No way to run a railroad
https://www.railwayage.com/safety/ntsb-determines-probable-cause-for-ns-three-train-accident/
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2023 report on issues with safety and PTC:
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MAN failure incident - the only fix is to eliminate MAN from the equation.
Tons of new regulations can be written and implemented in response to this incident, however, as long as the final element of control comes down to a human making decisions such incidents can never be eliminated.
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Not so fast!
Human error (engineer) was the primary cause. However, NTSB report also states: "Contributing to the accident were insufficient safeguards to compensate for human error, including current positive train control systems that do not prevent train-to-train collisions during restricted speed operations.â
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Final report (without going thru Railway age)
And a direct link to the report from the other year woke linked to above
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Regulators and lawyers can hand more and more laws and regulations upon the devices that human minds and hands control it all comes down to the mind and hands controlling the machine at the split instant in time when a mistake can be catastrophic.
No matter how we in society attempt to âIdiot Proofâ man operated machines - humanity keeps making Idiots that can defeat all those protections.
There is a saying âLife will find a wayâ there is the corollary the Idiots will find a way to defeat every attempt to protect them from themselves.
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from the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
I had to watch safety videos on the above triangle, so thereâs RR relevance.
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For a second, I thought NS changed their ways after the Ohio IncidentâŚ
Norfolk Southern: Whatâs Your Function?
Hookinâ up the Country Causing Derailments and Problems.
We haul everything UNsaftely and late!
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You seem to have to blame humans, whether pedestrians, drivers or engineers for these accidents. Itâs clear that a variety of safety systems adopted by the railroad companies are inadequately preventing various incidents.
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Currently EOTs donât have GPS. (I have heard rumors that some of the newest have it.) There currently isnât an option to enter an EOT (or GPS equipped DP unit at the rear) number into PTC. The only thing PTC has to determine length is what the paperwork in the computer has, and updates inputted by the engineer. Even with AEI readers and computers, maybe because those things are relied upon so much, there have been cases where the paperwork is wrong. Usually by a few cars, but sometimes by a wide margin.
Until the rear of the train can be determined by other than estimations, PTC wonât be able to prevent a restricted speed collision.
I probably should mention that PTC does not show any other trains on the locomotive PTC screen. It shows a track diagram, your train, switch and signal locations. A restricted speed zone is displayed as a yellow hash box over the track line. As you come to a switch PTC queries as to itâs alignment. If there is a train ahead, it is not shown in any way. I imagine if the rear of the train is tied into the system, it will just display a red line and red hash box where the end would be.
They also really canât have a ârolling blockâ system that doesnât have a large safety margin until the rear end can definitely determined.
Jeff
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Ours have some sort of GPS. Maybe not accurate enough to run on PTC, but enough they can be âpingedâ if they get lost somewhere.
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It was the engineerâs fault. There have been other incidents for exactly the same thing, âI thoughtâŚâ Sometimes the assumption is reinforced by other influences. You hear radio conversations, maybe even a train calling out a signal. More likely you hear half of a broadcast and think the train ahead of you is moving, when itâs a different train moving.
I had a student engineer once. We went past an Approach signal. It was a three mile long block. We were upgrade going past that signal. About halfway through is the summit and the next signal was on the down grade. It was also around a blind curve. If you werenât prepared to stop until you actually saw it, you wouldnât stop short if it were red.
We had been going around 20-25mph on the uphill. As we went over the top, the student let the train pick up speed. Getting close to the 30mph, top speed for the indication, he said he figured the train ahead had moved enough that the next signal would be more favorable.
I said that I think youâll slow down to a crawl prepared to stop at the next signal until you can actually see it or Iâm going to pull the air. (Open the conductorâs side emergency valve.)
As he started getting into dynamics and setting some air, I told him that he probably was correct (and he was) that the train had continued on. But thinking that way and not following what the rules required was a bad habit to learn. You might be right 99 times out of a 100, but eventually that 100th time will happen.
Jeff
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When the human is the last point to control an action - no matter how many layers of âprotectionâ you place above that final human point - the human is responsible. You can have the human work through a thousand point check list to get to the final human activity - and it can still go wrong. When safer devices are built, higher level idiots will get themselves and others injured or killed by them.
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Ainât that the truth!
Unfortunately truth written in blood too many times.
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There are many DOT accident investigations from the 20th Century where trains were âriding the yellowâ, expecting the next signal to be Approach or better only to find that signal Red and the rear of the train the signal is protecting immediately beyond the signal.
The normal definition of Approach Indication is to immediately reduce the train to Medium Speed and approach the nest signal PREPARED TO STOP. Any Engineer that expects the next signal to be anything other than STOP (or Restricting at an Intermediate) is a danger to himself and every other person around his segment of the railroad.
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Naperville was âriding yellowsâ, wasnât it?
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The problems also lie with a mediocre PTC system that was adopted. This was discussed on here several/many years ago. Perhaps Woke or Jeff might recall.
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PTC changed that a bit. At least for us - if you donât enter the block on a restricting, and the next signal/speed shown is not a stop - you can run accordingly.
Similar to cab signal rules. (the above is for non-cab signal territory)
Wouldnât apply in the above case in this thread, since they did enter on a restricting. I believe, in part, this is due to seeing a favorable signal for the train ahead of you being displayed. And this ensures you donât think it is for you.
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I think the discussion you are referring to centered on signal system overlay versus rolling block. Rolling block would require positive rear end protection, plus a safety factor. The industry chose signal system overlay to reduce complexities and costs. But once a mainline train has to operate past a restricting signal, PTC canât enforce anything except the upper end speed allowed by the restricted speed definition. And in situations like this accident with the curves and trees that speed is too fast to stop within one half the range of vision.
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Yes, once again profits over safety.
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