For perhaps a century, these two railroads seemed to compete tooth and nail with each other. They both were major trunk lines, connecting the East Coast, and the midwest. In most other areas of the northeast and Ohio River Valley, they seemed to service all the same major cities and industrial areas. Their overlapping territories was thought to be a major advantage for the PennCentral, but, in reality, was probably a hinderance.
In 1920, NYC had more miles of track than PRR. But it’s assets, and revenues were not as great. By the time of the PC merger, it seems PRR was bigger, but NYC was healthier(?), due, I’m sure to the work of Alfred E. Perlman. Yet, it seems like PRR came to dominate PC.
In the grand scheme of things, which railroad did better over the long haul? And, while we’re at it, am I the only one who wonders if Mad Magazine used Alfred E. Perlman as a model for their mascot, Alfred E. Newman?
I understand that the NYC put quite a bit of effort into “slimming down” their plant and operations (4 tracks reduced to 2, discontinuence of many passenger trains, trying to sell/raze passenger stations) to reduce costs and get a start on intermodal traffic with developement of their Flexi Vans. I’m sure the PRR made it’s own retrenchments and improvements as traffic shifted to highways and airplanes but I don’t recall reading about any systematic programs on the same scale. Was that because the PRR was slower to react or because their traffic levels remained higher? Since they both ended up in the Penn Central, it’s hard to say who “did better over the long haul”-their fates were a common one after that.
I suppose one way would be to see whose track is still in use today for new owners but even that has many variables.
One significant difference between the two railroads was their approach to pricing. The PRR was hungry for revenue and adopted a get-any-and-all-business-for-whatever-rate-you-can approach to tariffs. They probably handled a lot of carloads at a loss and were only barely aware of how much red ink that business was spreading. Also, post WW2, the dividends the Norfolk & Western paid to the Pennsylvania Company were essentially the entire company’s net income.
NYC’s traffic people had sharper pencils when it came to developing business that paid, but the railroad’s earnings at the end were a total yo-yo of extremes. I suppose Mr. Perlman couldn’t shed money-losing passenger trains fast enough to keep the railroad financially strong.
Anybody want to comment on the story I heard that PRR’s hogheads were predominantly Masons while the Central’s locomotive engineers were predominantly Knights of Columbus?
All the Monopoly boards I’ve seen show four London Termini belonging to the London and North Eastern Railway!
In fact I always believed that the PRR had a big share of Industrial freight traffic, and didn’t care if the Broadway Limited ran with more crew than passengers!
Once JP Morgan untangled the NYC/PRR fued, both RRs more or less went with the flow until hard times hit after WWII. Then, both RRs reacted differently.
The impression I’ve come away with is that the mgt of the PRR viewed the RR as inherently profitable and they were just the caretakers. They saw the world as it was, not as what it was becoming. There was also a sense of mainline Philly, blueblood entitlement.
The NYC saw the world as changing and was very aggressively trying to change to fit. This may be because the industrial rot started setting in sooner in their part of the world or maybe just because they had a more maleable corporate culture.
I’m still amazed at the differences between these railroads east and west of their midpoints. PRR had a lot of trackage west of Pittsburgh, but after Conrail came in and made rational (as opposed to the previous “red-vs-green”) decisions, what was left of ex-PRR trackage? Virtually nothing.
Don’t get me wrong, I think you made a very informative post and I liked it. But as to the above-quoted part: tic, tic, tic . . . . . . .
I find the pricing aspect of things as it relates to these two railroads very interesting. One of these days, I am going to figure out a thread that can get a good discussion going about railroad pricing. I never understood it. It seems to me that, although every car in a 100-car train can’t be priced this way, but if you have a 100 car train, and you add another car to it for $10, that is nearly $10 profit, as there is not that much difference in work.
Naturally, if you have to switch it in 5 different yards, that scenario might change.
I have a hunch that CN’s profitability relates to its ability to figure this game out. But, I don’t want to highjack MS’ excellent thread and will suspend my mussing for the time being.
In a lot of ways this is a question like which is better Fords or Chevys? There is only one issue to consider in the long run. They both had to merge to attempt to survive (and didn’t).
…Whatever the differences were…good and bad, both companies represented RR’ing in the east {mostly}, as the strength of America early and mid 20th century when we had heavy industry product to move…
That product gradually diminished and both RR’s had to scramble to survive, and did for a while and then that era was over. They were then scrambled and reshuffled {several times}, and molded into today’s transportation system through the same general area.
How do you judge which was better, stronger or whatever…At least some of their systems were salvaged to what we have today. Not bad.
I think that Perlman was a great railroad administrator, but it is irrational to claim we are going evaluate the RR’s “over the long haul” and at the same time place much weight on Perlman’s involvement.
With a few noteworthy exceptions I feel that NYC had the superior routings, while PRR had smarter management…over the long haul. Before trucking started siphoning off volume, the two could beat each other’s brains out, and there was still enough revenue for both to survive. Once shippers had an alternative to choose, the two started devouring each other
I only mention Perlman to point out that NYC seemed to look a lot better, going into PC, but lost any kind of advantage, once PRR swallowed it into PC.
Long before the arrival of synthetic notions of civil rights, these were important parts of corporate cultures. Milwaukee was always known as a “Catholic” railroad. WL Smith noted it upon his arrival in 1972 … and how careers of certain bright and knowledgeable railroaders there had been derailed “because they weren’t Irish and they weren’t Catholic.”
It is unfortunate that Perlman spent so much time and resources during the early 1960s fighting the C&O for control of B&O. NYC should have supported C&O+B&O, and allied themsevles with it.
From a Western Pacific thread-
Alfred E Neuman was named after a composer named Alfred Newman.
WOW what a great topic! It’s like Secret Agent versus The Man From U.N.C.L.E. NYC was New York and PRR was Philly. NYC was at least getting its act together while PRR was swamped by its very own omnipotence. PRR’s rather GIGANTIC presence in New York City guaranteed its failure when the unions (not rail unions) decided to ditch rationality; Federal regulations completed the flight of industry to more favorable climes. On the other hand, what’s up with the Turbojet RDC?
To my mind, these companies struggled against the Federal Government. Given the times and the ICC, how better than to smash your company on the rocks of Federal bureaucrats? If it moves, tax it. If it can still move, regulate it. When it stops moving, subsidize it.
Let it be proclaimed here forever that the Congress elected in 1994 made as it’s first act the elimination of the Interstate Commerce Commision.
Personally, I think the New York Central was cooler. I have edited this post for spelling. There is humor wherever one looks.
Ah, now I understand why people at the MILW viewed the Pacific Extension so favorably–they were committed transconsubstantiation–and why people outside of the MILW did not–they were committed to suconsubstanton. I also, now, understand why so many people say the MILW was a venerable railroad.