I should probably wait to post this topic until I am through reading my recently acquired book on the Illinois Terminal. However, it has me thinking.
To the disdain of some, one of the topics of choice on here is why some lines made while others did not–and all of the derivitives thereto, such as could have line X made it had it done Y.
Reading about the IT has put this topic in a new perspective for me. I know some disagree with this theory, but a derivitive of this topic I find persuasive is that the rail industry was hurting well before 1980 but had been “living off of its legacy” to keep from collapsing at an earlier date.
In the past, our conversations concerning who made it/who didn’t and why, and what could have been done differently, focused on traffic patterns, mergers, leadership decisions, and regulation. All of which are certainly relevant to the issue.
However, reading about the IT puts things in a new perspective for me. By all of the above accounts, the IT should have “made it.” It had an incredible customer base, made a real attempt at real customer service, prior to its last leadership–of which Greyhounds has already spoke to–it had good leadership, and it numerous on-line connections to other railroads for interchange traffic.
However, because the line was essentially built for street cars, it could not “live off its legacy” the way other railroads could, which appears to have doomed it existence. Not only did the IT’s 70lbs and 90lbs rail hamstring its attempt to survive, but it had more than one bridge failure that really hampered its operations.
Of course, the N&W ended up with the IT–I always though the CNW or B&O was a much more logical candidate for the purchase. But, in reality this purchase was more of a death than a merger–N&W essentially bought the IT’s Staley-ADM contract and Roxana operations and disposed with the r