Let’s just say a crew and train ran thru a red signal at an interlocking (crossing with another railroad).
What would occur specifically at that time? Would the CTC boards light up? Let’s assume there was no collision with another train. Would the train crew be subject to immediate investigation including testing?
Would the train and section of track be “locked down” for investigation? If so, what would occur at the road crossings?
Ed
Running by a red board no matter where it is located is an automatic pulled out of service and carries a 30, 60 or 90 days suspension (depending on the previous number of similar incidents) for the engineer and conductor; with both having to surrender their licenses…it’s a federal law.
Depending on the circumstance, if the engineer or conductor claim some extenuating condition, (the red dropped right in front of them) then an investigation would be held, but most of the time the crew admits they ran it, the CTC board will show when and where they got past it, the dispatcher will know, and most likely call them on the radio to tell them to stop and call the local trainmaster to inform him of the incident.
Most crews are not going to try and talk their way out of it simply because it is almost impossible too…If I claim a signal malfunction, but the train that follows mine has no issue, and the maintainer checks the circuit and it works, that’s pretty hard to argue with.
It is pretty much accepted that signals work the way they are intended to, after all, we trust them daily with our lives, so getting by a red one is almost impossible to defend.
No, the track is not locked out or service suspended on it, for the same reason a traffic cop doesn’t close a street when he writes you a ticket for running a red traffic light, again, the assumption is the signals work as designed.
Most of the time a crew is halted the moment the dispatcher see the violation, and a relief crew is sent out to continue on with the train.
Not to say a signal can’t malfunction, it is rare but happens, but….
To get to a red signal in the first place you have to pass at least 2 other signals that give certain indications, and such indications tell the crew to expect a red, so getting by a signal they expect to be red is again, hard to defend.
Because of the problems running a red can cause with the rest of the signals, most crews, once th
On my carrier in CTC territory, every absolute signal is a part of the Computer Assisted Dispatching System (CADS). All CTC territory track circuits, as defined in the CADS system, have an identity in the CADS system as well as each signal and switch. Whenever a route is lined by the Dispatcher a computer record is generated for every action that the Dispatcher used to line that route as well as the communications sent and received from the signal appurtenances in the field. Dispatchers are required to apply the correct train identification for every train (including yard jobs operating in dispatcher controlled territory) at the origin point for that train and it’s identity will be tracked through the system as it progresses. As the train progresses across it’s route, records are generated, timed to the second, for each track segment occupied and/or signal operated past.
It is possible for track circuits in the field to come on for a variety of reasons and drop a previously cleared signal to STOP, these track circuits will generate a record. When a train passes a STOP signal under these circumstances, the train notifies the Dispatcher who notifies the Chief Dispatcher who has the Signal Technicians run a printout of the Signal Log for the affected location to verify the crew’s claim. If the signal did drop to STOP in the face of the train - the train is given authority to proceed in conformity with the rules for a train having been delayed in the block. It the crew’s claim is in error, the train stays stopped at that location, company officials are notified to interview the crew and a recrew is ordered. A decision whether to cut blocked road crossings will be made by a Senior Division Official, local authorities are notified of the blocked crossings so they can be knowledgeable of the crossings being blocked and handle their responsibilities accordingly.
There was an incident on th eNorfolk Southern about 10 years ago where a crew ran a red. They said the signal looked green. When investigated it was proven that the sun, at that particular signal, at that particular tday and ime made the signal look green. The crew was exhonerated and NS put hoods on the signal to prevent it from ever happening again. A VERY rare case.
The PRR had a small blinking yellow light on some signals on grades allowing a train to continue moving at 10 mph or less when the stop aspect was displayed. It was understood that the block was occupied and the responsibility to avoid the train ahead was the engineer of the following train to stop in time.this woyld not be applicable to crossings.
As I recall, that was at Hershey, PA, and another contributing factor was an accumulation of water inside the signal lens or bulb assembly, etc. The incident resulted in a collision with another train, and I believe 1 of the crewmen was killed. And yes, the NTSB investigation exonerated the crew (but for sure implicated the maintenance policies and practices.) From my post to another thread here back in April 2011:
“_About 15 years ago there was a fatal rear-end collision on ConRail at Hummelstown (near Hershey) that the NTSB report concluded was caused by a combination of rusty water in the signal lens, an out-of-focus lens, foliage partially obscuring the signal, and a bright fall late afternoon sun shining directly on the face of the signal and its lenses, all of which made the red-over-red look like a yellow-over green. See REAR-END COLLISION/ DERAILMENT - CONRAIL HUMMELSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA - SEPTEMBER 29, 1997 - NTSB Report No. RAB-98-23, adopted 12-1-1998, at: http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/RAB9823.htm_ .”
That link is no longer valid - try this one instead (2 pages, approx. 12 KB electronic file size):
https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/RAB9823.pdf
An excerpt:
"On October 1, 1997, National Transportation Safety Board investigators, with represent
Paul:
Yes, you are exactly correct that was the accident. It was a weird situation and resulted in NS taking corrective measures as to the maintenacne of their signals.
Ira
[quote user=“Paul_D_North_Jr”]
As I recall, that was at Hershey, PA, and another contributing factor was an accumulation of water inside the signal lens or bulb assembly, etc. The incident resulted in a collision with another train, and I believe 1 of the crewmen was killed. And yes, the NTSB investigation exonerated the crew (but for sure implicated the maintenance policies and practices.) From my post to another thread here back in April 2011:
“_About 15 years ago there was a fatal rear-end collision on ConRail at Hummelstown (near Hershey) that the NTSB report concluded was caused by a combination of rusty water in the signal lens, an out-of-focus lens, foliage partially obscuring the signal, and a bright fall late afternoon sun shining directly on the face of the signal and its lenses, all of which made the red-over-red look like a yellow-over green. See REAR-END COLLISION/ DERAILMENT - CONRAIL HUMMELSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA - SEPTEMBER 29, 1997 - NTSB Report No. RAB-98-23, adopted 12-1-1998, at: http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/RAB9823.htm_ .”
That link is no longer valid - try this one instead (2 pages, approx. 12 KB electronic file size):
https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/RAB9823.pdf
An excerpt:
"On
Yeah, but sometimes you old pharts are kinda phun, and phull of lots of phacts and phigures……[swg]
Have to agree with you on that one. The CPL’s have a couple of kinds of redundancy, in that one or two bulbs could burn out and it would still be possible to ascertain the aspect. Position lights are also readable by people with colorblindness.
In Absolute Permissive Block signalling, and most CTC systems, following movements can pass an intermediate red signal under certain circumstances. An intermediate signal is one that is not at an interlocking or control point. These intermediate signals have a number plate or another special indicator as specified in the rules. NORAC rule 291 indication is STOP AND PROCEED, requiring a stop before passing (at Restricted Speed) UNLESS:
The signal has a “G” (grade) or “R” (restricting) plate in addtion to the number plate AND the train is not a passenger train. Passenger trains must make a full stop before proceeding.
Because they do not have the plates or markers interlocking or control point signals can’t display a rule 291 aspect. NORAC rule 292 applies: STOP SIGNAL. The indication is Stop.
If there is something to be said for LED lighting modules, it’s that they are usually dead on for color. Red is red, etc. One problem with filtered incandescent signals is that the filters may vary in their tint, etc, and there is still the underlying full spectrum (or mostly so) light behind them.
As for Balt’s comment on CPL, etc, the same could be said for semaphores, especially with today’s reflective materials, as backup for the lighting at night.
Not as rare as one would think. The same thing happened at Omaha with one of our crews, except instead of green the signal looked yellow. It was red. There are a few signals still like that. At certain times of the day the sun hitting the lens changes the appearance of the aspect color slightly. I have asked a dispatcher to flag me past a signal where I wasn’t certain if we had it after he had told me what his plans were. His board may show us lined up, but conditions in the field might not allow a signal to clear up.
Before they changed the signals, there was a dwarf signal at Fremont where at night the ditch lights would make the signal look lunar instead of red.
I’ve had signals, including control points drop in front of me. You bring your train to a normal stop and contact the dispatcher. Often, they don’t even notice that the control point dropped out. In those cases, they don’t pull someone out of service. Only when the dispatcher was holding the signal against you. Sometimes a dispatcher has warned a train that signal or track work going on within the block might drop a control point to red in front of a train. When doing so, he just tells the train to come to a normal stop and contact him.
Running a stop signal on our railroad gets you at least 30 days, possibly 60 days, at their discretion. I think 30 days is the minimum first offence penalty required by the FRA.&
BaltACD:
That was a great explanation of not only my hypothetical situation, but also your dispatching system in general. I listen in on scanner chatter constantly and what you outlined makes sense with bits and pieces which I have heard and accumulated over the years.
Often I will hear communication between dispatch and crews regarding “dropped” or “pumping” signals or track circuit issues. Another frequent conversation will involve a dispatcher asking a train if the signal can be “taken away” from the train, even tho the train is often several miles (and intermediate signals) from the affected signals. It makes quite a bit of sense now.
Lets say a dispatcher has a train lined up from Control Point 224 thru Control Point 235. There are three intermediate signals spaced. If the dispatcher wants to take the signal at CP235 and the train has passed CP224, then is the dispatcher:
Obligated to ask permission by rules?
Make this request out of courtesy to the crew, even tho it can be determined the crew will pass several intermediate signals?
Or under no obligation to communicate to the crew (other than signal) of the change?
Ed
Required by the rules to contact the crew and ascertain that the crew can get safely stopped before passing the next absolute signal. If the crew says they can get stopped the dispatcher can take the signal down. If the crew says they can’t then the dispatcher doesn’t take down the signal.
Thanks.
Ed
Depending on the physical characteristic of the particular territory, Dispatcher may have to ask to take down the signal at the 2nd advance control point. At one location on my territory there are two control points that are less than one mile apart.
It is always best to advise trains of the situations that the Dispatcher knows the train will encounter. If a train is going to have to stop behind another train - tell them about it. Train & Engine crews try to out think the dispatcher fr
And if the dispatcher (on the UP at least) wants to change a route at that absolute signal, they must wait until the affected train has reported itself stopped before changing a power switch.
There are non-controlled absolute signals (leaving signals that govern movement to CTC tracks over hand throw switches and automatic interlockings are a couple that come to mind) where, after stopping and meeting other certain requirements, trains can pass a stop indication without dispatcher authority.
Jeff
Balt:
Even more great info. A couple of years ago there was a massive 3 train pile up here in my area in which the T&E crew did “think themselves into trouble”, or perhaps “didnt think” (I read the NTSB report).
During these great spring and summer mornings, I go out to the patio with a cup of coffee and turn on my scanner. My makeshift antenna is pretty decent out there and around daybreak I can often hear the “skip” you referred to. It is always entertaining to hear the NS, CSX, and CN dispatchers talking to a crew 50 - 75 miles away. I do not hear the crew, but the dispatcher frequently is heard.
On really good mornings I will pickup the UP dispatcher and a Chicago operator for NS. There is so much involved with the movements of trains, particularly the closer one is to Chicago (or any other metropolitan region).
Ed
This NTSB report on a collision on SEPTA in 2006 is informative and supports a lot of the comments by Ed Blysard and BaltACD. In brief, a new engineer (5th solo trip) of a southbound train ran through 2 red signals and a switch at the end of double track - DS didn’t notice it promptly (see report). However, the engineer of an opposing northbound train on the single track did, because she wondered why she had passed a Clear Green and then at the next signal had a Stop and Proceed Red - without encountering an Approach Yellow in between them !
https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2008/RAB0803.pdf
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/RAB0803.html