I have a general question followed by an observation. It is my general understanding that trains cannot compete with barges in most instances. An example of this is the number of grain hoppers you see near a grain silo 20 miles from a major river as compared to the number of grain hoppers you see in a siding 85 miles from a major river.
But, are there some instances where rail can compete with barges on relatively equal footing–so don’t answer, yes, they compete well in Utah?
It seems to me that the loading/unloading factor could be to the advantage of trains in some instances. For instance, assume a 1500 mile coal transport. Say there was a power plant located at the terminus with river access, but the coal needed to traverse 1000 miles of rail to get to the river. Might it be cheaper just to keep the coal on the rail rather than going through the trouble, time, and expense of unloading the coal on to a barge?
It is my understanding that they do this at Havahna Illinois, so my observation might be incorrect. But, I don’t know the details of this operation, and the facility used to do the unloading at Havahna was already in existence. So, Havahna might not disprove my observation.
I hope this aspect of my topic does not dominate, but do subsidies affect the balance greatly? For instance, I have heard many persuasively argued that, were it not for highway subsidies, rail would dominate trucking. Is the same thing true of water navigation? Were it not for our friendly Army Corp of Engineers, would river transportation have the same advantage over rail?
The example you cite at the Havana transloading facility is a bit of a specialized situation involving one utility. The coal was shipped from mines on the Chicago & Illinois Midland (formerly owned by Commonwealth Edison) to Havana where it was transloaded to barges to supply Commonwealth Edison plants on the Des Plaines River, Sanitary and Ship Canal and the South Branch of the Chicago River. Several of these plants are older and have minimal rail access so this routing continues.
My understanding is a bit different. My understanding is that the GM&O wrestled this operation away from C&IM and the facility lay dormant for decades. However, now the UP delivers coal there from the PRB and it is transloaded for a power plant in the south.
I am not entirely sure that this is the operation, but I have been told this by more than one source.
[1] Nope. Historically that was so - see further below for more on that - but currently, I’d say it’s the other way around, if the railroad chooses to go after the barge-competitive traffic. Broad sweeping general statements are risky, but for a lopnger-haul shipment, unless both the shipper and receiver are on a good waterway and have really good equipment to load and unload the commodity, there’s usually not a good reason why the railroad can’t compete.
If you go back to Trains in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and read the numerous articles by George W. Hilton and John G. Kneiling, you’ll see why. Both were frustrated by the railroads’ seeming compulsion to head for a waterway and unload the cargo onto a barge or ship as soon as possible. Kneiling in particular thought the Missabe Range iron ore moves to Pittsburgh were nuts - rail from the mine to Duluth-Superior, then lake boat - which is really just a glorified barge - to Cleveland or Conneaut, then rail such as the B
Back when trains were still hauling grain down off the Camas Prairie in north central Idaho (an operation which ended ten years ago this fall), there were jumbo hoppers of malting barley, canola, and occasionally wheat, all of which stayed on rail to reach their customers elsewhere in the U.S. But the biggest haul off the prairie was in 70-ton “shuttle” hoppers which transferred their wheat to barges in Lewiston, Idaho, the most inland of all Western seaports. Because this wheat was bound for export across the Pacific, and barge service down the Snake and Columbia rivers is cheaper than rail, it made sense to put it “on the water” at the earliest opportunity.
Gabe’s “loading factor” plays out a little differently further downstream where UP’s Hinkle-Spokane line mingles with the Snake, and where UP and BNSF cling to opposite sides of the Columbia. Unit grain trains from the American Midwest (some of which skirt across southern Canada and reenter the U.S. at Eastport, Idaho) come flooding down the Snake and/or Columbia en route to export docks. Do they stop and transfer their load into barges upon reaching these navigable rivers? No; the trains just keep going another hundred-plus miles to their destination.
On the other hand, grain harvested in eastern Washington or northern Idaho that’s destined for export (the vast majority of soft white wheat in this region goes overseas) typically gets trucked directly to a barge loader, or trucked to elevators where shuttle trains are loaded to carry the grain to a barge loader. That’s a lot of local grain getting the truck-train-barge treatment, while grain coming from far away is rolling right by here on the rails. Both methods provide the most effective service to their respective clients.
The dynamics of COSTS vs. CONVIENIENCE are definitely in play here.
Subsidized Barge Transport vs. a pretty much non-subsidize Rail Transport vs a subsidized Highway Transport network.
In the case of barge transportation, the riverine facilities are maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers to specifications laid down in codified law by the Congress and Senate. The ability to maintain those specs are somewhat jeopardized by the allocated funding oof those same politicians. The Army Corps prioritizes the work according to the levels of funding for Navigation vs.Flood control. At times a very problematic situation for the waterways users.
The rairoads set their own priorities for their own operational parameters and metrics.
The motor transportation network is under similar constraints of funding based on political many political expedients as well. Not to mention priorities as the physical plant degrades under the loads imposed upon it.
Commerce seeks a level in price that can be effected by many issues. Costs in the modes needed to move the goods expeditiously to the users and abilities to move those goods in the necessary volumes.
“Excise taxes on fuel, right now set at $0.20 per gallon, go into the Inland Waters Trust Fund, and pay half of the costs of keeping the rivers navigable, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers.”
A little stale, but there are fuel taxes on the inland waterways. It was not always that way.
The following is memory. If anybody knows more on the subject, please advise.
Nearly 40 years ago, commercial navigation interests were pushing for a locking fee. This was not to be for commercial traffic, but personal craft. Towboat operators did not wish to wait for pleasure craft.
It was a political misstep. More pleasure craft owners vote than towboat captains. For shallow draft pleasure craft, locks are actually hindrances.
I forgot to mention above: the Southern Rwy.‘s “Big John” covered hopper for grain to be used as chicken feed and the subsequent rate case vs. the ICC - which went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court - originated with Southern’s attempt to institute ‘big car’ technology that would be more competitive with barges. Having thus lowered its actual costs, SR wanted to lower its rates commensurately to capture the traffic and still earn a profit. However, that would have undercut the barge operators, who protested to the ICC, which raised the rate to maintain the barges’ “umbrella”, until the Supreme Court ruled.
Unit trains and rates were a similar technological and economic/ rate response to barge traffic market share proportions, as well as to the “slurry pipelines” that were then proposed for hauling coal instead of by rail.
We can thank a man named George Stern for saving the C&IM (now the I&M) along with the Havana rail to barge bulk transfer facility. I knew Mr. Stern from the time he was at the ICG. After leaving the ICG he became president of the C&IM.
The C&IM had made a good living hauling central Illinois coal. Most of the coal went to the Havana transfer facility where it was transfered to barges for movement to power plants in or near Chicago.
About 1964 Commonwealth Edison, the Chicago electric utility that owned the C&IM, did two things that almost killed the railroad. They switched the Chicago coal business to GM&O unit trains and built a mine mouth generating station at the coal mine in Kinkade, IL that provided most of the coal moved by the C&IM. They put the railroad up for sale for $1.00. There were no takers.
Well after 1964 George Stern walked into this mess and one day found out that the Havana facility had be
Regarding the Original Poster’s question about barges vs. rail, note this excerpt from the above:
Interesting story there, greyhounds - thanks for sharing. Goes to show that each situation is often unique - “one size does not always fit all” - and that knowledgeable and dedicated individuals can have a positive effect.
This is a large file pdf that graphically represents the CN (neeICRR) coal handling facilities throughout its system in Canada, as well as tis country. It seems pretty relevant in this thread.
While searching this topic, I found this as kind of an interesting aside to this Thread, and interesting for those that have never looked at this type of document:
NS Conditions of Carriage for Cial, Coke, and Iron Ore:
It doesn’t apply to inland waterways like the Mississippi, but most ships and barges hauling coal on the Great Lakes, Welland Canal, St. Lawrence Seaway, and various rivers like the Saginaw connecting to those bodies of water have the capability to self unload the coal. You won’t find any Huletts around any longer and bridge cranes are rare and mostly only available at a couple of Canadian locations.
You won’t find non self unloading barges and ships for the most part hauling anything beyond iron ore to a couple of Canadian steel mills (American steel mills almost exclusively get iron ore from self unloaders) and grain (Until very recently, self unloading vessels had difficulty with this cargo and most grain elevators weren’t equipped to recieve cargo by them).
You’ll almost always find coal shipped on vessels with self unloading capabilities on both sides of the Lakes, such as with vessels like the barge McKee Sons that I’ve linked a picture of below. They have a unloading tunnel running the length of the cargo holds with a conveyer belt that carries it to a elevator that lifts it to the self unloading boom that you can see in the picture that is swung to one side to unload.