Here is an interesting and detailed video interviewing locomotive engineer, Paul Lindsay commenting on how the railroads should be regulated as to train length, and about hotbox detectors among other things.
He goes into detail about how the iron ore train recently ran away and derailed in Nevada. He said the following. The train was never weighed, but only estimated at 22,000 tons; and that it actually exceeded that weight. The initial report stating that the train was 50 cars long was not true, and actually, the train was considered to be “double length” which in this case, was 154 cars.
He says this about the runaway/derailment: The train derailed in a 60 mph curve after attaining a maximum speed of about 150 mph. It was underpowered but did okay going down grade, which was most of the trip. But, although the power was acceptable to pull the train, it was not able to provide enough dynamic braking to limit the speed going down the grade. He said the company boasted about getting the line quickly back in service, but that was relatively easy because the wreckage became airborne at the time of derailment and moved about 100 feet clear of the track. So there was not much damage to the track.
He also speaks out about the East Palestine wreck and the role of hotbox detectors and why they failed to prevent the disaster. From my reading between th
As I recall, the initial reports were that the train had experienced a break-in-two about 55 cars back, with the train kind of draped over a summit. The initial train was in the vicinity of 150 cars, but that’s not what ran away. Only those 55 cars took off.
The two lead engines were reportedly unable to push those 55 cars back up the hill to recouple. In fact, the weight of the train was sufficient to cause it to run away down the hill.
A HBD reported the speed as 118 MPH shortly before the train left the rails. The GPS report of almost 140 MPH doesn’t seem out of order.
One thing many overlook when Speed Restrictions are put in place on the railroad - either Permament or Temporary - the speed restriction applies to the entire length of the train - be that train 100 feet or 15000 feet in length. A short train can be braked to the speed of the Restriction in a much shorter distance than can a big train. The big train must stay at the speed of the restriction for the entirety of its length before it can attempt to accelerate back to track speed.
There’s an awful lot of supposition about East Palestine centering upon hot box detectors with the impression that warnings are routinely disregarded. Is that the case, or sensation? The media is just as deserving of suspicion as corporations and I am not sure I believe any of it until there is some thorough analysis presented by the STB. In over forty years of service I had never seen such warnings dismissed without careful analysis, with the tendency to err more on the side of caution. Then again, I have been retired for some years and things do not appear to have improved.
Mr. Lindsay’s thoughts are in many instances justified, however, I disagree with the nationalization tendency in his comments. What we have here is a series of events bringing either temporary or longer term focus upon maladies in the present application of rail economies, depending upon what transpires with regard to derailment frequency or chaos going forward. A strong case may be made that regulation has significantly trailed necessary restraints upon economies in manpower, experience, maintenance and operations in general. Regulation generally trails developments. A strong case might also be made that the mergers of the 90s created this situation by reducing competition to next-to-nothing. And Lindsay is right – the highway system is already over-burdened with increasingly large trucks. So there is a valid element of national security at stake although I am pretty sure this is just a talking point and no one in fed’l gov’t at present is much interested in that, what with everyone being so oppressed and other fal-de-rol.
Amtrak’s inability to recover from situations that seriously delay their trains - no matter who or what is the cause; can be explained in one simple statement - lack of equipment. Amtrak has enough equipment to meet their daily schedule requirements - no more; therefore they are not in a position to ‘cobble together’ a proper set of equipment and operate the next scheduled departure of a train or service On Time. Amtrak is forced into the situation of either running the set of late equipment on short turnarounds until they get the equipment back into the On Time time slot, If they can’t do that their only recovery avenue is to cancel one or more trips.
PRR & NYC operated multiple sections of the Broadway Limited and the 20th Century Limited because there was available equipment to do it - there was available equipment to originate the train On Time every day, no matter what ‘adventures’ the normal inbound train experienced that would prevent that set of equipment from being turned to protect the origination.
The movement of carload freight and passengers are as different as night and day.
Passengers show up at a schedeuled time expecting to board their particular train.
Shippers tender their shipment to the carrier and only cares for the consignee to get the shipment in the proper time frame. How the carrier’s move the shipment between orign and destination is the carrier’s responsibility - the carrier’s MAY become subject to penalties based upon the contract between the shipper and the carrier. Since the carriers are no longer transporting livestock there are no longer requirments that the ‘shipment’ be fed, watered and rested within specific time frames.
That’s my understanding, too. I haven’t seen anything to say otherwise. There hasn’t been too much put out about the incident. Usually when something like this happens they issue some kind of safety alert. The alerts describe what happened and rules involved with a disclaimer that it wasn’t to imply that rules were broken.
I must say I didn’t listen too much to the interview. I’m skeptical of the “Real News Network” and once I heard Railroad Workers United I turned it off. I want no part of that organization.
The discussion of the Nevada wreck begins and ends in time frame 5:00-15:00 in the video.
His point was that the train was 154 cars long, not that 154 cars derailed. His point was that the train was too long to be safe, and what happened was a result of the train length and lack of sufficient motive power. He said that the U.P. did imply that the train was only 55 cars long, and generally downplayed the derailment in their report of it. He said the train had air problems earlier that delayed the train about 6 hours, and those were never completely resolved. They had more air problems leading up to the break-in-two. So basically, he is saying that even though the runaway was only 55 cars long, the problems that caused the runaway flared up when the train was its full length of 154 cars.
In general, he is also very critical of PSR, ultra-long trains, and U.P. management for cutting the labor force.
A fine perfectiojn of ‘where you stand is where you sit’.
Dedication to welding all the rail unions and trades into one, strong, bargaining unit ‘to defeat Wall Street and the rail industry lobby’.
Result: everything is propaganda seen through one lens. Not that there is anything wrong with such advocacy – only that if you want facts or a fair analysis, you have to back-translate and then compare sources.
While they do have some points that I can agree with, I have a problem with their militancy on how to achieve some things. I also have problems with some of their positions on some items.
I actually think one united union could be beneficial, however for me, “they ain’t it.”
Getting back to the train. The real issue may not be the size of that train, but that it needed more power, especially dynamic braking power. They have to add power to run over BNSF trackage later in the journey. Reading some anecdotes from people who work that territory, using “just enough” power leaves little room for error or unusual circumstances.
We have manifests that can be long and heavy with a 1x1x1 configuration. It’s happened on our short steep grades were a train has come apart, but the single head engine can’t shove the head portion uphill.
They really should have a second engine on the headend. Not necessarily for power, but dynamic braking on some of our grades, even in “flat” eastern Nebraska and western Iowa. The less times you have to use air, the better off you ar
charlie hebdo
What’s the deal with the Railroad Workers United?
A fine perfectiojn of ‘where you stand is where you sit’.
Dedication to welding all the rail unions and trades into one, strong, bargaining unit ‘to defeat Wall Street and the rail industry lobby’.
Result: everything is propaganda seen through one lens. Not that there is anything wrong with such advocacy – only that if you want facts or a fair analysis, you have to back-translate and then compare sources.
While they do have some points that I can agree with, I have a problem with their militancy on how to achieve some things. I also have problems with some of their positions on some items.
I actually think one united union could be beneficial, however for me, “they ain’t it.”
Getting back to the train. The real issue may not be the size of that train, but that it needed more power, especially dynamic braking power. They have to add power to run over BNSF trackage later in the journey. Reading some anecdotes from people who work that territory, using “just enough” power leaves little room for error or unusual circumstances.
We have manifests that can be long and heavy with a 1x1x1 configuration. It’s happened on our short steep grades were a train has come apart, but the single head engine can’t shove the head portion uphill.
They really should have a second engine on the headend. Not necessarily for power, but dynamic braking on some of our grades, even in “flat” eastern Nebraska and western Iowa. The less
From the interview with U.P. engineer, Paul Lindsay, he makes the following points about the Nevada runaway ore train wreck:
In the interview, he makes the point loud and clear that the train was way too heavy for the dynamic braking, and the dynamic braking was way too little for the train weight. It was that combination that wrecked the train.
He says it is an undisputed fact that the longer trains have more mechanical problems that vary from blocking the railroad to causing derailments.
There is no scale facility for the origination of this train, so they always overload the cars until the springs are fully compressed. The load was estimated to be at least 22,000 tons. On this line, there were very few curves to hold the train back.
They also had mechanical problems with the air that delayed them for about 6 hours, during which the train kept losing its air. That problem began again as they were going over the crest of the grade.