I was reading some interesting history of the Chicago, Indiananpolis & Louisville Railway (the Monon). From the 20’s on, the Monon was struggling, filing bankruptcy in 1933. It revived a little during WW II, but shortly thereafter, some thought was given to abandonment.
Come 1946, and John Barringer becomes president of the road, and decides to turn it into a “super railroad”. He quickly dieselized the locomotive fleet by the end of 1948, and set about to fix up the physical plant. Among other things, he had grades no steeper than .5 percent, and curves no sharper than 2 percent. Bridges and track were fixed. 1000+ new freight cars were purchased.
The fairy tail ending, is that the Monon became a respectable, profitable railroad and was merged into Louisville & Nashville in 1971, and is now part of CSX. And they lived happily ever after?
Back to the thought of unbridled optimism in the railroad industry after WW II: Was Barringer a railroad “savior”? Was the Monon that much of a success, that railroads just had to merge with it? Or, was the 25 years of reletive prosperity just enough to pay off the cost of rebuilding before being swallowed up in a merger?
But it didn’t have Super Traffic. The L&N had to take the Monon to get the ICC to allow it to acquire the C&EI. No one wanted the Monon. It offered nothing of strategic value. It’s severed today.
I think the Monon was never a Super Railroad except by stretching the definition until it snapped.
I have a personal relationship with the Barriger family. Mr. Barriger was a smart, tireless, enthusiastic railway man. There was nothing not to like about him. He was highly successful at enabling some pretty marginal properties like the Monon and the Katy to fend off the scrap merchant for years, properties that few other CEOs would have tried to make something out of. As “systems” they had no particular long-term value, but thanks to Barriger some of their valuable pieces (such as Katy from Kansas City to Dallas) hung on long enough for a rich railroad (like UP) to come in, tear the track completely off the right-of-way, rebuild it from scratch, and make something useful from them.
Barringer does indeed sound like an exemplary railroad man.
I wonder today, in an atmosphere of sensitive common stock, more regulations and probably more railroad bureaucracy in the headquarters, whether one person at the head can “make a difference” in such a way. - a.s.
But…but…“If you build it, they wil come”. I know. I saw it in the movies. How in the world did Mr. Barringer get money put together to finance a revival of the Monan?
Yes, I think so. Plenty of them are pretty good at making a difference in a disastrous way, too. But fortunately few of that class of executives deign to work at railways. Too many of us obtuse, recalcitrant, old-fashioned types would make it too hard for them. People who want to make an obscene amount of money and aren’t bothered by the wrecked economies, wrecked lives, wrecked communities, and broken promises that result rarely choose railways for a career.
From a distance it sure appears the Claytor brothers made a difference.
It is obvious that Stanley Crane made a huge difference. The more I read of him, the more impressive he seems. He single handedly, well maybe not single handedly, but against all odds kept Conrail independent for several years and seemed to have respect of all, except Elizabeth Dole.
Monon is a surprizingly spry railroad in sections today. Between Lafayette and Crawfordsville they run quite a few trains. I have been making the trip often along their tracks between Northern Indiana and Crawfordsville and there is a nice amount of traffic, particularly with grain and steel.
Maybe because I am a transplant, it just hits me more than it should. But, I have never heard of a state so in love with a railroad than Indiana and the Monon. Normal people in Indiana who don’t know the difference between Amtrak and Amway refer to the Monon affectionately. If they are over 50, this is much more the case.
The thing that always struck me about the Monon is that it didn’t end up in the hands of the Southern. I still do not understand how that didn’t happen.
I think that was just serendipity, Gabe. The Monon was a railroad of the right size, that covered the state from one end to the other, and captured the fancy of the state by being the public servant. Some good PR, and the “Hoosier Line” (rather than, say, “Indiana’s road of commerce”) slogan, and the atmosphere that went with it, were helpful. The fact that it willingly modernized itself, and had (starting with Barriger) a bunch of salesmen at the helm to give the impression that they wanted to provide good service for their people did wonders when it came to fostering this atmosphere.
Railroads are in it for the money. But the right people can make the local folks overlook that for just a minute and come to appreciate the railroad as an institution and service. It would be nice if some railroads could foster that image today, but everything has to be just right. The two that come closest (or stand a chance) would be the Wisconsin & Southern and the Iowa Interstate. I wish somebody with a big pocketbook would cobble together what remains of Michigan’s shortlines and rejected routes, and make a cohesive railroad with peninsular recognition (and not name it something ridiculous like the Grand Elk!).
I am currently reading Richard Saunders Main Lines, dealing with the railroad’s revitalization from 1970 thru 2000 and he makes a point in the book that Southern was not interested in Monon. Further he states that as a condition of L&N picking up the Evansville - Chicago line from MoPac/C&EI that they (L&N) were to acquire the Monon.
So, given this and the lack of interest by the Southern, one must conclude it just wasnt that good of a railroad, even with the access to Chicago.
I thought I had read that Southern preferred a better connection from the south, through Cincinati? I’m not sure who that connection was with, or if that carrier had rebuilt it’s lines post-WW II to super railroad specs.
Gabe and Murphy – When you say “get to Chicago,” what matters is precisely where and how the line ends up in Chicago and who it parallels to get there. It doesn’t do much good to have a line to Chicago if it has no decent yards in Chicago, no trackage rights on belt lines, no ownership pieces of the belt lines, no industries along its lines, no smooth connections to other connections. The classic example of this is Rock Island in Kansas City – on paper the Rock went to a big city with lots of industries and rail traffic interchange. In reality the Rock was just passing through as if it was on a viaduct and it had no traffic there. It was landlocked into a little island called Armourdale Yard and had no ability to serve or develop any industries because it arrived and departed the city on top of other carriers via trackage rights. As I recall it had a grand total of one industry in Kansas City. All it could do was hand off and accept traffic from other carriers that in most cases were paralleling the Rock to wherever the Rock might take that traffic! Which means – it didn’t get any.
If the line to Chicago you purchase is parallelling a line of another carrier that by interchanging with your new line in Chicago instead of where it did previously would be short-hauling itself, the interchange in Chicago will exist on paper only. To illustrate, suppose you are a western carrier and your major interchange in St. Louis is with Conrail, and the preponderance of the traffic you interchange originates on Conrail (they control it) in Michigan. One day you purchase the former Alton from St. Louis to Chicago, and you announce to Conrail that now you’d like them to hand you that traffic at Chicago instead. After they pick themselves up from the floor and wipe the tears from their eyes, they will tell you, “No.”
Alternatively, if through an acquisition you take traffic off another railway that has interchanges with you at an entire
Monon was acquired by L&N in part to buy its acquiescence in L&N’s purchase of C&EI’s Evansville line. Monon was not a very good entrance into Chicago. It had a small flat yard in South Hammond and used trackage rights over the CWI to get into Chicago proper, although it did have an ownership interest in BRC. After a few years, L&N acquired trackage rights over GTW between Dyer and Thornton Jct. to get its Monon freights into Yard Center, which at the time was a joint MP/L&N facility.
Looking back to the 60’s and 70’s, it is my impression that the Southern Railway wasn’t especially anxious to extend their lines beyond their key gateways of Cincinnati, St Louis, Memphis and New Orleans. Beyond the zero-sum issue outlined by RWM above, the Southern happened to be well positioned to take advantage of the migration of businesses to the Southeast that became significant about the mid-20th Century. I think it can be said that they had a plant in good condition, sound operations and sharp marketing effort. Obviously, having a very well managed railroad is essential for success, but absent a solid source of business, even the best could fail.
To the best of my knowledge the SR remained profitable in the 60’s and 70’s, at the same time that the Official Territory (Northeast) and Granger Lines were generally going in the tank.
While the Southern was in good shape, they certainly were not ignoring the changes in the compeititve environment. However, it would appear that they were being very cautious about expanding. I don’t know the exact time, but somewhere between 1975 and the time they began merger talks with the N&W, the SR had discussions and did a thorough evaluation of a merger with the Illinois Central Gulf. That would have given them a couple of routes into Chicago and excellent freight car and intermodal facilities there. However, the ICG did not have a particularly strong on line traffic base in Chicago. A couple of years ago, I had a conversation with a former Southern employee who worked on that merger study. He said that in the end, against the price the ICG was asking, the condition of the ICG’s physical plant and the lack of the traffic that would satisfactorily enhance the Southern’s profitability led them to back away from picking up the ICG.
I think it can be assumed that for the time, merging with the N&W wa
RWM- I can easily understand how us folks at the Gabe, Murphy & Pacific Railroad could focus on the details of the small picture, and completely ignore the bigger picture. But, how did someone like John Barringer , who gets credit for being the savior of several small lines, have done the same thing? Was ther some other reason, that he felt his new super railroad would have the traffic needed to justify the expense?
May I add to this question? Is it probable that Barriger had in mind that a well managed property, even without great profit potential, would, with a good reputation, enhance shareholder value? Not to imply that it was by any stretch his only goal, but perhaps in the end the price paid by the railroads that acquired the lines he worked on was much greater than it would have been absent his work.
Lets not forget another discussion Southern had in the late 70’s and that was with the Missouri Pacific. That would have been a powerhouse and might have forced SP and SCL to make good on their possible merger. Both carriers were very well managed and had growing territories.
Further, Southern Railway explored opening an Atlanta - Chicago freight on a tight 48 hour schedule via Louisville/Milwaukee Road. Remember the Milwaukee picked up access to Louisville on the ex Monon when L&N purchased them. During the discussions with Milwaukee Road, they admitted they could not get a train from Louisville to Chicago in 48 hours, which was the time Southern wanted for Atlanta - Chicago. (source: Mainlines, page 162-3)
Southern didnt really seem to be in a panic to merge outside their territory, until the CSX merger. At that point, in 1979 they indicated in their willingness to purchase the former Monon line from Louisville to Chicago. In addition to the Monon purchase, Southern wanted to purchase: a Jacksonville - Orlando - Tampa line, K&I Terminal in Louisville, 50% ownership of eastern Ky coal lines, 50% ownership of phosphate lines in Fl, and 50% ownership of DT&I. Southern was planning to spend $145million for these lines. (source: Moody’s Transportation Manual, 1980 edition). So, with the CSX proposal, Southern got defensive.
In July, 1980 NW and Southern announced their merger plans.
The entire 1970/80’s merger movement is very interesting, particularly for those of us who were around then and remember all the barriers at the articulation points.
Mr. Barriger came on board in 1946, IIRC. Also in about 1946, the Chicago, Attica & Southern was on its last legs. About the only thing they had in common was service to LaCrosse, and I’m sure CA&S was worse off than CI&L. Still, I wonder if the Monon wasn’t just another CA&S with better management (oh, and big cities as end points).
Amazingly, the tower which protected the C&O and Monon crossing (Wade Tower) is still standing although the Monon line is long gone. The C&O line of course is now the CKIN (Chesapeake and Indiana) and hosted the NKP765 over Memorial Day weekend. It must have been quite a railroad junction back in the 40’s with C&O, Monon, Pennsy, CA&S, and Pere Marquette.
([:I]) OK…People like me, light years away from understanding the railroad business, could easily lose sight of the big picture. With a narrow focus, I might be able to convince myself that trying to turn the Monan into a super railroad after WW II, was a very good idea. And, I’d wonder why it didn’t work, and why there was no traffic to justify the expense. Why would someone like John Barringer, who always seems to be given such high marks for bringing railroads back from the brink, end up making the same mistake I would have?