MILW was historically perhaps the largest carrier of Pacific Northwest lumber products. After the Portland entry, additional lumber was coming from the Southern Pacific, which was the dominant carrier of Oregon’s sizeable lumber industry. That would certainly explain the jump in lumber carloads.
In a related discussion this week, I was surprised to learn that SP was sending so much long haul to Milwaukee at Portland that it was significantly shorthauling itself on that traffic.
“One other interesting event concerning the Portland Gateway, is that the SP agreed to short haul itself - I never have understood why. As the MILW traffic increased out of [Portland’s SP] Brooklyn [Yard], the MODOC traffic decreased. Prior to the BN merger, the SP was operating a through Medford-Ogden train via Klamath Falls, a 1st OGDUP and a 2nd OGDUP from Eugene, a first OGDRG and usually a 2nd OGDRG from Eugene. All of this traffic was “Long East”. When we started blocking for the MILW over Portland, that traffic volume started to decline to where the MODOC was handling only two trains each way per day and the Siskiyou connection had been cancelled. It is a tribute to the DRGW sales crew in Portland that one of those trains was a solid Rio Grand train and the other was a split block UP/RG that terminated in Ogden.”
Did BN interchange eastbound traffic also “out west” rather than at Twin Cities? If so, what was there motivation to interchange out west rather than TC, other than return of empties?
beaulieu mentioned the high failure rate of the Milw GP40 and SD40-2 as compared the the Soo Line’s same models.
Because of the 4-R money the Milw received they had to use any minority supplier who came along for parts and components. Some of the stuff the Milw received was good, but of course some was not so good. One of the first problems Soo had to correct was to replace governors, which were causing a high rate of failures of the ex Milw units.
Not sure I understand the question. BN would have little incentive to transfer to MILW out west for eastbound traffic, unless per shipper’s instructions. It would have been the equivalent of Milwaukee choosing to transfer westbound traffic at Twin Cities, rather than carrying it to Seattle or Portland. Can’t see any motive for either action. BN did interchange at the Western Gateways for eastbound traffic where that traffic had a MILW destination west of the Twin Cities – but they had always done that.
“at the same time,MILW lost tonnage and carloadings at Twin Cities eastbound - all shorthaul.”
Michael, that was the comment that I asked for clarification. What eastbound shorthaul did these lose at Twin Cities…unless it was the interchange from GN and NP which now went all the way thru to Chicago on the ex Burlington.
One hard assumption I would make is that GN/NP never interchanged bridge traffic with MILW if CBQ offered the Chicago interchange.
At Twin Cities during the 1960s, MILW received from GN 27,000 or so carloads, from NP 19,000 or so. MILW had lost 20,000 of those eastbound carloads by 1977. Whether those were “those” carloads, or perhaps that traffic had dried up on BN is not established by the available record. MILW appears to have kept its westbound carloads. There is some evidence that the loss of eastbound carloads was from traffic MILW was able to solicit out West through western gateways – the traffic no longer arrived in the Twin Cities on the BN, and so was “lost” only as a statistical artifact at that interchange. MILW may well have gotten the lion’s share of its own eastbound Twin Cities losses – for the longer haul.
Interesting, though, GN was always a reliable interchange partner with MILW at the Twin Cities – pretty good numbers.
And the 4-R money was going to equipment that had suffered a 50% bad order ratio during the bad winter of 1977-1978. A lot of repairs going on, to a relatively young fleet. Certainly would have seemed odd to a Steam guy. But, the VP – Operations and Maintenance wrote me a note that stated there “was a lot of water getting thrown up in the traction motors” that winter.
Had the Ogden Gatway Agreement requiring the SP to solict traffic preferentially for the UP from points on the old Central Pacific? This would explain why the D&RGW was soliciting the traffic from Oregon via the Modoc. Perhaps the UP/MP/WP merger ended the Ogden Gateway Agreement. I don’t know. The SP normally did not try to solicit traffic in Oregon, its subsidiary St. Louis Southwestern (Cotton Belt) soli
The Odgen Gateway Agreement died with the MOPUP merger. In the thirty years previous the SP would try to use SSW cars for moves from the PNW to the Northeast via E. St. Louis. If the car user was thick a SSW salemen would help connect the dots on car supply and giving the SSW a haul on their car. In addition it is bad business to screw your local railroad. Some day you will need a favor from your switching crew.
I am going to start another thread on them and would really appreciate your input. I got my 1972 Moody’s and am taking a pretty good look at MILW, Rock, and CNW.
Yeah, my girlfriend asked me last night if I was seeing anyone else. Guess that should be a clue to put the book down and pay a little attention to her.