By the 1960s, NP carried the most carloadings, it was managing to increase carloadings through its count point at Paradise during the 1960s. GN began a decline in carloadings through Whitefish beginning in 1958 and continuing through the BN merger. MILW was generally increasing its car counts, and these spiked considerably up after the BN merger, but, prior to that time, were about half the GN car count.
Statistically, GN’s Operating Ratio began a steady deterioration in 1950, which lasted through the BN merger, NP’s Operating Ratio dropped below both the GN and MILW in 1957 and never recovered, even while its carloadings increased after that point.
NP made much less money, no doubt due to an expensive operating structure. In 1967, it only made $9 million in operating income, MILW and GN both earned in excess of $50 million that year. Ironically, system-wide, GN earned most of its profit back east, Milwaukee made most of its net profit out West. GN had the shortest line hauls by far of the three (380, something like that), NP about in the middle (450 or so), MILW (PCE) about twice the NP average haul.
NP tried to run a big trucking subsidiary, NP Transport. BN shut it down right away.
GN and MILW ran pretty lean operations out West, NP had employees all over the place, wth some slight exageration probably more in Missoula alone than GN and MILW combined in the whole state of Montana.
From a carloading standpoint, NP was the biggest of the three carriers, but it also lost the long haul to the CBQ at Billings and then again at Minnesota Terminals.
NP and GN fought for traffic, there was no “friendly” cooperation. Ralph Budd was always initiating projects to “block” any suspected NP expansion plan – one project, the Montana Eastern, was partially completed in cooperation with the MILW.
Neither MILW nor GN had Government Land Grants to fall back on. NP could run a money losing railroad and never go bankrupt, although it