Who do you think was the worst Amtrak President. I reluctantly would like to nominate George Warrington (may he rest in peace) as the worst Amtrak President.
First, for his accomplishment. He did the tremedous work of getting the NEC electrification extention from New Haven to Boston accomplished along with implementing the Acela trainsets. No mean feat.
However, his failings were probably even more substantial.
He dismantled Tom Downs great concept of decentralized management (i.e. the wonderfully inovative Amtrak West, etc.) effectively snuffing out that inovation. This retrencement was a reflection of the increasing NEC orientation he brought to the company.
He took a worthy idea of pursuing express freight business to increase revenue and managed to help Amtrak lose even more money with that. To much money invested in rolling stock and making the passenger feel lower in status than the express freight (i.e. trains leaving Chicago Union Station and then being stopped at the Amtrak shops 1 mile away for over 20 min. while express cars are added)
He engaged in huge “spin” about the unfortunate “glide path to self sufficiency” while the NEC and Acela sucked up huge sums of money and starved the rest of the system, insurance money from wrecked cars was pocked and the cars were never fixed (over 100 cars on the dead line–lost revenue–when he left), the loss of the Pioneer and the Desert Wind, etc.
Just before he departed from Amtrak, the “national” (non-NEC) system was about at collapse, and his management team seemed quite willing to let it happen (the very existance of trains like the Empire Builder seemed unimportant compared to whether the 3:30 NEC local got out of DC on time)
Because of all this, Amtrak is still suffering. Amtrak nearly at the end of a 5 year capital program to clear out that huge dead line of cars and locos. They have been hamstrung by restrictions that Congress and DOT placed on them as a condition of their bailout.
David Gu
I would vote for Roger Lewis, the first Amtrak president. He had an airline background and got the job as a political favor. His role at the time was perceived by some people of consequence as presiding over the dismantling of the last remnants of the intercity passenger train “network”.
Lewis - ex- bus company president. Put in place to watch Amtrak die. SDP40Fs and E60s ordered under his watch could be sold to frt roads after Amtrak failed. Horrible equipment conditions. Reconditioned equipment was nothing more than paint and upholstery. No foward progress when there was lots of low hanging fruit.
Warrington - career bureuacrat. Blathered on while Amtrak crumbled. Expensive, overpowered, too wide Acela deal botched under his watch.
Downs - Hired consultant to improve yield. Result was reduced service that had unintended consequence of reducing yield. Classic deck-chair rearranger. No forward progress.
Common factor - no previous RR experience. Lousy relationship with host RRs. No common sense w.r.t. RRing.
Best 3:
Claytor - got Amtrak operationally straightened out. Did things that made economic sense like rebuilding Heritage equipment. Lots of accountablility on the operating side of the house.
Reistrup - Got Amtrak good, solid, Amfleet and Superliners they needed for long term survival. Also, AEM7s. Where would Amtrak be now without them? Also, started upgrade of NEC with concrete ties and faster schedules.
Gunn - Restored some financial accountability to Amtrak ripping away layers of Warrington and Downs confusion.
Common factor: Previous RR experience. Good feel for the “nuts and bolts” of the operation.
I’d have to say it was Gunn. This was the dude that basically wanted to make the operation a non union Wal Mart on wheels, sub contract out job duties to a 2nd party and run trains w/just one condr onboard. The UTU stated he was the worst head of Amtrak they ever dealt with. Many workers within the company agreed.
If you view the Presidents from Congress’s intent for Amtrak, they have all been horrid. Amtrak still exists, despite everything Congress did to make it fail from the start.
Which is exactly why he was employed, normally when companies what to have a “new” image or go into a new direction they employ an outsider as a “change agent” to effect cultural change with in the org. My understanding of US operations at the time would have been that the “Railway/Railroad” corporate culture was not seen as being with the times. I would hazzard to say if in 1971 Amtraks Senior executive group were all Railroad men things would have been very very different. From what I also gather at the time the same thing was happening in the freight RR’s where non-railroad people were being hired in to senior positions to effect cultural change.
Unfortuanately most of these so-called “change agents” seem to bring more havoc with them, than good ideas.
SFbrkman is a good example of the commonly held belief by workers, especially union ones, that a company’s workers’ interests should always come first. In the private or real world, such companies that do so end up with big problems and usually cease to exist. Worker’s interests do have to be considered–but in the context of the overall operations of the company and what’s needed for its survival and growth.
Was Reistrup involved the purchase of the turbo trains? Which when you look at it was really a bad purchase. I could not believe that at the time Amtrak were not looking at the BR HST 125 even though BR’s thinking at the time was that they were only a stop gap train until the APT was fully developed. I would think that a modified HST 125 would have been just the ticket for the Hiawatha services and services to St Louis
You’re right, and the current poster company for this problem is Chrysler – that situation has gotten worse than just walking wounded. However, in the defense of the workers, they frequently observe at much closer quarters than anyone else varous stupidities committed by management and the results thereof. Realistically, all a worker can do in that situation is go home each night praying it holds together long enough for him or her to get to retirement age.
The freight railroads may have avoided the worst of this problem as their portion of the industry by being in a sector that for the last few years has been expanding. Amtrak has not. Moreover, almost any politician prefers a “gift” that he can “give” annually as opposed to a single commitment to a long term solution, and to date the public has not insisted on a long term solution.
In retrospect, the mail and express initiative was a major mistake. It generated its own set of additional expenses and only made a minor postive contribution to the bottom line. In fairness to George Warrington, the political climate at that moment virtually demanded that he do something like this since passenger business all by itself wasn’t going to turn a profit and anecdotal history from the pre-Amtrak period suggested that mail and express income helped make passenger losses tolerable.
Reistrup was around when the Turboliners arrived. The Americanized ones for Empire Svc. were very nice and would have to be judged a success. They were smooth, fast and popular. The fixed consist issue wasn’t a big deal since most of the post-Turboliner Empire service is covered by standard consists of just about the same capacity.
Were their different issues with the French imports?
I have been on the Turboliners and on Amfleet. The Turboliners had bigger windows, and they rode smoother, but I understand they were a tad narrower on account of European loading gauge (European trains have less elbow room at 4-across than American trains).
They were carbon steel, not stainless, so they pretty much have the limited lifetime problem of all carbon steel rolling stock. There was a rebuild of the Rohr-licensed versions of the Turboliner for Empire Corridor service, and there was some dust up that Amtrak didn’t want to operate them. I don’t remember where I heard this, but someone questioned those SuperSteel rebuilds of the Rohr Turboliners on account of the carbon steel construction and whether at their age they were structurally sound.
Another thing I heard about the Turboliners is that they consumed too much fuel compared to an F-40. The closest thing I have gotten to fuel economy information about the United Aircraft TurboTrain and the French Turboliner is W. H. Gregory, Decision Nears on Turbine Train Award, Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 24, 1974, pp 63-67. Many of you may be able to get at that article from public or university libraries that carry Aviation Week. What a train article is doing in Av Week is that the TurboTrain was produced by a player in the aerospace industry.
A number of things are interesting. One is that Sikorsky was in competition with the French for the Amtrak turbine train purchase, and their entry was a second-generation TurboTrain with the domes and everything. What is different about the second-gen TurboTrain was that they were going to go with a single, higher-HP prime mover in each Power Dome Car instead of the modular approach of multiple smaller-HP turbines. They were also going to go to a torque converter drive instead of relying on the PT-6 helicopter-derived free turbine as a kind of gas-drive torque converter. The original TurboTrain did not have a torque conve