Testimony details events leading up to fatal 2013 oil train wreck
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2017/10/25-lac-megantic-trial-enters-fourth-week
Maybe this testimony will be coming, but this is what I would like to know about the knowledge and intentions of the people in the trial:
Did the engineer know the proper procedure for securing the train?
If he did, why didn’t he follow it?
Was he given any instructions by his supervisors about how to secure the train?
An interesting point in the testimony is that engineer was not told about the engine problem even though at least one other person knew about it. However, the engineer certainly knew of the problem when he tied up the train for the night at Nantes. It was reported that the engineer told his supervisor(s) about the problem, and at least implied that he advised his supervisor(s) that he wanted to shut down the engine before leaving it. It was reported that the supervisor(s) told him to leave the engine running.
In court, I would like to hear the engineer explain whether after shutting down the engine, he would have started another engine to pump air, if he had been permitted to shut it down the engine with the problem.
If he answered yes to that question, I would like to hear him state whether he was told that the faulty engine had been shut down by the fire department, as I understand that he had conversations about the fire with his supervisor(s)
Bucky,
I submit you are beating the proverbial dead horse. Can you not let go of anything that fits your agenda of your desired perfection?
You beat the subject to death in an another thread and refuse to let go. What is your problem?
You keep telling us you have experience but refuse to state your qualifications.
Please put up or shut up.
Your refusal to tell us about your ‘experience’ speaks volumes.
Norm,
Like you should lecture me about dead horses. You seem to be very angry. Who is the “us” you always refer to?
These three are only scapegoats doing things the way this railroad wanted them to. Running as cheaply as possible. I think this engine was bad ordered many times and nothing was ever done. Not setting the train brakes because it would take longer to get going in the morning. Track was maybe 10 MPH. Didn’t they find something like 17 things wrong and the 1 man crew the way they had it set up was just wrong. The higher ups stayed in the USA and weren’t held to account. Doesn’t accountability come from the top down not the bottom up. I think the trial of these guys is digusting.
I think you are correct that the blame for this goes higher than just the engineer or even his supervisors. The larger organization should be held to account for a lax safety culture if there was one. But depending on the testimony during this trial, the discovery of blame may lead higher up in the organization. That is why I am very interested in hearing the answers to the questions I posed above. It does not seem like it could be the engineer’s fault if he was securing train according to company rules or if there were no rules.
I am one of the “us.” Why do you not tell us what your experience is? Are you ashamed of something that you did? Were you a railroad employee? Were you a person who gained knowledge of practices by exercising them? What is your experience? Are you a Monday Morning engineer or trainman?
Well, I think you should think about it a little bit and maybe the answer will come to you.
[*-)]
Oh goody. A seance to liven up the forum…
Alas, we have, and the answer that’s come to us is that you’re an idealistic wannabe who can’t seem to accept any information that doesn’t fit your agenda.
And I think you’ll find that a great many of us would like to know the answer to the question of where your experience comes from - especially since you actually said you had some.
The folks at the trial may or may not want answers to the questions you asked. I’m sure you’ll be greatly disappointed if the answers are not forthcoming from said trial.
And don’t bother asking why.
In a face-to-face conversation with Larry (Tree68) last month, he and I pretty much agreed that we have a person who wants to be known as an expert on the various matters that have been discussed and has great diffculty accepting the realities that people with acknowledged experience present. I do not think that I need to name those who we are confident are well-experienced in the various matters that have been discussed.
And, I am confident that posters who are comparatively new to the forums will also recognize the old heads who know what they are posting about.
Frankly, I think you are projecting your own insecurity.
Can we discuss the topic and the Lac Megantic trial.
Nah.
Just gonna wait until the end of the trial to see what happens. I don’t have an agenda to justify.
Despite all of this off-the-topic argument, it does seem as if the trial is pointing to a general lack of corporate establishment of “Safety First” in its operations, a contrast to what I see as normal practice for every railroad in North America.
And I can understand the attitude of a USA owner who feels that interference with the way Canadians (mostly speaking French, not English) are running things may smack of too much foreign dmination, but that should not have stopped him from having more control over the situation than he did.
This is my impression from the way the trial has progressed thus far and the information presented. And I think I have a right to this opinion.
Here is the new ten-second procedure that might have averted the Lac Megantic disaster:
In reading this article, there is some good information about what seems to be a new rule by the STB. However, the pertinent point is obscured by author’s preoccupation of trying to blame MM&A management for the Lac Megantic disaster.
Here is the main point that needs to be clarified. The article refers to the addition of an automatic air brake application for supplementary securement. This is the so-called “ten-second procedure” that the writer refers as being a part of the new rules imposed by the TSB since the Lac Megantic disaster.
This suggests that the use of the automatic brake for supplementary securement was not required by the rules prior to these “new rules.” If so, MM&A was not required to use this procedure prior to, or at the time of the disaster.
Yet the article says this:
…on page 105 of the 179-page report
Some people here are very close to moderation or forcing the thread to be locked. PLEASE discuss the topic, not what you think of each other. Thank you.
IMO just securing trains on slopes can always fail. Why not require split rail derails at low end of any siding say for example 1 % slopes or more ? No matter how many securement procedures in effect a train somewwhere will get loose. If it hits a split rail and goes into an embankment not too much damage. Of course what does any RR do for securements on Main lines ? Another split rail if so many securements on a main line ?
Trains are not always on sidings when the need to be secured. Split rails may work for sidings - they are a derailment waiting to happen on the Main Track. In theory, every signal capable of displaying a Absolute STOP indication should be protected by a split rail derail.