From what I’ve read, the Milwaukee Road got them at a bargain price, as the onset of the cold war precluded them from going to the Soviet Union. Milwaukee Road got approximately 24 years of service out of them, 1950-1974. When the Pacific Coast Extention was de-electrified( is that a word?) in 1974, presumeably Milwaukee Road had to purchase diesel power to replace them- something they could have done in 1950, and skipped buying the Little Joes.
All things considered, was purchasing the 12 Little Joe electric locomotives a good investment for The Milwaukee Road?
The ‘Joes’ kept the Rocky Mountain Division electrified until 1974. There were some infrastructure upgrades that had to be done to support the operation of them(raise the power to 3300-3600 volts to keep the current draw within limits). The original box cabs were worn out. They had to piece together the box cab helper sets out of the dead line. All of the good box cabs went to the other electric division. The Milwaukee did not have funds to buy all of the Joe’s and some went to Brazil and the South Shore.
The big problem was not keeping the electrification. The traffic over the Pacific Extension kept getting worse through the post war years. 261/262(Thinderhawk/XL) were the primary Chicago-Tacoma trains. 262/263 wound up as ‘dead freights’ towards the end. There just was not enough traffic to keep the line running, electrified or diesel.
Absolutely. The PRR never had a very good electric freight locomotive until the E44’s came along. By the 1950’s the P5a’s that were the prime freight haulers (with some GG1’s) - which were supposed to have been the prime passenger power, but they couldn’t cut it - were wearing out, and were obsolete. PRR sampled a couple of different replacement prrototypes from GE and another Westinghouse, I think. But in the meantime the Virginian and GE developed and implemented the ignitron rectifier, and all of a sudden high voltage AC transmission and catenary to DC motor drive as with diesels, and easy control was practical, more standardized, and more economical. The E44’s and E44a’s (solid-state rectifier, I think) were rated at 4,400 HP for a C-C unit, but actually developed closer to 5,000 HP continuous and 6,000 HP short-term. I think they paid for themselves within like 8 to 10 years - because their running costs were way less than any diesel. They were the US units that everyone pointed to as the paradigm for the next generation of electric - simple, standardized, as much like a diesel road-switcher as possible, reliable, rugged, etc. - the Muskingum Electric coal line used essentially 2 more, onlly with newer rectifiers and more power rating. There were several articles in Trains from the 1950’s - 1970’s about them and their economical operation.
Now, I’d ask the same question about the 4 or 6 Virginian electrics - EL-2-or-3-something’s, I believe- that were the predecessors of the E-44, and which went to the New Haven when the Virginian was merged into the N&W and both electrifications were shut down in the early 1960’s . . .
Yes, I would definitely agree that The Milwaukee Road made a good investment when they purchased a dozen Little Joes. Here’s why.
By the time General Electric built all 20-units and was ready to sell them to the USSR, the U.S. State Department said, “Nyet” to the deal. So here’s G.E., who’s now stuck with some very specialized power, and along comes The Milwaukee Road with an offer to buy all 20-units for a rock bottom price. For what The Milwaukee Road was willing to pay, G.E. sold them 12.
By about 1950, the original box-cabs were approaching 30-to-35 years of hard service. Looking at the economics of the electrification, management was quickly approaching one of those critical decision points: do we keep the electrification or scrap it? By spending a few dollars to upgrade the power of certain substations (like Janney, Mont.) and being able to spend a reasonable amount of money to purchase some brand new, big muscled electric engines, the Railroad extended the life of the electrification for nearly another quarter of a century.
The Little Joes have a 2-D+D-2 wheel arrangement, meaning that the eight powered axles are distributed evenly between two 4-axle trucks. Those 4-axle trucks have a long wheel base, a feature which does not mix well with tight radius mountain curves. Because of those long wheel bases, the flanges wore out quickly. Like steam locomotive drive wheels, the powered axles had spoked wheels with steel tires. Since the flanges on those steel tires ground to a dangerously sharp profile relatively quickly, the Deer Lodge shop was kept busy sweating-off and sweating-on new tires.
So this now begs a new question. Instead of distributing the locomotive weight over 10-axles configured 2-D+D-2 (with 8-powered axles), would it have been economically possible to reconfigure the running gear into a B-C+C-B wheel arr
MILW could’ve purchased all 20 Joes, plus spare parts for what they later paid for just the 12 they got. Upper management delayed things until some of the others got sold. A B-B-B-B motor would have been been better for the curves, similar to what VGN had, but they took what they could get.
The electrification kept the operating costs down on the line. When they shut off the juice, the employees knew the end was near.
Milwaukee should have stuck to being a regional instead of going transcon.I followed their path through the rockiiess on google earth and anyone sane would not invest in the westward expansion. They went to late.
Weight distribution over just 10 axles instead of the original 12 ?
On the other hand, maybe the MILW’s track, roadbed, and structures could have handled that better than the Russian’s - that’s why they needed the 12 axles ?
Were the Little Joes a good investment for the MILW? For the sake of argument, I will argue that in the larger picture of the company’s future success, they were not a good investment.
Instead of purchasing the Little Joes – thus re-investing in the electrification system – perhaps the Milwaukee should have at that point, 1950, sold the entire electrification system for scrap. The cash from the copper sale would have been significant. They could have used the money from that sale, and from the money that was to go toward the Little Joes, toward significant track upgrade, track modernization, and purchase of new diesels. Doing that would have made the Milwaukee main line to the west a first class property by 1960.
The MILW transcontinental line needed modernization. The fifties would have been a good time to start. As it was, the transcontinental line never received much modernization. When the Lines West died in 1980 it still had hand-throw switches, wobbly passing sidings, an antique signalling system, and sub-par gravel ballast that didn’t hold up well under heavy trains.
One big reason to bring the property up to first-rate standards was to prepare for a merger. It was obvious, even in the 1950’s, that the future of railroading in the US involved consolidation. The need for mergers was especially apparent in the over-built pacific northwest, where four major railroads served the twin ports of Seattle and Tacoma, with none of those railroads being very prosperous. Two of the Milwaukee’s competitors out west, the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern, had already been in merger discussions since before WWII. So after WWII, it should have been obvious to the Milwaukee that it had make itself attractive for a merger partner.
And to make itself attractive for merger, it had to make itself modern:
Lines West was doomed from the start because there was not sufficient Pac NW traffic to Chicago to warrant four separate routes. Even now most of the traffic is managed on two.
But if the Milwaukee needed to persist in running Lines West, the bargain-priced Little Joes were a lot cheaper than the number of GP-9’s that would have been needed to do the same job.
Wm. Middleton says the Little Joes were 273 tons total - but no ‘per axle’ breakdown provided. So if we assume that weight would be equally distributed over the 10 axles proposed, that would be 27.3 tons = 54,600 lb. axle-loading, which is very reasonable. Even allowing for lighter loads on the former leading trucks of say 36,000 lbs. per axle, that would still be only around 67,000 lbs. on the main axles - again, still pretty reasonable, and comparable with diesel practice.
[:-,] But you do realize, of course, that what you’re proposing is essentially an updated version of the PRR’s GG1 - a 2-C+C-2 that weighed 235 - 239 tons with a similar weight distribution, but just with the leading trucks now powered . . . [swg]
Interesting thesis - but can you support it with actual $ figures, either then or today’s equivalent ? I doubt if that would work out - the copper scrap might have barely paid for the spikes, bolts, and tie plates, but no more - certainly not the rails, ties, ballast, new signals, and new diesels, etc. The relative proportions don’t seem right to me - it’s only copper, not gold . . . [:-^]
For comparison, note that in the early 1980’s, ConRail didn’t realize that kind of a windfall when it scrapped its freight catenary system after it lost reasonably-priced and convenient access to the NorthEast Corridor main lines controlled by Amtrak. CR’s upgrading started years before and continued for years afterwards - the copper salvage value was just a drop in the bucket as compared to that.
Although, that CR decision may support your overall thesis, because it too was then faced with an “upgrade it or scrap it” decision for the electrification. But I think the MILW made the right decision in the 1950’s with the Little Joes, because they were almost enough to replace the entire fleet and operation.
Otherwise, the rest of your proposition seems to make sense to me.
Of course, I have no idea what the Milwaukee could have gotten in cash for scrapping the copper trolley wires, …or for their existing fleet of electric locomotives, …or for the substation equipment in the 1950’s.
Just out of curiousity, I did a quick internet search on the historical price of copper and ran across the following chart. (Source: USGS)
As far as the substation equipment, possibly it had value to other electric railroads?
Searching the internet, I also ran across a dollar value for what the Milwaukee Road earned (circa ~1975) from scrapping electric trolley wires. (Information not verified.)
“At one point the price [of copper] soared, and it was estimated that the Milwaukee’s overhead wire was worth $10 million as scrap… But in the end the price dropped, and they got only $5 million.”
Paul:- You’re quite right. When I awoke this morning the first thing I realized was that I miscounted the axles. The Little Joes had 12, not the 10 I wrote mistakenly. My bad.
So readers, whadda you think? Could the Joes have been modified to run with a C-C+C-C wheel arrangement (12 powered axles distributed among four 3-axle trucks)? Or, how about something even more exotic like 1-B-C+C-B-1 (10 powered axles with a pair of pony wheels at each end)?
An item I’ve waited to be posted is the fuel savings of the electrification. Several articles I’ve read stated that Milwaukee saved much money on electrical power by using regenerative braking. By MU ing a diesel behind the electrics MLKE achieved the extra power to go up hills and the used regenerative to recover that diesel effort (partially) going down hill? Although I have no actual cites maybe someone can enlighten? Certainly if the electrification was still in place today and the track structure decent I would believe that electrification would not be considered for abandonment especially if the gap has been filled in?.
Modifying the Joes to a C-C+C-C or any other wheel arrangement would have meant building new underframes, which would have driven up the original cost. B-D+D-B (like GN’s W-1’s) might have been feasible, though.
Another comment about the Joes, South Shore’s management admitted that the Joes were bigger than what they needed, but the price was tough to beat.
Yeah - I was thinking the same thing earlier this morning. That would be an interesting comparison.
blue streak 1 - I have both Middleton’s book and the Woods’ book on Milwaukee Road West. Perhaps surprisingly, the latter has better data on the electrification, including the regenerative savings, as they appear to have referred to a lot of primary sources. Give me a couple days to peruse it and maybe some other references and I’ll see if I can answer some of those questions.
The electrification makes sense to me, as far as trying to deal with smoke from steam locomotives in long tunnels in the mountains. Didn’t GN have some electrified portions of trackage through the mountains as well?
As far as the bargain price goes… I’ve read that the Milwaukee Road engineering department wanted to buy all 20 locomotives and spare parts from GE, for $1 million, but the Board of Directors wouldn’t go for it. Later, when the B.o.D. would go for it, 8 had been sold, along with the spare parts. Milwaukee Road ended up paying $1 million for the remaining 12 units. That’s $83,333.33 each. I wonder what comparible diesels would have cost at that time.?
This link may provide some relevent information about the MILW RR’s EF-70’s [Little Joe’s] (Information from the Clayton County Chamber of Commerce website)
FTL: "….Engineering, design and manufacture of this order was contracted to General Electric’s locomotive plant in Erie, Pa. The locomotives were to cost $270.000 each. (Cost the U. S. Taxpayers). By September 1948, G.E. had completed eight locomotive
