I just want to reiterate…reading Vance’s book was an awakening. Just finished the western part of the book with details on most of the transcontinental lines to the west coast. Along with the book I used the Wikimapia service…the terrain view was great to actually see the geography which Vance described so well.
Unfortunately the book is due back tomorrow (inter library loans dont allow more than 14 days) and the chapter on Canada wont be read. Tomorrow is a 500 mile plus day (Lafayette, Indy, and Central Illinois) so the book wont be finished.
Great discussion here on St. Louis, Chicago, and the US railroad system. Thanks to all.
Originally I got the Vance book from an inter-library lending program. However, after I had returned it, occasionally I found myself wanting to go back and read some specific section again. I found several copies were available from the on-line used booksellers for $10-$15. I’d recommend getting your own copy that way. ,
I view the Chicago “problem” from a broader holistic or “systems” perspective, starting with everything that’s inside of a circle with a radius of about 100 miles from the Loop. Which is not to say that’s a “black box” concept and that the nuts-and-bolts inside of it can be ignored. To the contrary, for me that’s a rough gauge as to the limits of how far out all of the components need to be examined and analyzed to see if and how they are contributing to the problem, and what changes can and should be made up to that far out to contribute to the solution.
Once those components are identified, then the micro-analysis of each of the individual “hubs” (yards and junctions) and “spokes” (lines) - or whatever other analogy you prefer to use - inside that circle t
Another - even shorter - history of the world ! [tup]
RWM, I presume you’re familiar with Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, by Marc Resiner (1986, rev. 1993) ?
That’s where I first read about the promoters belief and settlers’ delusion that “the rain will follow the plow” also, and the 100th Meridian being the western limit of dependable rainfall for arable land. Also where I first saw the quote about “perpetual growth being the ideology of the cancer cell”.
To keep this post at least somewhat “on topic” for this Forum then: Do you have any thoughts that you can share about either the current or future effects on U.S. railways of: 1) the increasing population in the drier portions of the U.S. West - where there is clearly not enough naturally available water to sustain those populations without importing that water from another watershed basin a long distance away (
I see the reference about Peoria being the non-railhub from time to time. What about Peoria made people ever think it had a chance as a contender? Didn’t one of the eastern trunklines, like B&O, PRR even have a line to Peoria?
Some railroads took advantage of Chicago congestion and delays to market their Peoria Gateway routes, namely the M&StL (following its merger with the Iowa Central on New Year’s Day 1912), the Nickel Plate (following merger with LE&W in 1922) and the TP&W (George P. McNear bought this railroad in 1927 and then promoted it as a bridge route between the ATSF at Lomax and the PRR at Effner). Interurban Illinois Terminal gained a connection with the P&PU in 1914, and thus a connection to steam roads (and as industries sprang up, so did Peoria Gateway business). The Peoria Gateway also handle north-south traffic flows between the Rock Island and the Chicago & Alton/GM&O, Illinois Central and Illinois Terminal. After acquiring the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis into Pekin in 1926, the C&IM solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Springfield or Taylorville (B&O and Wabash connections). The Peoria & Eastern (leased to the Big Four and later, New York Central) solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Indianapolis.
Other carriers, such as the CB&Q, C&NW and PRR did interchange business at Peoria because some shippers preferred to route their traffic that way, or in some cases Peoria was the only logical point of interchange.
Through the 1950’s, the Peoria Gateway handled much east-west transcontinental interchange business.Then, the Gateway began to decline. The C&NW took over the M&StL in November 1960, and discouraged Peoria routings by downgrading Minneapolis - Peoria freights 19 and 20. Leasing the Wabash at the same time it purchased the Nickel Plate in October 1964, Norfolk & Western convinced shippers to give it the longer ha
CSXT never served Peoria (it came as close as Henry until IAIS took over that portion in February 2006). Most area CSXT business is handled by TP&W, but CN, IMRR and IAIS handle some as well.
Norfolk Southern makes a run to East Peoria from Bloomington-Normal about five nights a week.
Can someone explain the meaning and use of the term gateway, as it pertains to this, and other discussions? Thanks
I’d define it as any strategic interchange point (Chicago, Peoria, St. Louis, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Maybrook, NY, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Memphis, Birmingham, Potomac Yard/Alexandra, VA, New Orleans, etc.), past or present.
I’d add “between 2 or more railroads, or 1 or more markets”. Pretty tough to call something a “gateway” without some change in the traffic - either a connection or an origin or destination, etc. - occurring at least from one side of it to the other. Otherwise, it’s just another point along the line.
Pretty much synonymous with what Vance liked to designate as “articulation points”.
Paul North.
EDITED at 10:05 PM: ADD: - Of national or at least regional (multi-state) importance to the railroad network;
With significantly large traffic flows - say, > 10 % of the railroad’s volume; and,
At or as a result of natural or man-made “relief” - i.e., the absence of - an otherwise significant geographic or topographic obstacle or feature, such as a route through a mountain pass, a port, a bridge over a major river, etc.
What this would be is a belt line (like the BRC or IHB) writ large or on steroids.
As to the 3 reasons repeated above, they may not be all that formidable. Before CREATE, I would have a hard time making that argument, and would have to rely on the examples of joint facilities such as interlock
The point about “mine run” off the docks is well-taken - in other words, how the boxes get loaded onto the big container ship - and hence unloaded - is pretty much random. No one at that end of the supply chain is “pre-blocking” the groups of boxes for each specific destination. All of the boxes from Port A or Shipper A are on the bottom, and all those from Port B or Shipper B are loaded above, regardless of their destination. And even if the whole ship is loaded at one port, there are probably so many different manufacturers/ shippers on it to so many different destinations - and the ship’s own need to remain balanced during the loading process to maintain in trim, etc. - that pretty much any attempt to organize it better is precluded or frustrated. So be it.
And the point about dock space being too valuable (beause it is in limited supply and high demand already at those tightly constricted locations) is also well-taken.
So I’ll ask this: Why not build an intermodal station stop on the TransCon lines somewhere out the cornfields (cheap land) in western Illinois (startegic location, way west of Chicago), where the container trains would stop and the “not- Chicago” (only) boxes would be stripped off and put on and into their own blocks or train for other points east ?
Well, that would raise the “too much delay in the travel times” problem. Fair enough - all the Chicago boxes w
Yes, it’s been studied. It won’t even come close to paying for itself. I doubt it ever will because by the time the volumes grow high enough to make it viable, the volumes have grown so high that the problem that’s trying to be solved can be more economically solved by other means. Namely, with very high volumes it now becomes economical to fill a ship with single-destination boxes at origin point(s). The sort is taking place in the city streets of Shenzen and Shanghai (on someone else’e nickel) instead of where it take place now on the city streets of Chicago (on someone else’s nickel) instead of internalizing the costs with a rail-owned facility. Frankly, even if the externalized costs of Shenzen and Chicago were internalized to railroads – their incremental cost – I think it would still be much, much cheaper to pay that toll charge than a dedicated en route sort facility.
There is some sorting that takes place already at the ICTF and other West Coast ports to get the cats and dogs sorted out into blocks of like. Blocks are swapped en route at locations such as Belen, Clovis, and middle-of-line sidings. A train departing LA with Cicero, Alliance, Memphis blocks ends up with all Cicero blocks, for example. This is a fairly rough sort, however, not a fine sort. However, the new wide-span gantry cranes that are being installed at the very newest intermodal facilities (what I would call “third generation” intermodal facilities) will econ
What this would be is a belt line (like the BRC or IHB) writ large or on steroids.
As to the 3 reasons repeated above, they may not be all that formidable. Before CREATE, I would have a hard time making that argument, and would have to rely on the examples of joint facilities such as interlockings and grade separations (at the small end), to flyovers and trackage and haulage rights (in the middle range), to the recent corridor agreements (NS and CN, for example), exchanges of rights as part of merger agreements, and the Alameda Corridor (at the larger end), as precedents to make my case. But CREATE trumps all of them - since that was accomplished (somehow) and is being implemented, it does seem that many larger-scale coordination and cooperation projects are at least feasible.
The most uncertain one is revisiting the ICC Termination Act - depending on “whose ox is being gored” and their reception in the current Congress and/ or Administration (keep in mind the more aggressive antitrust enforcement policies announced earlier just this week), I can’t rule that out.
As to the Strategic and shareholder’s legal matters, as long as each railroad received something of benefit in return that its Board of Directors could reasonably find to be worthwhile for whatever they give up or advantage is conferred on another railroad as a “business decision” (similar to the contract law concept of “consideration”), that should immunize them from a shareholder lawsuit succeeding. It’s only when there’s a complete one-sided giveaway, corruption, or loss of a nature that “What were they thinking ?” is asked that such a “derivative suit” (the technical term for it) could succeed - I’m not aware of any such suit succeeding on the sole basis of a competitor receiving an advantage, without a corresponding loss to the subject corporation. Also, if STB approval were obtained, th
RWM - Thanks again for your time and interest to respond intelligently to my little essays / editorials.
I hear what your saying about the “one big solution”. Wasn’t it E. H. Harriman who said, “I’m tired of building monuments to engineers ?” - meaning over-designs or mistakes, etc.
Continuing the Greek sub-theme here: Just last week I reminded one of my colleagues that after Hercules cleaned out the Augean stables (supposedly 3,000 oxen for 30 years’ worth of manure, as one of his 12 penitential tasks) - by diverting 2 rivers through them, he then killed the guy who asked him to do it (because that guy went back on his word in some way - he didn’t like how Hercules did it, I believe). Anyway, point well taken there, too - not all tasks are worth doing in terms of effects on career and reputation, as well as the other more usual considerations. This too from Robert Townsend in Up the Organization.
I’ll try to go easier on the Kneiling quotes and references in the future. But other than you, who else is there to look to for incisive commentary ?
Yes, he did poke people in the eye. Most of 'em needed poking.
It was his job to stir things up. He was good at that. I don’t know what specifically RWM objects to about Kneiling - but during my time with the railroad I found Kneiling to be more right than wrong.
To change railroads, isn’t this a description of the reason for a large hump yard at a place like North Platte? It allows the western ports to build trains with little care as to the final destination of the boxes other than at the single car level. North Platte then sorts the incoming train into its destinations – Selkirk, Global III, interchange at St. Louis or whatever.
Further: Paul and I are not debating purpose and need for such a facility. We are debating whether it’s more economical for railways to supply their own facility made out of rail and ties instead of the facility supplied by the City of Chicago Department of Public Works made out of asphalt and concrete.
I think you’re getting to the answer to the original question here. Why Chicago, rather than…
“Chicago” knew/knows that as long as everything has to stop there, the city holds competitive advantage. And by hook or by crook, that’s what Chicago has always succeeded at doing.
Regarding CREATE. What do you think the chances are that the connection (NKP?) will actually be restored at Grand Crossing? Wouldn’t that cut a half hour off every Amtrak schedule to the south on CN(IC), and free up track space?
Ahh so - now I see ! [tup] Well said, between this and the previous longer post regarding same (above).
[:-,] May I suggest adding this to the list of “Ways to Make Your Railroad Income Statement More Fluid” in your post of 05-16-2009 at 10:01 AM over on the “Fluidity?” thread at : http://cs.trains.com/trccs/forums/t/153111.aspx?PageIndex=2
Unless you think that it’s already covered under 5. there (“Have someone else spend money on key terminals, use on toll basis that will never amortize the cost”, etc.), that’ll make 9 ways. So you only need 1 more for a “Top 10” list on David Letterman’s TV show ! [swg] Fame and fortune are yours to be had ! Go for it, man !
Seriously, I’ll have something more substantive on this later on. For the moment, it seems that:&