I just saw a story from the New York Post that an MTA engineer was charged in the death of a teenager. This happened at a grade crossing in Baltimore.
"Charging documents obtained by the station alleged that Smith caused Patterson’s death by operating the locomotive “in a grossly negligent manner.”
What could the engineer have done that would lead to these charges?
This incident happened on Baltimore’s Light Rail system that is operated by MDOT between BWI Airport South of downtown, through downtown and North to Hunt Valley. In the location of the incident Light Rail operates on the roadway that was operated by the Baltimore & Annapolis Railroad that ceased commuter operations in 1952.
The article states that the crossing protection was not observed to have been working.
I have no idea of MDOT’s policies and procedures are for operation when crossing protection IS KNOWN to be inoperative. The unanswered question from the article is - did the Engineer know that the crossing protection was not operating, and if he did then did he take the appropriate operational actions under the circumstance.
Yeah, like most news articles nowadays it leaves more questions UN-answered than it answers.
Do those crossings have enough activation time to permit an engineer to observe upon approach, that the crossing protection is not working, and then react by stopping the train before it reaches the crossing? If not, I don’t see how the engineer could be negligent. They say he was negligent, but how was he negligent when there was nothing he could have done to prevent the collision?
Is there some kind of electrical indicator that is mounted in front of the engineer and tells him whether the crossing protection has properly activated before he is too close to stop?
If there is not such a warning indicator, I don’t see why not.
Your basic crossing signal not only shows out the “front” of the signal, but also to the side. Older signals simply have a small window through which the bulb in the signal head shines. Newer LED signals have LEDs mounted on the sides for the same purpose.
Unless the signals themselves are obscured from the view of an oncoming train, the engineer should be able to see whether or not the lights are flashing on the signal.
Likewise, it’s hard to miss the movement of the crossing arms - which have lights on them.
I rode the line years ago from Linthicum to the baseball field, but wasn’t paying that kind of attention to details.
I’m guessing he wasn’t paying attention…
Edit - Looking at Google Street View, it appears that trains approaching the crossing from either direction would have a clear view of the crossing equipment. In addition, there are searchlight signals on both tracks, facing away from the road. They may or may not be tied to the crossing circuit. Or they may just be part of a normal signal system.
I am familiar with those small activation indicator lamps that activate with the crossing protection system that you mention. However, I have never considered how their failure to confirm crossing protection activation enforces a response from the engineer; or specifically what that res
Someone needs to find and post a link to the relevant section of MTA’s actual operating rules.
On many railroads, there are rules about how to approach and negotiate an unguarded crossing. Most of these presume a ‘second man’, either to flag the crossing or to drive up and block it with lights flashing (we have video of the New York MTA doing this for moves on the South Brooklyn).
Most rules treat damaged or defective automatic crossing signals as ‘unguarded’. At the very least this would involve a stop short of the crossing and then proceedwith ‘safe lookout’ or whatever. The little ‘side windows’ on the crossing equipment are an indication to watch if the gates and lights are not clearly visible at reasonable stopping distance.
In order for charges like this to be actually brought, there must be some other evidence, perhaps from onboard cameras. Until we see that, we should reserve further judgment.
test This a Light Rail incident.
More akin to a street car oprerating in a suburban area. I have no idea what is required for a person to go from Bus Driver to Light Rail Operator. I do know that Light Rail has had several incidents where movements have run over the end of track blocks at the BWI station in the past.
My question has nothing to do with this grade crossing collision per se. I am only asking about the small indicator lamps on crossing signals that are aimed down the track in each direction. My question is merely raised by these small indicator lamps that Tree mentioned in relation to this collision. This raises my question of exactly what these little indicator lamps are intended to accomplish.
I realize that when signals are taken out of service or known to be malfunctioning, the railroad company will make a concerted effort to protect the crossing users from trains by slow orders, flagging, etc. In these cases, the actions of the engineer would only be to comply with the flagging and other orders that have been provided by the company. But the point raised in this collision is that such formal crossing protection flagging will not be ordered unless the company realizes the subject signals are malfunctioning by
I have also seen white lamps on the wayside box as well.
Much easier to see at night!
I have read a few other articles on this accident. Here is what I conclude happened:
The crossing protection activated just as the train was about to enter the crossing. So the standard train approach activation warning did occur (nominally), but it was delayed due to a malfunction in the system. This shortened the train approach warning from the typical 25 seconds to practically no time at all. This explains the conflict in the story as to whether the crossing protection activated properly or did not activate at all.
I conclude that it activated properly in terms of lights starting to flash and gates coming down. But it did not activate properly in terms of when the activation began. It began so late that there was no time for the vehicle driver to react to it.
It is a technical mistake in the interpretation of these events that has been used to prosecute the engineer. Those who made that decision are confused because somebody has to be a fault, and they concluded that the driver could not be at fault because he had no signal warning. But if this happened because a warning was given but given too late for the driver to stop; then the engineer also received the warning too late to stop the train. So both th
Methinks you’re reading way too much into this.
On older signals, the window allows light from the incandescent lamp inside the housing to be seen by approaching trains. That’s exactly why it’s there. On LED fixtures, there are LEDs serving the same purpose.
When you’re coming up on a crossing equipped with lights and gates, you look for them. If you can see the gates, you watch for them. If they do not activate properly, there are rules on how to deal with it, including reporting the failure.
The crossing protection should be activating 15-20 seconds before the train enters the crossing.
Until the problem is declared resolved by the signal folks, you approach the crossing prepared to stop.
That’s how it is on “real” railroads. There are rules that lay that all out. Balt asks about the rules for light rail, which is a good question. I tend to believe they are similar.
Light rail is probably not going to run at any sort of speed that would overrun the crossing protection.
I stand by my conclusion that the operator was not paying attention. If he was, he would have seen that the crossing protection was not functioning properly and reacted accordi
Larry, For the most part, I agree with you but having when I have been in a cab, I have seen the small flasher porthole lamps showing that the flashers are activated and then the arm lamps are visable and showing the arms are descending. Fortunately, I was never in an event where they did not function as required. But at track speed, do the rules require that the operator (engineer or operator) require them to put their train in emergency braking if they do not see them functioning properly. Its been a long time since I study the rules but I don’t recall that.
On some transit systems, I note that they have signal (lunar) lamps or other signals that light or change aspect to indicate the crossing is protected and the operator can proceed.
If the pictures shown in the published article are accurate - it was a sunny day. If the driver was headed to school as was reported, then the incident happened in the early morning in February - when the Sun is low on the horizon during the sunrize period (as well as the entire day in early February).
I wonder what effect glare and reflections from the Sun and reflective surfaces (other cars, buildings, signs etc.) had on the actions of both parties. Sun glare and reflections can functionally blind a person to things happening right in front of them.
[quote user=“tree68”]
Methinks you’re reading way too much into this.
On older signals, the window allows light from the incandescent lamp inside the housing to be seen by approaching trains. That’s exactly why it’s there. On LED fixtures, there are LEDs serving the same purpose.
When you’re coming up on a crossing equipped with lights and gates, you look for them. If you can see the gates, you watch for them. If they do not activate properly, there are rules on how to deal with it, including reporting the failure.
The crossing protection should be activating 15-20 seconds before the train enters the crossing.
Until the problem is declared resolved by the signal folks, you approach the crossing prepared to stop.
That’s how it is on “real” railroads. There are rules that lay that all out. Balt asks about the rules for light rail, which is a good question. I tend to believe they are similar.
Light rail is probably not going to run at any sort of speed that would overrun the crossing protection.
I stand by my conclusion that the operator was not paying attention. If he was, he would have seen that the crossing protection was not
Our older crossing signals have the “portholes” on the big flashers, one coworker called them the “wig-wag” lights, and some have a separate LED light that flashes with the flashing light. Those with the LED indicators often have LED wig-wag lights. Sometimes the indicators flash red.
On the older “portholes” the visibility of them can vary depending on how the signal light is positioned. That positioning depends on the degree of the road/rail intersection. It should go without saying that they are a lot more visible at night then during the daylight.
There is no rule for a train operating at track speed to stop short of an unforseen malfunction. The only things that comes close is when stopped or increasing speed 5 mph within 3000 ft of a crossing or the train has less then 13 axles. The crossing is not to be fouled until the signal protection has activated and gates, if equipped, are down and providing protection. At track speed, any malfunction is to be reported to the dispatcher. If the dispatcher hasn’t responded to being buzzed up, warn any other known trains appproaching that crossing.
Usually malfunctions are of one, or more lights being out. Sometimes it’s a gate that won’t come down, or maybe comes down to far. During some very windy days last summer, some gates were being blown off center enough that when they rose back up they became entangled into the lights or signs mounted on the pole and wouldn’t drop when activated. One gate was down, but blown onto the tracks far enough that a train broke it off.
Total activation failures are rare from just normal “wear and tear” on the system. Usually some condition that might lead to a complete failure will be known and trains warned. One condition comes to mind is during extreme weather when power is out for much more extended times and back up batteries may deplete that it could affect signal
Based on the published information, that would probably be a reasonable conclusion.
The engineer’s culpability would probably be related to his ability to react in time to prevent a collision. As Balt notes, he may not have been able to detect the failure of the crossing protection due to the angle of the sun. This also can involve what kind of lighting the engineer can see. Having lunar lights indicating the lights are flashing is one way. A local short line has a standard amber turn signal mounted on the equipment shelter which flashes with the crossing signals.
That would certainly be a mitigating circumstance, and not hard to replicate if verified immediately (ie, the next day, assuming it’s sunny again).
As I noted before, this incident may have occurred because he simply wasn’t paying attention. You’re not going to see something if you’re not looking for it.
Not only do drivers assume the crossing protection is working correctly, so do the crews. Otherwise they’d approach every crossing prepare for a failure.
Faced with discovering that the upcoming crossing protection was not operating correctly, I’d be using lots of horn, getting off the power, and probably making a heavy servic
Has anyone else used Denver’s PTC controlled grade protection system?
So as I understand it, in order to charge the engineer, as they did, with a felony of manslaughter for causing the death of the motorist, the police would have had to conduct an investigation to determine that the engineer was able to stop the train before reaching the motorist’s vehicle.
The police would have had to test the indicator lamps on the signals in order to find the maximum distance from which the indicator lamps would be visible to a person with vision that qualifies with the railroad company’s requirement.
They would have needed to conduct this test at the same time of day, and the same weather conditions that existed at the time of the collision.
Next, they would have had to run the test train at the same speed up to the point where the indicator lamps would have been visible.
Once the test train reached that point where the lamps were first visible, the police would have had to test stopping with an emergency application of brakes.
They covered something like this on a episode of CHiPs in the 70s