The question of whether CSX employees were trespassing by walking on Amtrak tracks is not addressed by the NTSB. That unanswered question resides somewhere within the disjointed and ambiguous coverage of the topic of the two CSX conductors walking in the Amtrak track instead of CSX property. But, it seems to me that the fact of trespass (if true) would override all of this other mumbo-jumbo that NTSB offers to explain what governed the right or wrong of the employees occupying the Amtrak mainline.
That explanation consists of the following points made by the NTSB that are related to CSX employees being Amtrak property in the following quotes. From the NTSB accident report, the following comments are quoted in red and my comments in response to those quotes are in blue:
“The operating crews were not prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.”
I made this statement/observation previously and I firmly believe that for the reasons stated two lives were lost.
If they are on Amtrak property then they are governed by Amtrak rules and procedures which requires ‘foul time’. The Amtrak dispatcher must be notified of their intentions and grant them foul time to inspect their train. However it was not necessary for them to walk on a live track, all they had to do was go to the other side of their consist where there was no ‘live’ track as their train snaked through the crossover and occupied both CSX #1 and CSX#2 main lines. As I previously stated poor judgement__, inexperience and inadequate training on the conductor’s part cost both of them their lives.__
I would like the aforementioned contradiction clarified as to when the engineer on #175 applied the brake into the emergency position. Applying the brake to emergency after impact is unconscionable.
Could it be that the CSX rules have no place stating if employees have to walk on another RR’s ROW they must get permission? Find that ulikely but ? ? ? ?
There are operating agreements in which one company’s employees may enter the property of the company with which they have the agreement. I don’t know if that was the case in this accident, but the NTSB has not mentioned it if there was some type of agreement. And in such an agreement, there would likely be a provision to ask for protection from fouling track.
But I would be surprised if employees of one company could legally just enter the property of another company for some unusual need or convenience. I am not convinced that the company being entered would grant protection for such a random use. They might not even grant permission to enter their property on just an informal, one-time basis. I also do not know of any special status possessed by railroad employees that grants them blanket permission to enter the property of another railroad company.
If such a trespass did occur, I doubt anyone would make an issue out of it if the trespassers were employees of another nearby railroad company, and offered a decent reason for entering the property of another railroad without permission.
But these elements rise to a much higher level of importance in this case because the two CSX employees entered the property of another railroad company and were killed by a train run by that company when they were on that company’s property. So obviously, these unusual facts are a big part of this story.
He’s right, you know. Here is the actual language from the first section of the report:
This, if at all accurate, is worse than what we’ve been discussing – let’s look at it a moment. The NTSB is saying the engineer of 175 (1) saw the employees on the ends of the ties; (2) sounded the horn from 15 to 20 seconds; (3) came into contact with the employees ‘moments later’ even than that, at 74mph restricted speed; and only then, :“after the impact at 11:18pm” placed the train in emergency braking.
How far could she have seen them? 15 seconds at 74mph is a lot of feet. Meanwhile, “according to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks”.
So indeed – which is it? This may depend on something that has not been discussed ye
It is certainly a descrepancy that needs an explanation, but what do you mean when you say it is worse that what we have been discussing? It seems to me that it is exactly what we have been discussing.
He’s right, you know. Here is the actual language from the first section of the report:
She then saw two people in reflective vests walking single file on the end of the crossties outside the gage of the track (between Amtrak main track 3 and CSX main track 2). She blew the horn continuously for 15 to 20 seconds. This action automatically initiated the bell to be sounded and activated the auxiliary lights. Moments later, as the train was traveling at a reduced speed of about 74 mph to comply with the restrictive signal, it struck the two CSX employees. After the impact, at 11:18 p.m., the engineer placed the train into emergency braking, announced emergency three times on the radio, and called the Amtrak dispatch center via the radio. After her train came to a complete stop, she called her conductor to come to the head end of the train.
This, if at all accurate, is worse than what we’ve been discussing – let’s look at it a moment. The NTSB is saying the engineer of 175 (1) saw the employees on the ends of the ties; (2) sounded the horn from 15 to 20 seconds; (3) came into contact with the employees ‘moments later’ even than that, at 74mph restricted speed; and only then, :“after the impact at 11:18pm” placed the train in emergency braking.
Your own quote shows that sensing impact on a human is irrelevant. Yes, it’s a sloppy piece of writing, which likely will be proofed and corrected. Your frivolous, erroneous comment on ‘gage’ makes it likely they will not respond to you beyond the initial phone conversation.
"Page six, paragraph six, last sentence:
According to the event recorder and the engineer interview,the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking uponseeing
A lot of the problem was the fact that the two Amtrak trains were blowing horns approaching the impact point. The victims had their backs to the train that struck them. They possibly assumed the only Amtrak train coming was the one they could see, as it would be difficult to realize the horns’ blowing was coming from two trains, not just the one they could see on Amtrak track 2. Of course, they were unwise to be walking on an active track without obtaining clearance in advance, whether violating a rule or trespassing or not.
[from the preliminary report] “There were four parallel tracks (two CSX and two Amtrak) where the employees were struck. CSX freight train Q13727 was stopped on CSX track 2. The middle track was Amtrak track 3 where Amtrak train 175 was traveling in the same direction as the freight train. The track on the far right was Amtrak track 2 where Amtrak train 66 was traveling in the opposite direction of the freight train at the time the employees were struck. According to each Amtrak engineer, they started sounding their horns when they observed the employees on the track…After inspecting the second car reported by the mechanical department, the conductor and conductor trainee started walking back to the locomotive. The rear of their train was on track 1 and the front of their train was on track 2. As they approached the front of the locomotive, the walking space between CSX track 2 and Amtrak track 3 narrowed. They were struck by Amtrak train 175 that was traveling about 73 mph on Amtrak’s track 3.”
I have read of or been told about several accounts of this type of accident. I suspect it has occurred hundreds of times throughout history. It is a peculiar and unique hazard associated with double track. It is something that the victim does not anticipate because they take their hearing and vision for granted and believe they will always warn them.
I have never seen a rule that specifically warns of this danger. Rules typically warn to expect train or rolling stock movement on any track, in either direction, at any time. But the problem with this unique hazard is that an person thinks he/she is expecting movement in any direction at any time, but does not realize they are deprived of the necessary sensory perception to detect an approaching train. While it is true that approaching trains can be surprisingly quiet, this type of accident I am referring to has a different cause.
A person is walking on one track of a double track railroad. They are facing in just one direction, and may never look back if they believe they will always hear any train approaching from behind. Suddenly they see a train approaching from their front on the track they are walking
Now, I concur with this statement completely, and (subject to review of any timeline recorded by the onboard cameras and cross-referencing) I trust the event recorder’s data to be as reported.
But I’m not prepared to give the person or persons committing the ‘sloppy writing’ at NTSB a no-harm no-foul break to go back and ‘edit away their statement’ on this. NTSB has been preparing this report very carefully for months, and as a number of people have previously claimed on various threads concerning their activity, are supposedly very professional both in what they investigate and how they report the result of their investigation.
What they have claimed is, I think, very significant if it is at all true: that the engineer of Amtrak 175 delayed significantly in making a brake application responsive to the presence of workers fouling her track. That is not something that ‘counts’ as some little misstatement, and I can easily see counsel for the two CSX conductors gleefully jumping on it and starting to quote part of the Midnight Rider case in their civil briefs. Sure, a review of the source material NTSB used may produce a preponderance of evidence saying the emergency was applied before impact – but the damage has been done. And I cannot believe it is either casual or accidental, let alone merely ‘sloppy’.
In other news, Sumwalt has specifically requested a response from Anderson regarding the findings on this incident. If I were Anderson I would have something rather blistering to say on this particular point.
Now, I concur with this statement completely, and (subject to review of any timeline recorded by the onboard cameras and cross-referencing) I trust the event recorder’s data to be as reported.
But I’m not prepared to give the person or persons committing the ‘sloppy writing’ at NTSB a no-harm no-foul break to go back and ‘edit away their statement’ on this. NTSB has been preparing this report very carefully for months, and as a number of people have previously claimed on various threads concerning their activity, are supposedly very professional both in what they investigate and how they report the result of their investigation.
What they have claimed is, I think, very significant if it is at all true: that the engineer of Amtrak 175 delayed significantly in making a brake application responsive to the presence of workers fouling her track. That is not something that ‘counts’ as some little misstatement, and I can easily see counsel for the two CSX conductors gleefully jumping on it and starting to quote part of the Midnight Rider case in their civil briefs. Sure, a review of the source material NTSB used may produce a preponderance of evidence saying the emergency was applied before impact – but the damage has been done. And I cannot believe it is either casual or accidental, let alone merely ‘sloppy’.
In other news, Sumwalt has specifically requested a response from Anderson regarding the findings on this incident. If I were Anderson I would have something rather blistering to say on this particular point; I will be highly interested to see what he does say; in fact, I’d like to see Joe send Anderson a courteous personal note calling his attention directly to this.
I’m inclined to agree with you that this will end up in court (what doesn’t?). But it seems to me that the preponderance of evidence in the various NTSB reports is that the engineer on 175 (also the one on the meeting Amtrak train) blew the horn as soon as she saw the two CSX workers on track 3 and applied brakes.
Did you not say “we should trust the event recorder”? The event recorder is most likely not sophisticated enough to show a light impact thereby rendering it irrelevant. I was pointing out the irrelevancy to YOU but it seems to have sailed right on by you.
The statements attributed to the engineer are contradictory.
Hardly “frivolous, erroneous” given your own observation of “sloppy writing” by the NTSB it is most likely that word “gauge” was spelled phonetically by the transcriber who blundered into an obscure, little used and obsolete spelling of the word.
You are so desperate to always be right you cannot even comprehend what you read. Several others pointed out your error with regard to gage. You are a rude know-it-all and it is not surprising that nobody in authority pays any attention to you, even when, like a broken clock, when you are correct.
Around Amtrak MP 133.7 the engineer received an approach limited signal.3 She saw northbound Amtrak train P66 approaching her train on Amtrak main track 2 and dimmed the auxiliary lights.4 She then saw two people in reflective vests walking s
OK kids, play time is over, let’s get back to work…
No, wait: the plot may be thickening in an unexpected manner.
I provided a link to the NTSB public docket for this incident, which as of the time of posting included the actual text of source material such as engineer interviews. I did not have a chance to review this when I posted it, but noted that, in my opinion, either the ‘correct’ language of the engineer’s testimony will be available or it will be clearer to tell whether “interpretation” of what she said has been misconstrued in some way.
When I returned several hours later, the link to the docket material was inaccessible. I can draw no conclusion other than NTSB has become aware of a problem, and is either taking action or engaging in covering up.