On May 2, 1964, Great Northern Ry. westbound passenger train No. 27, the Western Star (also called the “fast mail”), was rolling through Minnetonka, Minnesota on the double track mainline at high speed (authorized up to 79 mph). The train was composed of five engines and 26 cars. An eastbound extra freight was approaching No. 27, and was slowing to 12 mph in order to comply with a slow order for construction work on the Highway 494 bridge over the railroad.
As the freight train reached 12 mph, its brakes suddenly went into emergency, stopping the train, accompanied by some degree of perceived roughness. Just then No. 27 came into view and the head brakeman of the freight radioed No. 27, and said they have probably just broken in two. About the same time, the rear brakeman on the freight called No. 27, and said they had just experienced a rough stop. Both brakemen were making the ominous point that their freight train may be fouling the track on which No. 27 was rapidly approaching.
A few seconds after the radio warnings, the engineer of No. 27 saw a boxcar of the freight train blocking his track ahead. He put No. 27 into emergency and was able to slow to 65 mph before hitting the boxcar which was loaded with 98,400 pounds of plywood.
In earlier threads about controlling derailments, we were discussing stopping derailed trains as quickly as possible, and how quickly trains could stop while running on the ground. Interestingly, from the evidence, it appears that No. 27 derailed at 65 mph, and stopped after traveling only about 200 feet further. The five diesels ran on the relatively soft ground alongside of the track. They seem to have been guided to run in a straight line somewhat by the track on their left side and the cut b
It does not take a degree in physics to figure out that the deceleration rate achievable by locomotives on the ground will be much greater than those – even with locked brakes – achievable by cars with steel wheels still on steel rails. Or that there will be momentum effects when the latter contact the ‘immovable object’ that the former has become, and the only effective braking force is longitudinal with any ‘lever effect’ tending to jackknife cars, and the only force keeping this from occurring is 3/4" flange engagement on a couple of points on one side of the car in question…
The only thing that is going to produce the rate of deceleration observed in the accident described here is going to be some form of track brake. There is no way it can be achieved through steel wheels, even under ‘perfect’ metal-to-metal adhesion conditions, and I doubt it can be achieved reliably by electromagnetic track braking of the scale that would fit between wheels of a three-piece freight truck. The system I designed would probably do it, but at the cost of likely significant track damage, and of course with the added risk that many components of the system run directly in the wheel path, and any loose parts or damage can induce, rather than ameliorate, a derailment…
Note that no system of differential air braking would have helped this situation in any regard – there was too much momentum to be dissipated. Now, on the other hand, it might have helped keep that plywood-filled boxcar out of the path of No. 27 in the first place – but the story does not tell us anything about the problem with the extra train.
I understand your points, but I did not mention the connection to our earlier derailment control discussions with any particular conclusion in mind. I only see several interesting points about the wreck of No. 27. First, I am surprised that a 26 car passenger train with five engines could derail at 65 mph, and stop in just 200 feet. Although the added resistance of the five engines on the ground apparently added enough extra resistance to the emergency brake application to jackknife the train in two places. I am also somewhat surprised the locomotives did not dig in deeper than they did. I find it interesting, although somewhat understandable that the first four engines did not jackknife.
My larger point was just to show the details of an interesting accident and the detailed crew response and actions. One might expect the worst from running into the load of plywood at 65 mph, but the collision must have been somewhat glancing judging by the damage to the locomotive nose. I thought the radio warnings from the two brakemen were interesting in that the danger only needed to be implied rather than stated outright.
Regarding your point about the story not telling about the problem with the extra freight. The report does indeed go into very extensive detail about a coupler breaking, the type of coupler, why the crack had never been found during inspections, the marks the coupler left on the axle as it lifted the end of the car off the rails, etc. The coupler pulled out, dropped onto the track, and basically pole vaulted the end of the car up and off the rails, and the compressing slack set the end of the car down on the opposite main line in front of Mr. Brown and his No. 27, marking the start of the onrush of misfortune. &
I always find these accident rports very interesting. It is amazing how thorough th ICC and NTSB are when they investigate accidents. The y give you a great insiet into railroad operations, human error and how things can go very worng very quickly for no apparent reason.
Much like the oil train accident in Casselton, ND, the rule makes it clear that tracks could be fouled if a train goes into emergency. The freight should have called out “emergency” immediately upon loss of air. 27 may have been able to take some speed off. I am sure passing a stopped freight is so routine that 27 thought nothing of it. It also sounds like the freight’s radio transmission was garbled. The only words needed in this case are “emergency”. That should stop all trains within radio range.
I find those communications between the freight brakemen and No. 27 to be quite interesting. One said that the extra had probably just broken in two. The other said that the extra had just experienced a rough stop. They told the engineer of No. 27 all that they knew, and let him use his own discretion. Although somewhere in the report, there was also a reference to a radio message saying, “Slow down No. 27.”
The report cites this rule:
“102. When a train is disabled or stopped suddenly by an emergency application of the air brakes or other causes, a lighted red fusee must be immediately displayed on adjacent tracks at front and rear of train and adjacent tracks that are liable to be obstructed must at once be protected in both directions as prescribed by Rule 99, until it is ascertained they are safe and clear for the movement of trains.”
In this case, there was not much time to react. The freight train went into emergency and fouled the other main track just as the engines of the two trains were passing each other. So it was too late for a fusee to be displayed ahead of No. 27. The radio warnings were given immediately after the emergency application on the freight train, but at almost the same time, the engineer of No. 27 saw the boxcar fouling his track.
When emergency application starts - Hit the Emergency buttion on the radio wich tones in the Dispatchers Radio console with a Emergency tonal announcement.
Announce on the road radio channel: Emergency, Emergency Emergency and follow that up with the train identifiecation, track number, head end mile post and rear end mile post. All trains on a territory are required to monitor the road radio channel that is specified for the territory.
After train stops, begin inspection. Trains hearing the Emergency transmission are to STOP before passing the announced mile posts and establish communication with the train that is in emergency.
If the train that is in emergency has HAZMAT in the train, it cannot authorize any other train to pass until ALL the HAZMAT in the train have been inspected and are KNOWN to be on the rail. After the HAZMAT has been inspected, or if the UDE train doesn’t have HAZMAT it [b]may[.b] authorize other trains to pass at Restricted Speed. The train in emergency can request protection on the adjacent track in multiple track territory for inspecting the track side of the train - the Dispatcher will grant the request consistant with operations - when HAZMAT are involved the UDE train gets protection on all adjacent tracks until the last HAZMAT is know to be on the rail.
There is no fail safe procedure for when two trains are about to pass each other at ‘speed’ and one of them has a emergency brake application. Just as there is no fail safe procedure when automobiles meet on a two lane highway.
Yes, the time to stop No. 27 had just run out when he got the warning. If he had been only a minute later, he probably could have stopped short of the collision. But then again, if he had been a minute earlier, the collision could have been very deadly if that NYC box car derailed and bit into the side of No. 27’s cars.