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MM&A CEO, managers face criminal charges in Lac-Mégantic case; Burkhardt mum on new development
I was wondering if Fast Eddie was going to beat the rap on this one. He should have said “No comment” or “Pas de Reponse” before he showed up at Lac-Megantic without speaking a word of French.
We could not expect that a disaster of this magnitude would not result in multiple charges at many levels. The conclusion of the investigation determined that the primary cause was, to paraphrase, criminal negligence. Many lives were lost and many others were affected, as well as massive destruction of property.
Going after Ed Burhhardt shows nothing but contempt for “big business.” Yeah, like he was there saying “come on, lets go, no need to set any more brakes.”
Rehashing my previous stipulations:
If there was a rule required “number”, not in the weasel words “a sufficient number of”, but a specific number of handbrakes to be set before leaving a train unattended and the engineer didn’t set them, there are 5 too many charged.
If management didn’t set requirements by the numbers and didn’t as supervisors set the requirements by rule and did not educate and enforce them, then 5 officers or more, but not the engr., should be charged.
And, every oil field chemist that did not warn the world of the volaitiltey of this fracked crude should be
crude-cified.
It seems the obvious points being missed here m are:
#1 Yes the Train Crew Stopped the train, and set (an appropriate number of brakes within the train.) according to their Rules?
#2 That an unexpected event occurred: Fire on the active running locomotive:- The locomotive left running was disabled/shut down by the responding F.D., allowing the brake system to bleed down; creating the run-away situation. Apparently, the responding Fire Dept personnel shut off the locomotive and failed to notify the railroad in a timely manner of their action?
#3 Should the F.D.which was on the scene “stood-by” until a railroad official arrived ,and re-secured the train? Then starting one of the other locomotives to provide air to hold the train?
#4 The F.D.'s shutting down the engine could have been a";given response" in the situation, but were the F.D. personnel on the scene competent to assess the act of shutting down the locomotive, and assessing the ramifications of that act?
It appears the fire department will get a pass if its their fault. Not the case if its the railroad’s fault and that’s not right.
When you leave a train unattended on a siding or the Mainline you are to put enough Handbrakes to hold the train even if all the air brakes bleed off. You are never to depend on the air brakes to hold the train if no one is on board. This was a rule which was in the rulebooks in 1972 when I started with the CNW. Also you would give the train a pull if leave on a grade before you tied the engines brakes down and the train was not to keep rolling. To do that with one man would take a long time.
Sam your take on fire departments actions that night were spot on. Their main concern when arriving on scene is to get the fire out. If MMA had had first responder meetings like my railroad does they would with out a doubt known what to do. The fact that when the engineer heard what was going on up on the hill above town offered to go help secure the scene and was told NO speaks to A total disregard for safety and more about profits in this case. I hope the family of all the victims get some kind of closure when all is said and done.
Tom K. a retired engineer thanks you. There may of been a company culture of get the train over the road as far as you can. That encourages shortcuts to be taken. Leaving a train on a grade unattended for long periods of time repeatedly is asking for trouble to strike eventually. The whole one-man crew thing is a shortcut in my book.
@SAM PREST - The fire department did not fail to notify MMA in a timely manner. An MM&A employee was at the scene while they were there. You can’t get more timely than that.
Why does this myth keep being repeated again and again and again? No version of this myth has appeared in any newspaper article about the accident I’ve seen - EVERY news article has reported the presence of an MM&A employee who was there during, and after, the firefighters, and who left BEFORE the train ran away.
It would not have rolled if they would have done a brake test like we do here or at least my railroad does, regardless if engine was shutdown or not, the brake test we do is with engine or engines coupled, brakepipe at 90psi, independent released then 3 minutes, so dont blame the Firefighters like some people have. But thats my opinion based on my experience personally.
Mr.Harding had a practice of failing to apply enough hand brakes, and many of the former employees had learned that when they had picked up a parked train. They lost their jobs because they failed to inform someone who would have corrected the situation. They will also have to live with that knowledge that they are also guilty. More than one person knew what was happening every day even if it was a one person crew on those trains.
The company rules permitted a locomotive to be counted as a “car unit” but it only has 2 brake shoes apply when the hand brake wheel is tighten. The rules required 10% plus two cars.
Loco 1: 2 brake shoes
Loco 2 : 2 Brake shoes
R/C caboose counted as a locomotive: 8 brake shoes
Loco 3: 2 brake shoes
Loco 4: 2 brake shoes
Spacer car: 8 brake shoes
This is all that was applied by Mr. Harding, and not one oil car receiving hand brakes. Total: 24 brake shoes
If he applied 10% plus two car it would include 3 car of oil.
Car 1 of Oil: 8 brake shoes
car 2 of oil 8 brake shoes
car 3 of oil: 8 brake shoes. Total 24 brake shoes.
If he applied per the rules he would have doubled the number of brake shoes set tight against the wheels to hold the train.
The company rules should not permit counting a locomotive which only apply 2 brake shoes, and only train cars with 8 brake shoes be permitted in the 10% plus 2 cars.
24 brake shoes will not hold that weight train on that grade.
48 brake shoes would likely had held the train and a properly applied tug test would prove that.
The tug test must only be made when the locomotive independent brakes are in full release so it test the holding strength of just the hand brakes.
The management is charged as they had failed to make Train Master safety test of this man’s performance. Many of the men who picked up these trains should also be charged for failing to call in the safety failure.
Shutting down the locomotive would cause the locomotive brakes to release but would have no effect on the train brakes.
@Kenneth Packard, train brakes are different from truck brakes when air is lost. Train brakes release when the air supply is lost while truck brakes set. Stop the engine, you stop the air supply. No train air, no train brakes eventually. This is a railcar design in order to prevent flat spots from developing on the wheels when the air is lost while moving. Profits vs safety is the rule here.
@Paul Harrison, People on this site keep saying there was an MM&A employee on site during the engine fire. Just who was this employee and what was his job description or qualifications? If this person was there during the fire, why isn’t his or her name on the list of people being charged?
@Brett Reid III, How do you do a train air test @90PSI with no air supply? In this case the local FD shut the engine down and thus shut the train air supply off. Had the FD started another of the locomotives in the consist then another source of air supply could have been applied.
The FD was ignorant of how to respond and react to a fire PERIOD. Volunteer or paid, the FD is responsible for it’s own training first and foremost. Standards are set but the training can be exceeded. You train for ALL possibilities. Thus the main responsibility for the ensuing wreck remains their responsibility. But this is Canada and common sense doesn’t prevail.
The Canadian rules at that time, and Railroad rules, required the entire train air brakes to be in release with no train line air pressure. The locomotive brakes should also have been in release but their practice had been to have the engine brakes applied with a unit running to keep the pressure retained. Supervision did not correct that.
The failure was the fire department thinking the railroad was in control, but the railroad men on the seane were only 2 track men who knew nothing about the securiity of the train. The company failure was not having a management employee on the incident, and the railroad office approved the fire department leaving the fire.as the fire chief told the office that railroad men were there. Also, the fire could have been left to burn all night and no damage would have been done, and if any manager was there he could have handled the fire. Mr.Harding called from the Hotel and asked to return to the engines and was told to get his rest. That was a bad call as the office knew there was no manager at the locomotives at the time. Mr. Harding could have started another unit and killed the fire without the fire department.
The rules were immediately changed to have a parked train retaining 90# in the brake pistons and be in applied status. This still requires hand brakes to be applied hard against the wheels of 10% of the train size plus 2 more cars. Mr. Harding only applied half the hand brake shoes he was required to apply, and them he did a tug test against those hand brakes, but it had all the locomotive air brakes applied, so his test was a total failure. He was pulling against 48 brake shoes, but when the engine brakes leaked off, there were only 24 shoes applied to prevent the train movement. Not enough and not per the rules. That was the second failure by Mr.Harding. He would have discovered his first failure if he did the tug test corectly. The Federal rules were wrong at the time also.
@LAWRENCE G HAWS - There was actually two employees (FWIW), figured the easiest was to check Wikipedia, whose article on the disaster is fairly comprehensive. I checked the sources linked to in the article and they confirm Wikipedia’s version. Firefighters arrived on scene, MM&A dispatched two employees who were there before the firefighters left, the MM&A employees left later.
Were they not qualified? Possibly - they were, according to the article, track maintenance people - but they were there, supposedly being the experts from the railroad.
Are they being charged? No idea. I can’t find any article that names them. If they weren’t qualified, then it’s arguable the people who dispatched them and then failed to do a thorough debrief (or else failed to act upon that debrief) are more responsible.
To add context to my post just now (and to answer some of the other questions that keep coming up here), here is the Wikipedia page in question: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lac-Mégantic_rail_disaster#Events_shortly_prior_to_the_derailment
As I said, the version there seems to match the sources they link to.
To wash some blood off the bus’s tires, were, as rules require, a tried, tested and proved number of freight car handbrakes set, proven to hold the train and “power,” we would not be having this conversation; no one,from CEO to Operating Dept Officers, to Train and crew Dispatchers, the engineer, Maintenance of Way emloyes, Fire Dept members, none could be held responsible, "cause the tragedy would not have happened.
Whatever official and whatever engr that left trains so hideously and heinously hazardous that…S–T Happens…that the 47 people and explosion…fire and heart-rending results inevitably were our fate.
Increase diligence!
Of course what is astonishing about the scenario leading to the train’s running free is the lack of caution, which is always the primary element for an accident, broken rail, wheel, etc. aside.