Jim: I’ll have to ask tomorrow about the purchase details.
Some of the subsequent posts on this topic concerned the value of Conrail. In general terms, you can think of a railroad having three positive values, cash, real estate, and traffic. I don’t know what Conrail had in the prior two categories, but as I recall the principal attraction was traffic and a low operating ratio.
Consider the traffic position of CSX and NS. Both are essentially single-track railroads with many duplicate routes, none of which can be abandoned without severe hardship on the systems, CSX much more so than NS. Neither railroad had a position in New York City and North Jersey, the principal East Coast intermodal terminal and industrial complex, respectively. Coal was the money-maker at CSX and NS, but beginning several years ago it entered a period of steep decline that shows no signs of reversing.
Neither railroad was a major east-west intermodal player, in part because their routes are fairly indirect, in part because they connect very few major city pairs with a high-speed route (Cincinnati-Atlanta on NS is a noteworty exception), and partly because the principal east-west gateway city, Chicago, they approached from the southeast.
The gateway cities matter a great deal. If you look at a U.S. railroad atlas for a few minutes, consider how each gateway is approached. On all sides of Chicago, flat open country allows high-speed routes that have been built up with multiple track for high capacity. It also doesn’t have the Mississipp River to tussle with, which becomes more and more difficult to cross the farther south you go.
St. Louis is boxed to the west and south by the Ozarks, and while it has excellent approaches from the east, the western approaches are hilly and slow. It’s going nowhere as a gateway, and is avoided because of the high costs and slow transit times of its two terminal roads, TRRA and A&S. MoPac and Cotton Belt figured out how to go ar