Indeed - although the thread has been running now for some five weeks…
As has been suggested, this is still really early in the game. PTC became law in late 2008 and the end (full implementation) is still too far out to see from here.
PTC “cured” a problem that was largely non-existant. In the 20 years prior to Chatsworth, only two major loss-of-life incidents had occured that would have been prevented by PTC. The causes were later dealt with by rules changes.
The same can be said of many of the freight incidents. Many railroads use the SPAF (switch position awareness form). This is almost completely because of the incident in Graniteville.
There was no groundbreaking technology in that “fix.” Just a simple change in procedure.
Barring a knee-jerk reaction by law makers (see PTC…), this issue is going to sort itself out. New standards and procedures will come forth and be implemented. But it’s going to take time. A five week discussion on an on-line forum isn’t going to solve the problem. None of us here (that I know of) have the connections or ability to implement anything of that magnitude. And any proposed solution will need to be ev
Not to say “yes, but…” in the wrong way – but a great deal of the ‘hard’ part of PTC design and enablement was Government-underwritten, or at least assisted. The Meteorcomm SBRs are one example… would that technology have been developed if it had to be commercialized and standardized and marketed to railroads? This is the level I thought Government ‘contribution’ would be appropriate for oil-train ‘safety systems’.
Meanwhile, I am tempted to say ‘the government got what was coming to it’ by mandating PTC without a corresponding Polaris/PERT-level technology organization and coordination effort – which it could easily have engaged in. Pity.
I think you are right, but it might be possible for a properly-designed system, presented ‘right’ to the right people in the right timeframe, to become adopted. So far, I haven’t seen a train-control system or advanced brake system that wasn’t designed by the kind of engineering effort that produced the SPV-2000. That’s not to say either one can’t be developed for the ‘sandbox’ environment that Bakken/Eagle Ford crude trains offers. Personally, I am hoping that the Government does mandate “ECP” for oil trains, because I’d like to see if anyone who steps up to the plate will ‘get it’. Even if the result doesn’t make sense to roll out across the full range of interchange cars, it can’t be bad to have defined sta
dehusman
I don’t see any of that happening. The Government has not given any grants for PTC, all of the equipment, all of the installation and all of the maintenance is paid for by the railroads themselves, not the government.
Not to say “yes, but…” in the wrong way – but a great deal of the ‘hard’ part of PTC design and enablement was Government-underwritten, or at least assisted. The Meteorcomm SBRs are one example… would that technology have been developed if it had to be commercialized and standardized and marketed to railroads? This is the level I thought Government ‘contribution’ would be appropriate for oil-train ‘safety systems’.
Meanwhile, I am tempted to say ‘the government got what was coming to it’ by mandating PTC without a corresponding Polaris/PERT-level technology organization and coordination effort – which it could easily have engaged in. Pity.
I see even less of an incentive for the government to get involved with oil train enhancements like ECP etc from a financial standpoint since its an even stickier wicket than PTC (more players).
I think you are right, but it might be possible for a properly-designed system, presented ‘right’ to the right people in the right timeframe, to become adopted. So far, I haven’t seen a train-control system or advanced brake system that wasn’t designed by the kind of engineering effort that produced the SPV-2000. That’s not to say either one can’t be developed for the 'sandbox
Fortiscue is not a network of loose cars operating on multiple privately owned and operated railroads. Test enviornmnets and day in day out railroading in the US are two different worlds.
Of course that’s true but it doesn’t address the “half baked” comment. The network of loose cars and the lack of backward compatibility issue are the reasons ECP has not been adapted here, not a “half baked” spec issue. The lack of a migration path is the primary reason for lack of implementation. And I wouldn’t call the Southern Companies PRB coal service a “test” enviorement.
He addressed that to me, and I wasn’t questioning the standards, onlly the operational result that has been built and tested in the United States so far. It’s the result, not the planning and engineering, that I was commenting on, and only in the sense that the instantiations aren’t quite seen as ready ‘enough’ to be valuable in current railroad service (at least, not cost-effectively).
What I’d like to see is an architecture that provides ‘legacy’ one-pipe compatibility with simple (or even automatic) adaptation to two-pipe where that can be provided in blocks or unit consists, and have that adopted as the ‘mandated’ standard the Government winds up using for its safety ECP. If that can be done within the framework of the 42xx standards, so much the better.
I certainly did not mean to belittle the AAR or its standards!
After reading these last comments about all the objections to this thread, I had to go back and review the whole thread to see if it was the same one that I remember. In pages 1-16, I don’t see any problems. It covered a lot of ground in an organized fashion, and in great detail about technical issues of oil trains, safety ideas, derailments, etc. Most of everyone’s comments were stated with great clarity, and the thread stayed right on topic. There was some disagreement and debate, but it was entirely civil with no sense of personal attacks. There was some apparent misinterpretation from time to time, but this was cleared up without problems.
But this is just my description of the thread. It is just my narrative about the content and tone. Others have a different narrative. But the thread does not need my description or anybody else’s description for that matter. The thread is right here and it speaks for itself. It is the perfect transcript of the content and tone. So rather than listen to narratives of what happened in the thread, I suggest just looking at the actual thread. Here is a general list of content by page number. This is highly abbreviated and only for the purpose of generally making reference benchmarks:
Since you want to understand, here are some observations on the Lynchburg derailment.
At various points in the converstaion you have described the first 7 or 8 derailed cars as some form of “upright and in line”. Upright and in line implies that the cars are on their trucks, merely derailed and are roughly parallel to rails of the track they are supposed to be on. If a cut of cars is derailed “upright and in line” you should be able to use a set of frogs to rerail them. Not a big deal in the grander scheme of things.
The first 7 or 8 derailed cars are NOT “upright and in line” by any stretch of the imagination. The are derailed and on their sides. They are completely off their trucks, the trucks are disassembled and the track they should be on is completely gutted. The only reason they are not in a pile is that they fell over on flat ground, an adjacent track. If there had been the river embankment in that area instead of a track, they would be down the embankment, in the river. These cars cannot be frogged on. It will take multiple side-booms or cranes to rerail those cars after track is built to them.
Something caught my eye as I watched the video that I would have to assume you did not see. As I understand it, the differential braking concept is that the braking effort is reduced on the portion of the train ahead of the derailed cars to increase the draft forces on the cars ahead of the derailed cars, in order to keep the head end and the derailed cars stretched. The increased darft forces would prevent the cars from going out of line. Hold the thought about increasing the draft forces in the head end.
Between about 2:00 and 2:10 in the video the drone flies over and around the end of the first car in the pile, CBTX 741720. Something is missing. Its
Here is an FRA proposal for an overload detection device that would be a part of draft gear and record impacts in road and switching operations. It mentions that TSB of Canada is considering that switching impact exceeding 7.5 mph would be illegal, and if it occurs, a structural integrity test of the tank car must be performed. The concern is impact great enough to cause undetected damage that might lead to a structural failure later.
However the FRA is considering the installation of a device that will actually measure impact force rather than just basing the assessment of damage on impact speed. The Tank Car Committee is considering the use of accelerometers and/or strain gauges for the same purpose. https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02906#p1_z10_gD_s23_y2002_y2001_y2010_y2012_lPO
Quote from the link:
“Rather than using speed as a measure for determining the severity of a dynamic event, FRA is considering research to help develop an “overload detection device” as an integral part of a draft gear. The device would detect dynamic loads near or exceeding the design limits
Thanks for your comments. They are indeed legitimate observations and questions, as you say. I did look at that 741720 car and see what you mean about the pulled drawbar, and you raise some good points about what it indicates about adding draft force when the draft force is already high enough to part the train.
I understand your point about the problem of increasing the pulling force to keep the train from jackknifing, and then defeating the purpose by pulling the train in two as a result of that increase in pulling. I agree that it poses somewhat of a problem. It has to thread a needle between too little braking difference and too much braking difference. So I think the solution has be to have differential braking force simply limited to what the drawbars and couplers can generally withstand, and be able to achieve benefit within that force limitation.
After following this particular thread for an incredible length of time, I have come to the conclusion that Bucky/Euclid is making his presentation to the wrong people. Very few of the members of this forum are professionals who could make a valid critique of his proposals. He would better serve himself and others by presenting his proposals to various engineering and other professional organizations where they could be critiqued and developed as appropriate.
While many of the members of the forum are indeed railfans rather than “professionals”, I am aware that several of those who have regularly provided their critiques are working railroaders with experience in fields such as train operations, civil engineering and accident investigation. They have been attempting to provide advice and corrections to some of Euclid’s assumptions but it seems to be mostly falling on deaf ears.
Any “engineering or other professional organization” would first require the scientific research and analysis to back up his proposals before even bothering to consider them. We have been kinder here. Imagination is praiseworthy and does occasionally lead to valuable innovation. But that is highly improbable in this case for all the reasons the professionals have, with incredible patience, repeatedly tried to explain.
I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules.
This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules. However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.” Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows:
“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”
I did not realize that ECP brakes are a part of the new oil train rules currently under review by the Obama Administration. My understanding was that Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx had written a letter to the AAR and asked the industry to add ECP brakes to tank cars, but never actually included a requirement for ECP brakes in the proposed new tank car rules.
This report implies that ECP brakes are part of the new rules. However, the implication is not entirely clear because the article variously refers to ECP brakes and “advanced braking.” Apparently, the call for ECP is simply an option that is under consideration and described as follows:
“Option 1 would have 9/16 inch steel, would be outfitted with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes and would be equipped with rollover protection.”
It sounds like ECP brakes are one of three options under consideration for inclusion in the new tank car rules. The DOT released this July 2014:
· Proposes new standards for tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 (and that are used to transport flammable liquids as part of a HHFT) (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and bottom outlet protection; tank head and shell puncture resistance). PHMSA is requesting comment on three options for enhanced tank car standard requirements: