating that at the time that he was MILW Asst VP-Planning, mid-1970s, MILW had 76% of all of POS traffic, and over 50% of the growing TOFC/COFC traffic. Hank Levenger, general manager POS, confirmed this to me personally.
Volume 328, Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, page 474. These are the official findings and opinions of the Interstate Commerce Commission resulting from the presentation of sworn testimony and evidence taken in any given official proceeding – in this instance, the Northern Lines Merger proceeding.
Michael,
When #261’s schedule was lengthened to Portland, do you have the figures on how much added tonnage this added to #261 overall? (Same to be said for #262 eastbound) I know after a short amount of time the traffic coming out Portland required a second set of trains to be added (I had heard they even tried for a third set but were told no?)- do you know how much of this was high priority traffic for #261?
I find it amazing that even up to the end of operations the MILW still had a healthy amount of Port of Seattle traffic left on #200 and #201- was there still a good amount of autos going to Kent via MILW- or was that some of the traffic lost (given away) to the UP after the 1977 bankruptcy/1978 service crisis?
I should also note, because not only the falsity of this contention is stubbornly ingrained in the railfan consciousness to the extent that no citation is important if it is to the contrary of the perception, that FRA published a study, 1978 I believe, that showed that MILW had 23% or so of the total Washington State rail traffic in 1977, which represented a decline from the market share of previous years. Considering that the Washington rail market was appropriately represented by the constituent roads of the BN – therefore consisting of the former NP, former GN, former SP&S, MILW and UP – that the average market share if all things were equal was 20% among the five rail lines.
That MILW represented a larger portion of the overall market share than the statistical average, even in 1977, is suggestive that MILW’s ability to sell it’s services was not less, but rather better than, the statistical average of the five rail lines serving Washington State. This is suggestive in an indirect way of MILW’s high market share of Port of Seattle traffic.