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Transportation Safety Board: Series of events likely led to Lac-Mégantic disaster
As of today (July 15), 35 confirmed dead, 15 still missing and presumed deceased as well as the centre of the town being demolished. Let the investigators do their job.There are too many unconfirmed comments in the media and little respect for the affected people in this small community of 6000. The investigators are working in 15 minute shifts because of the heat and toxins. Kudos to them for their dedication to the horrendous task.
Too many unproven stories and rumors flying around. Let the investigators do their thing then we will know for sure.
There is no question that a number of things went wrong! Here are some of them.
1.) The matter of how many hand brakes need to be set is quite
complex and apparently engineers need some help in the rule books as to what conditions need to be considered. The
Canada Rules for Train Operations apparently has a table of weight of train (or per car?) vs. number of hand brakes that should be set. Does every railroad’s rule book state that you must not rely on the air brakes to hold a train stopped on an incline.
2.) A post from a railroad crewman stated the the brake wheel must be set, then you go under the car and “kick the chain”, (to be sure there are no snagged links) and then you go back up and tighten the wheel again.
3.) Did the engineer report the leaking fuel line to the dispatcher? (It caused the fire which started the whole horrible accident.)
4.) Apparently the MMA employee who answered the call to help the firemen who were working the fire in the parked engine was an MOW crewman not familiar with train operations so did not warn the firemen that shutting down the engine would allow leakage in the brake system to release the air brakes. Question, did he report to the dispatcher that the engine had been shut down? If it was reported, is it the dispatcher’s responsibility to call out an engineer or conductor to go out, start the locomotive, and re-set the air brakes.
5.) Another problem (assuming the post I saw it in was accurate); the train was apparently parked on the main, not the parallel siding because there was another train on the siding. Had this train been on the siding the derail (assuming it was there and set) would have stopped it before it could get away. Was the dispatcher aware of this problem? If he/she was, what responsibility does he/she have to do something about it?
See Trains April 2013 “Split Second Decisions” top right of P28 "Before railroads, hardly anything exist
It seems clear at this time that the locomotives were at the head end of the runaway, but did not derail. Having had much experience with crashes involving shifting loads, I can say with certainty that a loaded tanker has a dynamic center of gravity, and would be far more likely to derail on a curve at too high a speed a locomotive. That said, any poor track condition on the way from “dead stop” to the point of the wreck would have contributed to the transverse dynamic in the c.g. However, I believe these were pressurized tanks, which changes that dynamic a little. So, yes, the only responsible conclusion is that all the facts are needed before a conclusion is made.
I think it was the falt of the enginger
What stopped the locomotives past the derailment site? Is their an automatic stop feature once the train behind has been decoupled?
Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper has some lengthy coverage of this disaster but I am still confused as to what actually happened. Was the train “intact” until it entered the small town, then the tankers derailed leaving the locomotives to travel on their own?
Below is an interesting story from today’s paper.
Dynamic Center of Gravity…how 'bout that factor?
Engines independent leaks off 'cause engine (was) shut down during fire. MOW guy inspects before they do. Insufficient train hand brakes were applied.
In the 25 minutes between the Nantes stop and going to the rest location, I’d be hard-pressed to tie the 5-unit locomotive’s hand-brakes.
The Nantes grade to Lac Megantic gets the train up to moderately fast speed approaching the beautiful downtown where there’s a fairly sharp curve. The engine doesn’t like it, but survives. the tank cars enter; their loaded, to say, 80 per cent of their volume leaving room for sloshing ( sorry for the high-tech term) and the load is thus increased on the curve’s outside rail from dynamic C. of G.-----the rail spreads, derailing and turning over, the 10th cars coupler separates…everything goes into emergency… the engine and nine cars stop on the rail…65 cars behind replicate Dante’s Inferno.
The horror! Not SNL, but Saturday Night Death…slaughter.
“Offensive language, personal attacks… will be deleted”. Please delete the comments from P Mcnamara of Illinois. If this isn’t a personal attack, what is?
Why is it possible for a train to be in two pieces, with one half able to roll down a hill with no brakes applied? Time to get rid of those manual brake line shutoff valves and come up with a more modern air brake system which is more fail-safe. The current air brake system for trains, for all practical purposes, has not been updated since it was invented. Meanwhile the tractor-trailer braking system used on highway equipment automatically applies the brakes when the brake line to the trailer is broken, leaking badly, or disconnected. There is no shutoff valve on the trailer side to bypass this feature. The most a driver is able to do is turn off air going to the trailer from the cab, which will result in automatically applied trailer brakes. The end result is the same even when operating multiple trailers, such as UPS wiggle wagons.
I’m under the impression that minimal fault lies with the engineer. It’s a shame that Burkhardt is throwing him under the bus and doing all of this fingerpointing. Really doesn’t seem like a good guy.
Thank you Mr. McFadden for the correction. It does indeed appear the entire train ranway locomotives first.
P.S. Edit duplicate posts!
One item of interest mentioned is that the locomotives and 9 or so tanks remained within a few hundred feet of where the train tied up. The rest of the train was the runaway portion. Has this been verified?
P.S. Stop duplicate posts!
A horrible accident! But one suggestion to keep this type of accident from happening, is to keep the consist moving. When I worked for CSX in the 1980s, our trailer trains only stopped for crew or engine changes and set out of bad order cars. Otherwise, they kept moving. Maybe the same should apply here.
The cause of this accident was failure to secure the train properly. Period. Crude oil is very heavy and there should have been operating rules or time table special instruction pertaining to securing the train in this area. The rules are written to cover all “what if’s” such as what if the only running locomotive is shut down due to fire or loss of fuel etc. If they had no rules for this,they soon will. provided they are still in business after all the lawsuits. An old saying is that the rules should be printed in red ink as a reminder of the blood spilled in previous accidents.
Hope the possibility of vandalism has not yet been ruled out!
At last, a responsible statement.
and the motive power found 1/4 mi down the track. Did propane in the yard ignite? or fumes from the crude? Many unanswered questions.
The general public is asking why a train with 5 locomotives and over 70 cars with hazardous cargo was left unattended overnight by the train’s only crew-person? That is a question that needs to be answered satisfactorily by the railroad, whoever was at fault.
Mark Paul
Kitchener Ontario
Glad that I can follow this mishap here, from “Downunder” news has been rather spasmodic. We have cable but really do need a network out of Canada from our service provider to follow news from over there. As to the statement by Mr Burckhardt seems very quick to “Throw Grandma off the train” excuse the pun. A responsible manage he seems not to be, I wonder how long till he declares bankruptcy.