More than just a glorified truck driver

https://www.railwayage.com/safety/more-than-just-a-glorified-truck-driver/

Posted separately so those who are not following the 501 thread will see this.

Words spoken by someone who likely could do neither job (or maybe Menke was a qualified locomotive engineer… I dunno). Both professions require alot of skill and training… albeit, sadly, only one of them (locomotive engineer) is generally recognized as such… Which requires more? I don’t know… I can only do one of them… Nor does it matter… Menke’s words insulted truck drivers as well as locomotive engineers at a time of labor strife when a softer tone would have been more useful… maybe proof that the position of CEO is also overstated.

The author draws quite a contrast to what is needed to know the territory and what was lacking in route knowledge with the engineer of #501. This appears to be a problem with Amtrak hiring and training. The engineer of #501 seems to have been very familiar with the deadly curve, although he failed to keep track of where he was and came upon the curve unexpectedly. It seems that he was in doubt, but did not take the safe course. Instead, he soldiered on in search for the answer.

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He was not prepared to encounter the curve, so rather than slowing from 79 mph down to the 30 mph curve speed limit; he entered the curve at 79 mph. His last recorded remark to the conductor riding with him was, “Aww, we’re dead.”

Thanks for reposting … must have lost this in all the other discussion on the 501 thread.

One would have thought that a supervisor would have been in the cab for the inaugural run.

We have a training program here when we can not find drivers that we need. However it is not the standard OTR training program that catches so much grief in the media if you read transportation journals. The boss set it up after talking to both my hubby and his now late father on what would be the best way to train new drivers for what we haul around here. His father had over 3.7 million miles all accident free in his career and had been a trainer at several companies. How we set it up was a 12 week course most are 6 weeks. The first 4 weeks solid the trainee does all the driving however the trainer is in the passenger seat watching every thing that the trainee does and at the end of the day tells him what he is doing wrong and how to correct his mistakes. 2nd month the trainee drives his shift the trainer drives for another 5 hours. But again they do the post day debriefing. The last 4 weeks they run team. Our trainees before they are released to run on their own have at least 36K miles of OTR driving in real world situations and have gone down every single mountain we tackle on a routine basis. Then and only then do we turn them loose. The program must work pretty well our trainees according to our insurance carrier have a 80% lower rate of accidents than any other 1st year driver.

Part of the problem with better “smarter” technology is that it allows the operator to become inattentive… so he/she may be highly trained and capable, but that doesn’t matter when they’re asleep at the switch. This will likely become more of a problem over the next five years as smart technology becomes more pervasive, yet an operator is still required. This is what appears to have happened here with the Amtrak engineer… he was well trained and likely capable… just wasn’t paying attention. The tech wizzards and designers need to consider how to keep the operator interested and engaged when applying new technology… if the engineer is needed but has nothing to do for any length of time he/she (like any human being) grows bored and becomes inattentive… with predictable consequences.

Actually what appears to have happened is that the engineer was dismissive of the need to apply dilligence to safety. This appears to be part of his personality, and Amtrak did not let that prevent their hiring of him. He also was not well trained for the route. But he did know about the deadly curve, and did not make enough effort to make sure he knew when he would encounter it along the route.

If you read the transcript of the in-cab conversation between the engineer and the conductor, it is stunning how he jokes about how difficult it can be to navigate your way on unfamiliar railroad routes. The conversation as they begin the run is almost predictive of an impending disaster.

Sounds as if he was simply bored… “dismissive of safety and diligence” is not an ingrained personality trait… rather its a behavior acquired, probably over time, resulting from outside influences. He wasn’t paying attention…It’s somewhat akin to you and I driving down the freeway on a clear day with little traffic… we’ve got the music turned up… one hand on the wheel…and we’re likely chatting with the passenger if there is one. Very few of us would be sitting bolt upright… both hands on the wheel… 100% focussed on driving… The Amtrak engineer similarly wasn’t engaged to the extent that he needed to be…maybe he was on other trips… but this time 'round he wasn’t.

If we assume the man was no fool, and experienced, and not possessed of a ‘fat head’, what could possibly have led him to be where his body is today…first time on that route, no experience to speak of on type, and this happens!!! I’m inclined to think he was distracted, inattentive, lacked situational awareness (if just for two minutes…), or had way too much hubris to have been the great choice for this inaugural run.

The engineer knew about the 30 mph curve as he approahced it at 79 mph. He just did not know exactly where it was by actual landmarks. He knew where it was by mileposts, and there was a 2-mile advance warning sign. He did not happen to see that sign and one of the mileposts. He had an oddometer that he could have used to spot mileposts and thus know exactly where it was, but he did not do that. He knew he was lost at this point, and yet he did not slow down. The rules says, “When in doubt, take the safe course.” He was in doubt and the safe couse was to slow down to 30 mph until he arrived at the curve and proceeded through it. Distraction probably played a role in this, but he should have not let it play a role. He knew he was lost. Yet, he kept running at 79 mph apparently in hope of regaining the knowledge of where the curve was before actually encountering it.

You would have to read the transcript of the cab conversation and see how he was almost joking about getting lost in other locations. He seemed to dismiss the his responibility to know his territory in these conversations. It was as if he regarded it to Amtrak’s fault for thusting into unfamiliar territory.

All what you tell is the recollection of the engineer four weeks after the accident.

For me all his actions (e.g. not using the odometer) show he didn’t realize he was lost until the last moment. So he didn’t slow down.

I’m not sure if one can take the joking literally.

It was Amtrak’s fault to send an engineer unfamiiar with the route and locomotive on that trip. It is the engineers fault that he didn’t protest or refuse to run the train.

To judge from that little information we have that he shouldn’t have been allowed to become an engineer seems a bit exaggerated.

If better vetting would have found possible flaws I’m not sure.

I was involved in vetting processes of civil engineers at my employer. Often enough I was proven wrong, in both directions.

Don’t forget that people go prepared into this kind of interviews. You mostly can only look at their head not into.

And you can select only from those offering their labor.
Regards, Volker

And people are frustratingly unpredictable… I hire people too. And more often than I’d care to admit, I’m dead wrong in my assessment. Hired a straight laced articulate intelligent guy with credentials a mile long… had to fire him for spitting at an MTO officer (among other things). Also hired a “biker dude”… rough looking would be an understatement… no credentials… best worker ever. Go figure. Test all we want… people are unpredictable…

I fail to see how making self-deprecating jokes is a career-disqualifying character flaw.

The engineer made a mistake. That’s on him. But he was provided with a route that he’d only operated once, at half of track speed, with a brand new locomotive that he’d never operated before (that has much larger blind spots to the right and left) and a conductor trainee that he was supposed to help qualify.

A pretty stacked deck against him.

I don’t see his making of jokes as being the character flaw. What the jokes do is reveal a flaw in the kind of character that is needed to run a passenger train. The jokes and his behavior both show an attitude that he just runs the engine and it is Amtrak’s responsibility to make sure he knows where he is going. Amtrak offered him the run with all of the hardships of not knowing the territory. So he took the offer, but then acted like the hardships were not his problem. In Doug Riddell’s story, he was put in the same position and he refused the run unless the company sent someone more qualified with him.

We know the engineer knew about the 30 mph curve, but he did not know how to identify the approach to it by landmarks. We know that if he were to just wait until he saw the curve and then took action to slow down, it would be too late to slow down. He must have known that too.

So apparently, the engineer intended to rely on spotting the 2 mile advance warning sign to learn that the curve was 2 miles ahead. What was his plan to make sure he did not miss that 2 mile advance warning sign? He would have had to resolve to not take his eyes off of the right side of the track where the sign would be located. Obviously, he either did not do that or he did it, but somehow failed to assimilate the advance warning sign.

As I seem to recall, he did say that he looked at some instrument gauges in the cab, and therefore, might have missed spotting the advance warning sign while looking at the gauges. What was his plan if someone had stolen the sign, or knocked it down so it could not be recognized? This is

Which should have him tightning up his male attachments and stating to anybody that was listening and to all those that weren’t listening -

I am NOT Qualified on this route and I am NOT Qualified on this locomotive. I will not depart until I am provided a pilot that is qualified on both the route and the locomotive.

No matter how stacked the deck was against him he held but did not use the ultimate trump card -

I’m NOT Qualified!

To Volker Landwehr’s points: “…It was Amtrak’s fault to send an engineer unfamiiar withSomeone the route and locomotive on that trip…” Absolutely,Someone at Amtrak screewd up! With no further information on the [#501’s]Engineer’s side; of what happend when he took the throttle, there is only supposition(?). What if any ‘pressures’ were brought to bear on the engineer; as to him making the decision to take that trip [#501]? What was said, to him to make him leave out(?). Threats? Cajoling? Who knows? Obviously, at the point of departure, #501 was making a very important trip, for the State of Washington, and not to mention one of immense political importance , as well.

Volker Landwehr further stated:“…It is the engineer’s fault that he didn’t protest or refuse to run the train. To judge from that little information we have that he shouldn’t have been allowed to become an engineer seems a bit exaggerated…”

It would seem to me at that point the ‘first safety’ for AMTRAK would have been to have assigned a knowledgeable Pilot Engineer, as well ; The ‘second safety’ would have been, to BaltACD’s point. The assigned engineer to #501,should have made his demands to be ‘replaced’ due to his unfamiliarity of that track and territory. Followed by demanding to have an assigned Pilot; one who was competent to operate under the existing rules; #501 over that track and territory

From the link provided in the OP’s initial post: The author, Doug Riddell noted: "…The two key findings so far in the Dec. 18, 2017 deadly Amtrak Cascades crash seem to focus on the 30 MPH curves on an otherwise mostly 79 MPH route, and the training&mdas

[quote user=“Euclid”]

I don’t see his making of jokes as being the character flaw. What the jokes do is reveal a flaw in the kind of character that is needed to run a passenger train. The jokes and his behavior both show an attitude that he just runs the engine and it is Amtrak’s responsibility to make sure he knows where he is going. Amtrak offered him the run with all of the hardships of not knowing the territory. So he took the offer, but then acted like the hardships were not his problem. In Doug Riddell’s story, he was put in the same position and he refused the run unless the company sent someone more qualified with him.

We know the engineer knew about the 30 mph curve, but he did not know how to identify the approach to it by landmarks. We know that if he were to just wait until he saw the curve and then took action to slow down, it would be too late to slow down. He must have known that too.

So apparently, the engineer intended to rely on spotting the 2 mile advance warning sign to learn that the curve was 2 miles ahead. What was his plan to make sure he did not miss that 2 mile advance warning sign? He would have had to resolve to not take his eyes off of the right side of the track where the sign would be located. Obviously, he either did not do that or he did it, but somehow failed to assimilate the advance warning sign.

As I seem to recall, he did say that he looked at some instrument gauges in the cab, and therefore, might have missed spotting the advance warning sign while looking at the gauges. What was his plan if someone had stolen the sign, or knocked it down so i

If he did that he most likely would have been told to go anyway, and if he refused that direct order he most likely would have been suspended or fired, and at minimum would have earned a big target on his back.

I’m not saying his decision to take the train was right, but I understand why he did it.

I have seen incompetent Trainmasters or Chiefs telling Engineers to go out and get a freight train on territory they are unfamiliar with, and then refusing to call a pilot when the Engineer requests one. There are two common endings to that scenario:

  1. The Engineer invokes Part II of the Canada Labour Code, which is our right to refuse unsafe work. Everything then stops until the appr