First of all: Hi to all the railsfans in America!
I am from Germany and doing postgraduate-studies at the moment.
I’d like to do a report on the UP/SP-Merger and so far I found plenty of information about what happened in 1997 and the reasons which caused the congestion. But I hardly find any information about what was done to solve athe problems. So which actions were taken from the side of the UP, the STB or/and the competitors?
Does anyone of you have information on that or can you tell me any sources?
Southwest_Chief
In very brief customers diverted everything they could to BNSF, trucks or barges. UP got their directional running, hired crews and dug themselves out.
Most observers credit UP’s arrogance for their problem. They blamed the poor state of the SP. Funny thing is the SP management that UP ran off managed to run the SP. Wonder how they did it? Almost everone I know who worked for SP thought their management was a bunch of dunces until the UP showed them what little they knew.
Ed in Houston can likely supply details as that is where it started.
Mac
The establishment of directional running in East and Central Texas was the biggest operational solution. This solution is still in place today. Directional running established pairs of lines that are effectively operated as dual mainlines - even though the lines may be many miles apart. For example, most northbound trains between San Antonio and Taylor TX run through Austin - while most southbound trains run through Smithville which is about 40 miles east of Austin.
The establishment of the directional circulation loops, provided the structure that allow UP to take advatage of the additional crews that where hired.
Related to this was the establishment of a joint Houston area dispatching center at Spring Texas with BNSF. but I think this was established later than other solutions in the melt-down.
dd
From conversations I’ve had with former SP folks, it’s evident that most people don’t realize how close SP was to collapsing.
I also know from experience in a prior merger that UP plans these things with little consideration of how things were done in the past, or of what works. Eventually they come around, though. “The UP way” is something that you hear often from older employees at our end of the pike, now nearly twelve yeard after they turned things upside down for us (and that is literal!).
I belive that they attempted to consolidate some of their Houston operations by closing a yard, and that’s where a lot of the problems began.
I’ve also heard that SP was losing money like crazy, and was near collapse, but UP would have saved a lot of $$ by just sending a big check to San Francisco and not rushing the merger. Loud claims to the contrary, UP seemingly learned nothing from the its bungling of the simple previous merger with C&NW.
Houston (where UP closed a yard without trusting the advice of the SP managers) was indeed the epicenter of the mess, with shock waves extending all the way to the West Coast. I can remember driving along I-10, east of the Los Angeles basin, and seeing an eastbound parked on nearly every passing track while their crews “died on the law.” What a mess!
As noted above, directional running apparently has been the biggest single improvement by far. I get to visit in Cotton Belt territory in Arkansas every so often, and now only watch for trains one way.
However, UP 's management problems continued into the 2000’s, until the recent change in leadership. The same guy who led these two fouled-up mergers also led the company into its enormous hiring shortfall of recent years, a 2004 operating ratio of nearly 90%, and the weird, paranoid PR disaster of licensing the logos of fallen-flag predecessors, and suing the likes of little Steamscenes (the calendar publisher).
Mercifully, a new broom has swept clean in Omaha.
I would guess there is the makings of a good book in the UP’s acquisition of first the C&NW and then the SP with the subsequent Texas meltdown. It is too bad that someone like Rush Loving doesn’t do it. Now that top management has changed at UP, there might be sources willing to talk who would not do so previously.
I have a feeling that Trains magazine did an article on the meltdown three or four years ago, but I’m not able to cite a specific issue.
Thanks for all your answers so far!
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So, it’s quite clear that the UP didn’t change their “UP way” after the problems with the acquisition of the C&NW. But did they change anything in their management when the big problems (the meltdown) occurred? Did they react on the problems by changing their way they did the acquisition?
I mean, did they ever think about that at least a small part of the problems could have been not accepting the SP-culture?
Or did they just go on with their “UP way” until every part of the SP as UP (turned all upside down)?
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I read that the STB forced the UP to open their tracks to competitors. Is that true?
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Besides the directional running and more crews, did UP also lease or buy new engines?