I’d love to see the details on the various corridors.
Chicago - Saint Louis ($445M): This corridor would take less than $300M for 110 mph service infrastructure improvements over 70% of the the corridor. Tilt equipment would eliminate the need for curve easement or speed recovery from restrictions.
Chicago - Cleveland ($1,187M): I cannot fathom the high cost for this corridor. This works out to $3.4M a mile, including the Toledo - Cleveland stretch. Would this include a new additional track along side the existing NS tracks between Fort Wayne and Cleveland? Not be much curve easement would be needed. The map indicates that the former Wabash alignment would be used; but this line was abandonned.
Limited service from Chicago could be extended to Pittsburgh and Buffalo from Chicago. 110 mph would be practical for most of the route to Buffalo while speed restrictions for frequent curvature could be reduced with tilt trains on the existing line to Pittsburgh.
A Fort Wayne - Columbus branch offers the most direct route to this major market from Chicago. A high speed connection would be needed west and south of Upper Sandusky for a 110 mph route. This aids a secondary route to Pittsburgh as well, serving Mansfield, Canton, and other cities in route.
Detroit - Pittsburgh, Detroit - Columbus, and Detroit - Dayton - Cincinati services should be added. This would provide missing connections for the “3-C” Cleveland - Columbus - Cincinnati corridor that is not included in the network for reasons unknown by me.
Chicago - Detroit ($873M incl Grand Rapids & Port Huron): From Kalamazoo eastward, 90 mph would be the practical limit with tilt equipment without extensive and costly curve easement. The only 110 mph potential would be Indiana Harbor (East Chicago, IN) - Kalamazoo, MI with few intermediate restrictions.
Your negativity, like my pessimism, seems as well-founded on long experience seeing projects of all kinds. Chicago has had more than a fair share of monumental cost overruns, most lately Millennium Park and the Loop Airport Terminal. So far, $150-200M of transit money has been spent on an office tower around and above the Loop Airport Terminal; but there is no tunnel connection between CTA lines, or maybe even the 1-block tunnel, much less tracks and signals.
For that matter, whatever happened to Chicago’s infamous Crosstown Fund that was suppposedly left over after a new experessway paralleling Cicero Avenue never got built? Seems in the Nineties it was turning up occasionally (bad penny, anyone?) only to vanish from practical application in times of these drearily similar budget “crises” at CTA.
Could it be that the cost includes aquiring the ROW in this case (rather than being a tenant)?
It would be quite a bit cheaper to us the NS Chicago Line and just plop down a third track, but that means you trade Fort Wayne for Elkhart and likely lose the bulk of the Columbus - Chicago traffic.
“HSR” means different things to different people. Harvey K was using it to mean top speeds in the 110 mph range in the Midwest corridors in the above posting. In the NE corridor, they use it to mean the 150 that the Acelas reach for a short portion of their run. California seems to be referring to something over 200 for the LA/Bay area run. We end up using the same words to describe a large variety of situations.
For most corridors I suspect improvements that get the average speed into the high two digits is the realisitic goal, and even then I’m not convinced that it can be done on tracks shared with the freights.
California’s HSR system is designed to operate on its own Right of Way grade separated from any other traffic. Under the guise of expanding the San Francisco - San Jose Caltrans commuter rail system the state has been quietly acquiring the additional ROW necessary for the HSR between those two points. It will parallel Caltrans between San Francisco and San Jose with two tracks of its own. The major expenditures along that route will be fror grade separation. It is my understanding there will be a HSR Station at San Francisco, SFO and San Jose with Caltrans operating as a feeder for intermediate stations. Much of the land where the HSR crosses Pacheco Pass and Tehachapi is already state land. Not all trains will make all stops after San Jose in fact it is my understanding after Leaving San Jose there will be express HSR trains that will make no further stops until reaching LA and then on to Anahiem. I still feel that for the trackage and station at Anahiem Disney should pony up the money as he is the definite beneficiary. California HSR regional trains will stop at some Valley stations but not all. The San Joaquins will continue to operate as feeders to the HSR system up and down the valley. These same regionals will make a stop at
I think the former PRR line to Fort Wayne, IN is preferable as well - not that the NS main wouldn’t be an acceptable alternative.
While the South Bend-Elkhart, IN SMSA, 316,000 pop, is not as large as Fort Wayne, 570,000 pop, a saving could be realized in future full grade separation for the shared right-of-way.
As I wrote before, the route through Fort Wayne would provide a shorter route to Columbus, OH by way of a high speed connection near Upper Sandusky, OH that would merge at Delaware, OH with a high speed line between Cleveland, OH and Columbus.
A secondary route for a round trip is afforded between Lima, OH and Cleveland sharing the Cleveland - Columbus line from Crestline. The more costly alternative would be for a new Cleveland - Columbus high speed alignment through Mansfield and Akron.
A second Chicago - Pittsburgh route is possible through Mansfield and Canton. Much of the line west of Mansfield could be upgraded to 150 mph for significant stretches with full grade separation but without significant curve easement. Tilt trains would improve speed for the many restrictive curves from Mansfield to Pittsburgh. This route could tie into a Cleveland - Pittsburgh high speed line.
Upgrading Chicago - Mansfield to 220 mph would require some new right of way for additional grade separation and curve easement in developed areas, incurring the costs of dislocation and segregated freight tracks as well as electrification for the entire route and branches to Toledo, Detroit, Cleveland, Columbus, and Pittsburgh. Reducing running time of 4:22 hrs to ~2:30 with 220 mph service for Chicago - Cleveland would be significant, while reducing Toledo - Cleveland below ~1:30 would not make as much a difference.
Plopping down a third track is expensive, even with existing track beds and bridges; but $3.4M/mi?
Now assuming a third track is added along the NS between Butler, IN and Cleveland and tracks are re-sp
Please don’t shoot the messenger. The Midwest Regional Rail System that I’m basing my comments on calls that high speed; and the stimulus bill includes improvements for that level of service as high speed.
Many have hope that a more receptive Administration will hasten very high speed, 220 mph service.
I too think 70-80 mph overall average speeds would be a significant improvement, competitive with driving, and capable of attracting a significant increase in passengers.
For FY 2008 the Pacific Surfliner trains lost $14.7 million or 6.1 cents per passenger mile before interest and depreciation. The Capitols lost $14.2 million or 12.9 cents per passenger mile before interest and depreciation. The statement payments are designed to cover the losses and make Amtrak whole.
Only the NEC trains covered their operating costs. They earned $369 million or 20.7 cents per passenger mile before interest and depreciation. So far this year they are not doing as well, in large part because of the slowdown in the economy and the decrease in the cost of gasoline. The Acela’s are still covering their operating costs, but the regionals have slipped into negative territory.
You failed to include my comments recognizing that the $8 billion slated for high speed rail is indeed small compared to the national debt or the annual federal operating budget and deficit. However, it is more debt. And one does not cure an addiction to debt by adding to it anymore than one cures alcoholism by giving a drunk just one more drink.
Amtrak is not a public transport system ala a municipal transport system. The elimination of a public transit system in most cases would work a hardship on the many poor people who rely on it. Amtrak is an intercity system, although some people use it to com
This is not a promoter’s report. It is one done for the various state DOTs by expert consultants. These generally use fairly standard ridership models. Many times, these same models underestimate commuter and light rail traffic (see Charlotte, Albequerque and lately Phoenix).
This particular study used Amtrak’s highly inefficient current costs to figure train operation costs, but did figure that some newer ROW maintenance methods into that part of the cost.
Of course, there is a lot of uncertainty with any new venture with long lead times. It is particularly hard to calibrate ridership models for new corridors because there haven’t been any implemented anywhere! Sensitivity to trip times, frequency and price are very well known, however.
(I’m surprised you didn’t take the chance to show this an example of regionalism that’s working. Look at how many s
We visited our relatives in San Antonio this past week and went by your neighborhood. Can you tell me which I-35 through Austin is supposed to be the “through” route, the upper deck or the lower one? The signs are no help at all and the traffic was terrible.
You have mentioned many times your extensive career in the electric power industry. Would you please give us a few opinions on how you think electric power should evolve in the United States? It’s not totally OT because electric power could be the future of RR power. It would be nice to hear from an expert.
Maybe another thread, like the “Trackside Lounge - Spring 09 Edition,” would be appropriate for such a discussion.
Phobe Vet, Sam1: Regarding the comment “If high speed rail was truly a good idea, investors would fall all over themselves to fund it”: When discussing HSR as an investment, [Problem#1] compare right of ways to highways. When in history did the market decide it needed an Interstate Highway System? Who ever invested in the IHS? Who ever measured the return on investment of the IHS? Many companies today, in my humble opinion, take the IHS and the state highways for granted, and are not concerned with the cost of highway maint. Perhaps it’s because the cost of IHS is shouldered by everyone who pays state, federal taxes and buys fuel at the pump. Which probibly is the way to go regarding HSR, or as already mentioned, an Interstate Railway System (Administration). [Problem#2] I agree with the statement “Amtrak is not a public transport system ala a municipal transport system”. However, I do not agree to continue equating Amtrak with HSR. Amtrak, as we all know, currently is the only passenger railroad provider. This will change with the adoption on a governemnt controlled HSR system/IRSA. Once all railroad companies and tax payers are funding IRSA, there will be other passenger railroads operating, because these companies will have track available to operate on…in other words, once the market sees a coast to coast HSR/IRSA system in place, we will see long distance, regional, and inter-city train service providers besides Amtrak. As long as the sections of HSR that are under consideration now continue to be associated with Amtrak, or NS/CSX/UP/BNSF, the market will not be interested, due to the belief that the tracks are owned by these above mentioned railroads, and use to companies outside this group will be restricted. [Problem#3] A distinction needs to be drawn between intercity/commuter rail travel, and long distance train travel. The idea that there’s only to be a few HSR ROW’s in America is very short sighte
The Interstate Highway System (IHS) was built in response to a market demand by motorists (personal and commercial) for a better highway system. They lobbied Congress to make it happen. The game plan was for the government to provide enabler funds to jump start the building, which they did under the ruse of building a defense highway system, but ultimately it would be paid for by the users through fuel taxes, which is what has happened.
Until 1999, the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) ran a surplus, except for the building years. From 1999 to 2007 it had to draw down the surplus to continue to fund the highways, primarily because Congress would not raise the fuel taxes. In 2007 the U.S. government had to transfer approximately $3.4 billion from the general fund to the HTF, and in 2008 it transferred approximately $8 billion.
Transferring monies from the general fund to the HTF means that the motorists who pay federal income taxes are still paying for the highways, although using general funds tends to shift the burden from lower income motorists to higher income motorists. Thus, lower income motorists are not paying the same amount per vehicle mile as upper income motorists to use the federal highways.
Commercial users of the Interstate Highway System, e.g. truckers, bus companies, etc. must cover their costs, including fuel taxes as well as earn a profit, or they go out of business. Most of them pay higher fuel taxes than non-commercial users. They pay federal income taxes on their profits, and the federal government earns a return on the highways. Because the IHS has allowed freight carriers, as well as bus companies, to operate more efficiently, they have earned higher profits, and they have therefore paid higher amounts to the federal government. So the government no only recoups the cost of the highways through the fuel taxes, it gets a payback through the hig
I’d like to go back to the (often heard or posted) comment that if there was profit or if it had potential then investors, private enterprise, would do it. But that is definitely not the case, nor was it ever! From the Erie Canal to the Panama Canal and so many others around the world (I know there are or were some private capitlaized canals) it took governments and/or governents in partnership with private capital. The Union Pacific Railroad relied very heavily on government land grants and protections in order for private enterprise to succeed. So why does this come up everytime a major project which will benifet people and private business is proposed? Should only private enterprise do anything concerning commerce from making mining a mineral and making widgets to carrying the raw material to the factory and finsihed product to market? Does anyone have any idea how far back in time we would be if Dewitt Clinton turned his back on the concept of the Erie Canal or if Abraham Lincoln couldn’t fathom the need for a transcontinental railroad? Or how would you get to work in the morning if there were no roads from your house to your place of work? I just don’t get this fearful fervor against governments doing anything to progress society and the feeling that if a private investor isn’t going to do it then it shouldn’t be done.
SAM: I believe the conventional wisdom is that trucks do not pay for the maintenance. An 80,000# tractor trailer is considered to cause much more dmage than they pay for in taxes and user fees. I forget the figures but it is something like 240 times a 5000# car and about 800 times a sub compact car. I believe it is some kind of exponential curve. Remember the threads on here that talked about how much more roadbed, track, mtc., etc that is needed to go from RR cars of 286,000# to 315,000#. Any of our highway engineering people have the exact figures?
The federal and state governments, sometimes in partnership with private capital, invested in transport infrastructure, e.g. canals, railroads, highways, airways, waterways, etc., because they realized the need to do so to jump start the projects. They expected to recoup their investment from user fees. In most instances they did.
Given the dismal financial performance of passenger railways trains throughout the world, there is little chance that investing in high speed rail will enable the investors to recoup the