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Trains News Wire FLASH: Insufficient handbrakes applied prior to Lac-Mégantic disaster
But Big Ed is sitting there cool as a cucumber.
So how did they get to this conclusion? The official report isn’t even published yet…
DR WILLIAM J MCDONALD from VERMONT said:
Has the possibility that one of the volunteer firemen may have unwittingly released the automatic brakes thinking he was shutting down the prime mover on the lead locomotive been ruled out? I can not Believe that all the air brakes bled off in an hour or two on that train. While employed on the Erie Lackawanna, we often would “bottle the air” after a 15 lbs. brake pipe reduction, make our set out and tie back onto the train with plenty of air still in the train line and be on our way immediately with no time wasted pumping the air. Never did we have a problem. This was not sanctioned by the Erie management but as long as all went well nothing was said. The Erie men knew how to get over the road. Ten mins Was typical for a set out.
The air on that ill fated train was released but who would ever admit to it? No one for sure, so we probably will never know."
WELL SAID!
LANDON ROWELL from ILLINOIS said:
How many brakes did the rule book require? If it was not specific, why not? I would guess that the engineer thought he had sufficient brakes applied. If he were relying on the air brakes alone he wouldn’t have bothered to set any. Also, I see no evidence that a 2 man crew would have done anything different."
Great point! all Locos brakes were set. Fire dept ended up releasing the brakes… knowingly or not.
Has the possibility that one of the volunteer firemen may have unwittingly released the automatic brakes thinking he was shutting down the prime mover on the lead locomotive been ruled out? I can not Believe that all the air brakes bled off in an hour or two on that train. While employed on the Erie Lackawanna, we often would “bottle the air” after a 15 lbs. brake pipe reduction, make our set out and tie back onto the train with plenty of air still in the train line and be on our way immediately with no time wasted pumping the air. Never did we have a problem. This was not sanctioned by the Erie management but as long as all went well nothing was said. The Erie men knew how to get over the road. Ten mins Was typical for a set out.
The air on that ill fated train was released but who would ever admit to it? No one for sure, so we probably will never know.
Dr. McD
Let me guess, you describe trains with AB, not ABD or later car brake valves, equipped trains, before 1964 valves.
An unequalised brake pipe pressure gradient could…would unintentionaly cause a brake release with ABD trains.
But getting to the 7 brakes set, at a different place and time, an 8000 ton lumber train, well over 100 tons average per operative brake…its engr was directed to pick up on the point, a unit, “set it out at Colton” and change crews.
The engr that set it out said it wouldn’t control the dynamic brakes, by radio to the picking up engr, who immediatly called the dispatcher saying he wanted to bury it in his engine consist.
Answer’s “no, put it on the point.”
Descending Cajon Pass, 25 mph track non block signal so your train has to have a flagmen drop off and protect 2 miles back whenever your train needs to stop, and this is daylight in desert Southern California.
Meanwhile on the other end, you stop to set a lot of retainers , which requirs when youproceed again a maximum 15 mph speed and a stop for wheel heat radiation every 10 miles…send out the flagman…call him back 2 miles each time, desert heat.
The grade is more than 20 miles long, 2 radiation stops…Need to recharge your brake system?: “brakeman, I need 57 handbrakes,”
Flagman, out and back again.
Close to 4 hours for a 1 hour descent
How is it that that the engineer wrapped 7 brakes but none on the 72 cars. Were there six units in addition to the head end buffer? What was MMA’s requirement for that gradient listed in their time table?
A two man crew would probably have set more brakes.
How many brakes did the rule book require? If it was not specific, why not? I would guess that the engineer thought he had sufficient brakes applied. If he were relying on the air brakes alone he wouldn’t have bothered to set any. Also, I see no evidence that a 2 man crew would have done anything different.
To be honest, I suspected this was the case from the beginning…
How many hand brakes were applied? You can tell by the flat wheels and burnt brake shoes on the first 7 cars. Mr. Harding had not been applying sufficient brakes for over a year, AND all the train crews that picked up trains after he left them know how many hand brakes they had to release. One train crew called it into the Rules Examiner to complain that he found one train with only one hand brake applied. The management did nothing to correct the failure of Mr. Harding.
The MM&A and Canadian rule requires the train brakes be in
release position, no pressure in any pistons when set to wait.
The engine power was shut down by a trackman pushing the off button on the engine, whom was not qualified to do so even for the fire department request. The fireman did not touch the control. The trackman assumed the hand brakes were applied but he failed to check them. The railroad failed to get an official to the scene and when Mr. Harding called the dispatcher to ask if he should return to the train, was told to stay in the Hotel and get his rest. The west bound empty train at the time was tied down with insufficient hand brakes and that engineer was also fired after they check his train the next day.
You think a two man crew would not work this way but when another man picks up this train, he counts as a second man who knew what was being done but that did not correct the failure of the solo man crew. So much for thinking that a second man in a crew is the cure. A second man was always releasing brakes on the trains at Nantes and the failure was never corrected. The railroad needed better management, such as a Train Master doing his job and honest workers.
According to GCOR rule 7.2 Do not depend on airbrakes to hold a train, engine, or cars in place while left unattended. Apply a sufficient number of hand brakes to prevent movement. Although that appears to be a vague statement; that’s pretty much a judgment call.
It is possible a volunteer fireman accidently bumped the automatic brake handle when moving around in the cab and unknowingly released the air brakes. The cursory handbrakes then would not hold back the tonnage and away she went…with the handbrakes on the engines squeeling in protest.
Mel and MO Miller: Isn’t the other half of the rule to also test out handbrake efficiency before depending on them to hold the train in place… that’s where his problem was. Also I read somewhere that the engineer did not set the air brakes on the train, just the independent brake on the locomotive. When the fire department shut down the lead locomotive from the fire, it was no longer supplying air to the brake cylinders on the locomotive. Slowly the air bled off of the locomotives, and train began to roll.
If this was a one-off, if Harding had said “That’s it, I’m done with this crappy railroad giving me stupid burning locomotives and paycuts, I’m not even going to bother securing this train, I’ll tender my resignation in the morning, screw 'em!”, then the fault is apparently Harding’s alone.
If, on the other hand, the lack of handbrakes was SoP, and yet somehow this behaviour went unnoticed or, worse, ignored, by his supervisors for months or more, then MM&A has/had an appalling safety culture and is in large part to blame for this accident.
Unfortunately, everything I’m reading points to the latter. Which is kinda what I figured from the start, but that doesn’t make it any better.
John Sheskier, I need to add to rule 7.6: If hand brakes are not adequate, block the wheels. When the engine is coupled to a train or cars standing on a grade, do not release the hand brakes until the air brake system is fully charged. When cars are moved from any track, apply enough hand brakes to prevent any remaining cars from moving. 7.6 doesn’t mention anything about testing whether the Hand brakes will hold the train in place. If the locomotive is shut down certainly the air in the system will bleed off thus causing the brakes not to hold. When setting out cars, you want to dynamite the air. you don’t want to bottle the air in the brake pipe. otherwise that air will bleed off and thus the hand brake will not hold.
I’m mildly amused by titling this as a “FLASH.” Anybody reading what’s been posted here figured out sometime last summer that there must have been too few handbrakes applied.
I think the real news here for TRAINS readers is that this fact about the handbrakes is showing up in court documents. Once it’s tested in court (which it will be), the fact will have some real legal weight; and in a case with the possibly far-reaching legal ramifications that this one has, that could be a significant development.
What about the genius who turned off the diesels, killing the air brakes?
I think the train had five units, with an (ex-caboose) remote control unit spliced into the consist. Presumably, the seventh handbrake to be set was on the barrier car.