FIELD, British Columbia — Hours before a Canadian Pacific train derailed in the rugged mountains of British Columbia, killing three railroaders, the previous crew had struggled to keep the doomed grain train under control on a steep grade. On T…
In the earlier thread about this wreck, I speculated that the release of the emergency application was due to the pressure leaking off through the brake cylinder piston packing which is a rubber cup. I believe the cold temperature stiffened up that rubber packing cup to the point where the rubber lost its memory and would not return to a tight seal against air pressure.
When these packing cups are new, I am sure they are fully capable of maintaining a seal in the coldest weather encountered. But rubber ages and becomes less resilient. So there must be maintenance instructions that call for replacing these packing cups at specified intervals.
Interestingly while the regulatory body tells us that tests revealed that the car’s air brake system failed to maintain constant pressure over time, they don’t say what components failed in this mission. Surely they know if they conducted extensive testing that revealed that the system was unable to maintain pressure. My bet is on defective brake cylinder piston packing that was not properly maintained.
From the news article:
“After the derailment, investigators took the 12 grain cars that did not derail and c
Hand Brakes, Hand Brakes, Hand Brakes! Original crew set the trap that was sprung on the relief crew.
No—maintain the brake cylinder packing, maintain the brake cylinder packing, maintain the brake cylinder packing!
There was no requirement to set handbrakes. The original crew did not set any trap that was sprung on the relief crew. All they did was save the train and their lives by complying with the requirement to dump the air because their train was running away.
The trap that was sprung on the relief crew was the decision to proceed down the grade without knowing what the problem was that caused the train to run away with the original crew.
The trap was NOT SECURING THE TRAIN - to figure out why it was not braking properly! Self preservation trumps rules or the lack therof. Were I your Trainmaster Euclid - you would be on the street for 30 days or fired outright!
Why was the train parked for nearly three hours while waiting for another crew?
I don’t know. I recall some reporting about spending time inspecting the train. The previous crew had stopped by making an emergency application. Does that then require an inspection? I am guessing it would, but I don’t know for sure. But aside from the train having been stopped by an emergency application, there was a real emergency in the form of the brakes not holding the train’s speed down to where it should have been and was expected to be when descending the hill. That would indicate a very serious problem.
I would think that somebody higher up than the second crew had to make the decision for the train to depart. It seems evident that whatever the problem was that produced the insufficient braking experience by the first crew, it was the same problem that caused the emergency application to leak off as experienced by the second crew.
So that suggests that the inspection never found the problem. If it did not find the problem, how does one conclude that the problem does not still exist and is waiting to do the second crew what it did to the first crew?
How does one assume that the problem is gone just because it can’t be found? Yet that is apparently what happened. Or maybe they were still inspecting when the emergency application leaked off and thus were blindsided to the same extent as the second crew.
Maybe the inspection found no problem with the air charging and brake application and release, and concluded that the problem must have just been snow on the brake shoes.
Getting recrews to trains that are stopped in remote areas is not the easiest thing to do - especially if it had been considered that the crew that went into emergency was figured to have sufficient time to make their crew change point prior to having their problems.
Don’t know the particular realities of this location. In the US all crews get a nominal 2 hour notification before their on duty time. Once on duty they must be transported to the location where the prior crew went HOS. Sometime the conveyance taking the recrew to the HOS site will bring the ‘dead’ crew back to the terminal, other times two conveyances will be used and the ‘dead’ crew will be long gone from the scene.
Sort of like what happened to the Challenger. Dold weather made the O rings hard allowing leakage. Maybe a redesign in the brake cylinders would be called for. I am NO engineer, but too many of these are occuring.
Here are some mileage numbers from the Canadian Trackside Guide 2013*.*
The Laggan sub begins at Calgary, passes through Yoho (between the two tunnels) at m.p. 129.8, and ends at Field, at m.p.138.6. Field was the west end of the Prairie Division.
Does this help?
I have two questions about the problems in this accident.
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Would use of retainers helped with the control of the train?
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If locomotives assigned to operate a train over a significant grade such as Kicking Horse can start a train up the grade, could they not hold that train stopped on the grade? Said another way how can you start a train if you can not overcome gravities pull on the train. I know that DC motors are not designed to handle the currents that would be incurred if a locomotive is run in reverse to the trains travel but can AC motors create torque when reversed? I am not clear on the issues here. In dynamic braking the electric motors are operated as generators and the braking force drops to zero as the speed drops but if the motor was reversed ( as if it going to push the train backwards) can an AC motor create a force that could stop a train?
For some operational background per the 2006 timetable go here, pages 11 thru 15:
My copy of the 2012 ETT shows only a few subtle changes to that (see Footnotes pasted below), most notably under Footnote 11.3, which instructed crews when “abnormal conditions such as weather or poor braking” are present to “apply a hand brake on every car” in 2006 vs. “apply a hand brake on at least 75 percent of the cars” in 2012.
The crew arriving Partridge with the train in question had reported braking problems.
I can’t say whether the ETT in effect at the time of the accident included further changes to those train handling procedures. After the accident, CP issued Revised Train Handling Procedures on Mountain Grades which call for hand brakes on 25 cars and retainers set to HP position on all cars before attempting to recover from the first emergency brake application, and hand brakes on ALL cars and retainers set to HP position before attempting to recover from a second emergency brake application.
[Excerpt below from Nov 2012 ETT]
11.3 The train handling procedure on page 5/7, and the
following instructions in paragraphs A, B, C and D
apply to westward freight trains in which the weight
per operative brake is 100 tons or greater.
Note: All westward trains experiencing an emergency
brake application beyond mile 123.5 must communicate
with the on duty Trainmaster via the RTC
and be governed by their instructions.
A. Emergency brake recovery procedure – If an
emergency brake application is experienced between
Stephen and mile 125.5, the train brakes
may be released and the train allowed to pr
I understand your point about setting handbrakes to secure the train as logically being the first priority. Without handbrakes being set, the train stopped by an emergency application can run away any time if the air leaks off. So, secure the train by handbrakes before spending time looking for a brake problem that lead to stopping the train. Once the train is safely secured by handbrakes, take all the time in the world if necessary to correct the air brake problem. That makes perfect sense.
The question I have is whether or not setting handbrakes after stopping was required by the rules. I have yet to see any news report, expert interview, or NTSB information say that a rule requiring the setting handbrakes was broken, or that any such rule applied to the train in this runaway accident.
If there is no such rule to set handbrakes, I do not understand how the company deals with the risk of an emergency application releasing on its own at any time after it has been made.
However, that risk also exists with a requirement to set handbrakes because it takes a couple hours or so to set enough handbrakes to achieve reliable securement. The risk is that the emergency application releases before that handbrake securement is achieved.
If there was no rule requiring securing the train with handbrakes, how can you conclude that the first crew set a t
I think the failure of a decent training program is obvious here.
Well, Zug, it seems that here again we have the unlearned training the ignorant.
One can wonder if the trainers were hired off the street and were givren instructions as to running trains but not as to stopping and holding them after they were stopped, especially on grades.
Suspect EHH cronies were the trainers with the mantra - Hand Brakes are for sissies!.
If you read Bruce Kelly’s posting a few hours earlier than yours, you would not have to ask the question. Read, and understand! It is required NOW, but as a result of an emergency order issued by Transport Canada a couple of days after the runaway.
Also, folks, there is additional relevant discussion following the posting on the Newswire section.
Not a single cause but the fatal combination of bitter cold, leaky seals on older grain cars and a prolonged wait showed the weakness of the usual procedure.
I have read Bruce Kelly’s post several times, but with layer upon layer of provisions and conditions, and not knowing the locations listed, the answer to my very simple question does not exactly pop out at me.
I realize that it is required now. But I have been told that the first crew should have securred the train with handbrakes. I would assume that if requiring it now was a change, as has been reported, then it must not have been required during at the time of the runaway. If it was not required at the time of the runaway, why would anybody insist that the crew was negligent for not setting handbrakes?
The question I am asking is just a simple yes or no.
Bruce,
You provided the handbrake securement rules from the 2006 timetable and from the 2012 timetable. And you say you do not know if the 2012 handbrake securement rules applied at the time of the runaway accident. Is there any information that you have that would confirm what the handbrake securement rules were at the time of the accident?
The result speaks for itself! Every railroad rule book has the statement ‘In case of doubt the safe course must be taken’ or other words to that effect.