The WSJ has a genuinely interesting article on the Chicago-St. Louis Amtrak/Illinois “Higher Speed” upgrade of the UP (ex-GM&O). While the headlines are somewhat tainted by the WSJ editorial board’s hostility to Amtrak the article is overall worth a read.
If you can’t open this visit Facebook for the WSJ and the article opened fine there, at least yesterday. I also have it posted at my own Facebook page for “Carl Fowler” and on multiple discussion groups devoted to Amtrak.
This is my response and critique of it:
Overall this is a good article, but it puts too dark a spin on what Amtrak and Illinois have accomplished. For decades opponents of rail have argued that spending should be focused on 300-400 mile corridors, between major cities and also serving significant regional centers. That is precisely what was done here. And 110 mph is a very significant increase from 80 mph–40% faster.
As the article correctly notes, this was a very complex project. Hundreds of grade crossings needed to be upgraded. New stations were built. In a major city tracks moved to an entirely new alignment. The complex Positive train Control (PTC) system had to be installed over the entire line.
Yet at the very beginning of the project Illinois added additional trains to the line which triggered a great increase in patronage even before speeds could be raised. The 40-50% improvement in ridership compared to the 1990s to date is only the preview to what will come when 110 mph becomes the norm on the entire co
Well said Carl. It is past time for the US to stop spending money on illogical dreams of true high speed rail like the California fiasco and also get rid of the long distance trains that carry an infinitesimal number of passengers and start looking at increasing the number of short/medium distance higher speed trains serving a true rail market between major metropolitan areas. I look forward to riding these trains. The last time I tried to ride this line I had to abandon my attempt and fly to get my connection in Chicago when the Texas Eagle was running 6 hours late.
Unfortunately, I couldn’t access the WSJ article at the address given. I wish I could, because Carl’s description looks interesting. It could be because I’m not a WSJ subscriber or because I’m very close to being a computer illiterate (I used to think that a “Blackberry” was some kind of dessert and that an “Apple” was something that grew on trees).
That said, I’m at least very familiar with the Chicago-St. Louis route. It’s a really good “intermediate point” example because it provides a good link between Chicago (the state’s largest city) and Springfield (the state capital). It also connects Chicago to Bloomington-Normal, which has a large college population
If we assume the distance of travel for the intermediate points averages to half-way, and that an hour is saved for the full run, then the saving for those runs would be a half hour.
Do you really think the saving of a half hour is going to significantly increase ridership?
“I wouldn’t take the train before, but now that the trip is half an hour faster, I’m in.”
It will be interesting to monitor the ridership increase. Is there a way to obtain ridership figures on the route for the present day? Including intermediate stops. The numbers certainly exist. I would be interested on tracking the ridership increase as it happens.
In FY18 Amtrak carried 586,200 riders between at least two points on the Chicago and St. Louis route. In FY17 it was 590,000. In FY13 it was 655,465.
FY18 ridership declined 64/100s of one percent between FY17 and FY18; it declined by 10.6 percent between FY13 and FY18.
In FY18 Amtrak realized an operating profit of $1.7 million for the Chicago to St. Louis service; in FY17 it was 4.7 million.
In FY18 the average load factor was 46 percent; in FY17 it was 45 percent. In FY18 the Chicago to St. Louis trains realized an average on time performance record at their end points of 68 percent; in FY17 it was 67.9 percent.
I don’t know whether these numbers include the Texas Eagle. In any case, they probably would not sway significantly the overall results.
In FY17 177,241 passengers entrained or detrained at Springfield. At Bloomington/Normal the number was 242,844. In FY16 the numbers were 164,484 and 226,212. The Springfield numbers increased 7.6 percent from FY16 to FY17; the Bloomington/Normal numbers increased 7.4 percent.
I have not looked at every station’s activity. Moreover, the station numbers for FY 18 have not been published on Amtrak’s website.
I can envision the annual operating profit increasing to $10 million a year, with increased ridership and a raise in fares. If the project costs $2 billion, then the expense will be paid down in 200 years. This, of course, is VERY approximate.
With current ridership at about 600,000, daily is about 2000. I think there are six trains a day. So about 300 per train. That’s pretty good looking.
My quick reading on the subject shows that there is no projected time for the trains running at 110 mph. When the PTS starts working, speeds can go up from 79 mph to 90 mph. So the claimed elapsed time for the trip is kind of marginally increased, certainly not enough to gain ridership.
I also understand that new equipment has been ordered. If more trains were to run, that could lead to more profit, but you also have to get people ON to the train.
It does look like a big experiment, so it should be watched and analyzed carefully to see if it’s successful. And part of that success should be justifying the expense.
If you can’t open this visit Facebook for the WSJ and the article opened fine there, at least yesterday. I also have it posted at my own Facebook page for “Carl Fowler” and on multiple discussion groups devoted to Amtrak.
The piece is worth the effort to read. It’s very complete and much of it very fair and interesting.
Indeed it is, which is why it’s not going to happen.
Figure it out for yourself – a mile at 110 mph takes 12.27 seconds less than a mile at 80 mph. How many miles do you have to run at 110 mph to save an hour?
Here’s a stab at cut/paste of the text at least–the graphics won’t transfer–but this is I hope all the text:
Amtrak’s route from Chicago to St. Louis would seem an ideal place for the U.S. to adopt high-speed rail such as in Europe and Asia, where passenger trains can race along at 200 miles an hour. The stretch in Illinois is a straight shot across mostly flat terrain. In fact, a fast-rail project is under way in Illinois. Yet the trains will top out at 110 mph, shaving just an hour from what is now a 5½-hour train trip.
After it’s finished, at a cost of about $2 billion, the state figures the share of people who travel between the two cities by rail could rise just a few percentage points. Behind such modest gains, for hundreds of millions of dollars spent, lie some of the reasons high-speed train travel remains an elusive goal in the U.S. The challenges faced by Illinois, among them limited federal funding and people’s ingrained travel habits, mirror those faced by other states that would like to upgrade the passenger rail network.
Compared to the current top speed of 80mph 110 mph is indeed 40% faster. But the speed comparison you gave is flawed, because it fails to account for very substantial mileage where the speed will be going not from 80 (79mph) to 110, but from much slower speeds to new maximums–sometimes 110, but always faster than before. For example no less than 68 grade crossings were sealed through Springfield, creating an essentially sealed corridor where speeds will be raised. Repairs have to done to raise speed through yard districts. Total exclusion gates protect all crossings. Delays for meets will be largely eliminated by the addition of 26 miles of double/passing tracks to the extant passing sidings.
The bottom line is that Illinois, the UP and Amtrak are contracturally obligated to reach the commited overall running times. This will ultimately come.
I am not an uncritical fan of this plan. It has taken a remarkable amount of time to build. The 18 miles that were (largely) cleared for 110 mph already between Dwight and Pontiac have reverted to 79mph as PTC is tested and implemented route-wide. In this short distance no great harm was done to the overall schedule, but it was a shame to see things go backwards if only for one to two years.
But while you might not be thrilled with a 60 minute speed-up over 284 miles, experience world-wide has shown that the combination of frequent service and speed over distances like this is truly potent in building ridership.
There is a line in the WSJ report that on the one-hand shows how weak both air and rail are in the market for the full run CHI/STL–but it also confirms the potential market that exists here. At present air has only 1% of the total market and rail 1.3% (although amazingly Amtrak’s fairly slow current service does that well and is in effect 30% ahead of air already here). What this tells me is that the potential to increase market share from the 97.5% who drove is immense. (Buses have only .02 of the market).