Are the railroads run along the military model, or does it just seem that way to outsiders?
NO!
The Army is far more flexible and innovative. I’m serious.
The railroads are run along the Harvard School of Business model. When John Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense tried to institute those policies in the military, the result was paralysis by analysis and some very expensive (and downright stupid) blunders. Examples:
- The F-111 was supposed to be the ‘Swiss Army knife’ aircraft, capable of carrying out all the missions required of carrier aircraft. As the fallout fell out, the Navy absolutely refused to accept it.
- The same thinking led to the last US aircraft carrier that WASN’T nuclear powered. One of McNamara’s whiz kids calculated that the nuclear power plant would be more expensive than a traditional oil burner over the life of the ship…
OTOH, the Army manual on operating railroads in war zones seems to have been based on the premise that nothing in railroading has changed since WWII. It’s full of references to telegraph lines, roundhouses and TTTO operation that has been dead for half a century.
Chuck [MSgt(ret)]
I would guess that updating the manual on operating railroads in war zones has a relatively low priority.
First, let me say that I was Chuck’s worst minor irritant. Kind of like a fly he had to shoo away. I was a 2nd Lieutenant. But I was a 2nd LT in the Transporation Corps and actually served in a rail detachment at Ft. Eustis, home of the Transporation Corps… (They told me I was in charge of the detachement.)
I’d like to understand what happened with the Army’s use of rail. From the Civil War through the Korean War rail transporation was critical to the US Army. Then all emphasis on rail just went away. It’s not like somebody on the other side just figured out that rail lines could be attacked. The Union Army in the Civil War operating near Atlanta was dependant on rail supply. The Military Railway Serivce performed this supply. The Rebs knew this and continually tried to cut the rail line with their calvary. So that’s not new. (A Union general named Thomas is credited with devising ways to keep the line guarded and open.)
In Korea there were five railway operating battalions. They provided most of the ton-miles. 15 years latter in Viet Nam, Army rail didn’t exist. I have no idea what caused the shift. The road convoys sure took attacks, and they continued to do so in Iraq.
In Britain and Europe the British army still uses rail to transport some items, and so does the US Army. Explosives are banned from the Channel Tunnel but within Britain, and on main land Europe they are moved extensively by rail.
When the Chunnel opened for business in 1994 one of the first freight trains to use it was a US Army special conveying a field hospital from Britian all the way to one of the former Soviet republics as part of the relief effort following an earthquake there.
For a long time the British military establishment had opposed the construction of the Channel Tunnel but in the 1950’s a study by the Pentagon suggested that in the event of a conventional war between Nato and the Warsaw pact, the Chunnel would enable troops and supplies to get from Britain to the expected front line in Germany a day sooner.
Historically, in Britain at any rate, railway management structure was modelled on military lines because back in the 1830’s the army was the only organisation with people in lots of places so the railways copied their command structure.
Murphy:
I like to argue that the military is run on a railroad model. [;)] Except we do it much better.
Having just been at an O-6 level reporting to a major general, and with going on 25 years in the railroad industry, I have some experience in the differences and similiarities:
Similar:
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Strictly hierarchical. You’d better be right, and lucky, if you decide to reach around your boss.
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Extremely tough-minded, ruthless, and demanding on performance; there is no room in either for anyone who can’t do or won’t do what is asked of them by their superior, and anyone who fails their superior will find their career options revised for them on the spot
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Both require people to consistently perform to a rigid set of promulgated standards and rules regardless of weather, hour of the day, time on duty, and depth of manure you’re standing in.
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Both are highly intolerant of insubordination, dereliction of duty, and failure to promptly and faithfully carry out orders.
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Both expect junior officers to show a high degree of self-reliance and performance of objectives within a narrow set of freedom of action.
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Both expect people to perform consistently absent of frequent supervision, and there is intolerance of people who wander off the path, sit around waiting for someone to hold their hand, or decide to set their own priorities.
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Both expect careerists to put the organization at a greater importance in their personal life than almost any other organization, live where the organization tells you to live, and do what the organization feels is best for you and your career. Both require extremely high amounts of time away from home. (I have averaged less than 3 nights a week at home in the last five years.)
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Both are opaque to the public, a culture unto themselves, and people that marry (and stay married), tend to select their partner from within the organization, because no one else understands it o
Or to put it moe simply.
There is the RIGHT WAY,. the WRONG WAY and then ther is the ARMY WAY!!!
This comes from working for the army for many years. VERY buracratic, they do not care what it costs, dont think, just follow orders. We NEVER had enough money for training or new equipment, but comes the end of the fiscal year and WHALA money suddenly appeared for the bosses to take boondoggle trips to germany and the far east. At the end of each fiscal year, IF there was money left over we were told to buy new furniture or anything else that we wanted. DO NOT WANT TO SENT MONEY BACK TO THE TREASURY!!!
Ditto RWM’s comments:
(+) Go back and look at the effect of the Civil War Union Army Transportation Corps had on american railroading from titles/ranks down to technical methods. - Huge!
-former ATSF Roadmaster
[(-D] I had to google porkpie hat, just to figure out what one was! Was that the preferred headgear for management only, or the operating department as well?
If you mean that there was a formal chain of command and discipline form top to bottom, then yes, railroads were designed similar to military form. A lot of military people joined railroads after the Civil War when operation and safety matters, new modes of communication, more trains, multiple tracks, longer track segements (and railroads), everything bigger and faster; it had to be dealt with in a serious manner. And so it evolved. And it was a strict adherence with difinitive divisions of labor and authorities working up and down and not across. Today’s railroading is a ghost of such discipline.
Remember that many former Civil War soldiers and officers were involved in building the transcontinental railroads, like Gen. Grenville Dodge etc.
Railroads are set up in divisions, just like the army. In fact the hierarchy of the military is very similar to the way railroads were set up.
Before the Civil War, conductors wore long black coats and top hats. After the war they wore blue coats with gold buttons similar to Union army coats, and wore hats with brims somewhat similar to military uniform hats. BTW in the South, conductors were often called “captain”, although the anology was of a ship’s captain than an army captain, since the conductor (not the engineer) was the person in charge of the whole train.
Combine the historical responses above from tulyar15 and mudchicken, plus henry6 and wjstix while I was writing this, and for today add in RWM’s comments.
Until the U.S. Civil War, railroading was pretty much a local business only - maybe the B&O was the only one longer than a day’s trip. That changed when the U.S. Army generals co-opted the fragmented rail system and made it theirs out of necessity*, in the process integrating it and imposing their systems and culture on it. That was partly by default, and partly by accident, because the military model was all they had, and the railroad looked a lot like a civilian version of the military anyway, and it looked like that engrafting would work pretty well, and it did.
After the war, when the first long-distance rail construction started (UP), many of the now-surplus soldiers wound up there as either guards or workers - including the generals, as engineers or managers, etc. Also, much of the territory that was being built through was protected or under the ambit of - yep, the U.S. Army - so there was no getting away from it. At time went on and people rose through the ranks and trained others and moved on, the culture / religion was inculcated in new people and new places. Lo and behold, the resulting uniformity - today we call it compatability or interchangeability - was also a good thing, which just reinforced it all.
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- “Amateurs study tactics; professional soldiers study logistics.” - Tom Clancy, in Executive Orders or Red Storm Rising (I think, although I see it’s also been attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, among others). Note that - if I’ve got the details right - the only 3-star general promotion by General “Stormin’ Norman” H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. during or as a result
[quote user=“Paul_D_North_Jr”]
Combine the historical responses above from tulyar15 and mudchicken, plus henry6 and wjstix while I was writing this, and for today add in RWM’s comments.
Until the U.S. Civil War, railroading was pretty much a local business only - maybe the B&O was the only one longer than a day’s trip. That changed when the U.S. Army generals co-opted the fragmented rail system and made it theirs out of necessity*, in the process integrating it and imposing their systems and culture on it. That was partly by default, and partly by accident, because the military model was all they had, and the railroad looked a lot like a civilian version of the military anyway, and it looked like that engrafting would work pretty well, and it did.
After the war, when the first long-distance rail construction started (UP), many of the now-surplus soldiers wound up there as either guards or workers - including the generals, as engineers or managers, etc. Also, much of the territory that was being built through was protected or under the ambit of - yep, the U.S. Army - so there was no getting away from it. At time went on and people rose through the ranks and trained others and moved on, the culture / religion was inculcated in new people and new places. Lo and behold, the resulting uniformity - today we call it compatability or interchangeability - was also a good thing, which just reinforced it all.
-
- “Amateurs study tactics; professional soldiers study logistics.” - Tom Clancy, in Executive Orders or Red Storm Rising (I think, although I see it’s also been attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, among others). Note that - if I’ve got the details right - the only 3-star general promotion by General “Stormin’ Norman” H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. during or as a result of the 1991
When I was in the track construction business, the guys I worked for were (from the top down):
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Ex-US Navy “SeaBee” (Construction Battalion) Captain;
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2 Ex-US Navy Lt. Commanders, 1 from the Viet Nam era;
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1 ex- US Army Captain.
EDIT: Forgot to mention - 2 of the top were ex-PRR Track Supervisors, 1 of whom had the Hudson (North) River tunnels in his territory, and the last was an ex-PRR Asst. Division Engineer for the Phila. Division. 'Nuff said about the military-railroad connection ?
The guys I worked with in the field - typically as foremen or equipment operators - were mainly non-commissioned officers (“NCOs”) of various grades.
Also, we did a lot of work at, in, or serving various military installations up and down the East Coast of the US. (Security clearances and passes - a whole 'nother delight in life.)
I don’t recall that much of what we did or how we did it was explicitly military or the same way, but the style and culture were sure there underneath and in the background.
To add to part of 13 on RWM’s list (above) - “Railroads and the military are games played outdoors all over.”: I’d add construction to that list, at least the kind I do - the civil, “heavy and highway”, site, and building structural stuff (not the indoor fit-out work, of course). On further thought, many of the construction organizations I’ve been involved with shared most (but not all) of the items in his list, no doubt because there was a principal cadre of military personnel in them, too.
And to add to RWM’s list of the differences (and not be too cavalier about it):
- The risk of being shot at and captured (or worse), for decidedly inferior compensation and “perks” (with apologies to To
I am not being sarcastic in asking this, but were there even railroads in Vietnam? The very fact
Yes, Iraq has and had railroads right along. See TRAINS mag from a couple of years ago.
The railway in Iraq could have functioned for the military, had they needed it for the invasion. They didn’t. The railway was activated shortly after the invasion for resupply for the military, an
Gabe - Yes, there were, and are (apparently quite nice, too !) For example, see: http://www.seat61.com/Vietnam.htm
But back in the Vietnam war days, it was inherited from the French, and apparently a favorite target of the Viet Cong guerrillas. From time to time in the 1960’s the Trains “Newsphoto” section would have a photo from there, unfortunately usually of a GE diesel or an armored railcar that had hit a mine (or similar) and blown off the tracks into the ditch or jungle and overturned, etc.
Also, someone - William Middleton, most likely - wrote a 2-part series that also appeared in Trains titled “Railroads of Vietnam”, if I recall correctly. I’ll see if I can find the cite for it.
I’d say your analysis of the role of the railroad in that war, and in that society and economy at that time, with respect to the military situation and tactics, is right on. It was essentially irrelevant to the mission and methods selected.
However, I think you underrate the durability of railroad technology and railroads as supply lines in combat situations, as a general proposition. Someplace recently I read that in Korea (and maybe even Vietnam), the problem for the US was that the enemy could always repair the lines enough to resume some traffic pretty quickly - there didn’t seem to be a “knockout blow” that could be delivered and would stick. In Iraq, I don’t know if the rail line went where we ne
MWHemphill -
Not to get too far “Off-Thread”, but your commentary reads like the book The Ugly American, only about 50 years later. Familiar with it ? Concur ?
EDIT: Maybe we should have asked the Russians to show us how to secure railroad lines, esp. post-9/11. [sarcasm] Rail lines were state secrets to them, with attendant consequences to anyone who tried to even photograph them without permission (Ron Ziel notwithstanding). Somehow I think they would have got the job done . . .
- Paul North.
OK, I was “close” - it was Jerry A. Pinkepank instead. Here’re the cites:
Trains, March 1969, pg. 20, “Rails through Viet Nam - 1, The Conveyance Which Runs by Fire”, Pinkepank, Jerry A.;
Trains, April 1969, pg. 36, “Rails through Viet Nam - 2, Railroading Where the Competition is a War”, Pinkepank, Jerry A.
- Paul North.