I realize that a lot of these “what ifs” I’ve done haven’t been very well received but this one interests me, and not only because of the “North and South as one” mentality.
As i understand it both had East- West routes, while SP also had it’s SF-Portland Line, and the Cotton Belt. It would make sense to me that, if Northern Pacific and Southern pacific were to merge, they could then acquire trackage rights from Seattle to Portland (which, SP and NP already had) and carry out the manuver SP did to get into Chicago in the real history.All this being said, it seems like that would give the combined NP/SP a circuit-run around the United States. To my understanding, of the Hill railroads, the Northern Pacific was the one he had the least control over.
Do you think such a RR could exist? What do you think it’s traffic would look like? Headquarters? Would the NP and/or SP be strong enough to survive a merger like that? What do you think?
Somewhat interesting. However, the NP did not have trackage rights Seattle-Portland; the NP owned the track. So far as I know, the SP did not run trains to/from Seattle, but relied on the connections available in Portland (GN, NP, and UP).
However, I do not know of any advantage the SP would have gained by merging with the NP, which did not run southeast of the Twin Cities.
THe SP managed to get into Chicago Using Cotton Belt, and then buying a line off of the GM&O to my understanding, which would fix this problem to a certain extent.
I imagine that if the NP had enough of a traffic volume, the combined company might be able to get into the Northern Traffic market, access to a Chicago-Pacific Line, and perhaps even compete with the other carriers for Powder River coal once it became available (assumign this happened in the 60s or 70s.)
You are overlooking the fact that NP, GN and CB&Q were all Hill lines from the time JJ Hill began accumulating railroads and became ‘The Empire Builder’. The formation of BN was the natural merger of the Hill properties.
It makes more sense than SPSF, ICG, or SCL did. There would have been virtually no mileage duplication. The gap in the east would have been a problem but not necessarily an insurmountable one, BNSF was in the same boat for a short time and they survived quite well.
NP + SP likely would have led to UP + GN for defensive and competitive reasons. No idea what would have happened then to WP, RI, MP, CB&Q, or SP&S. However, SP’s financial problems likely would have sunk NP, and UP - with its piles of cash to prop up SP - couldn’t have stepped in because it then would have been on the other side of the table, so to speak.
Do you think it would have survived? It makes sense to me (with my limited knowledge) that it could have existed as a transcontinental carrier: The PCE as well as the combined midwestern trackage, could have given it the route miles to compete?
Pre 70’s they were financialy strong. Post 70’s not even a player.
from what I have learned the SP management chose to keep paying dividens in a troubled time when they should have reigned it in and bought locomotives (among other things). instead they chose to rebuild the (older) fleet, and defer maintainance. Going into the 80’s and beyond they were chronicly power short and that caused a snowball effect. There were other factors (like the failed SPSF merger that they banked on) but the bottom line is ther arrogance in the 70’s is what did them in. The cornerstones of there network (lumber, Calif. perrishables, auto mfg in the west) were dissapearing while they still acted like ‘all is well’. If not for there dominance in the doublestack traffic out of the so Cal ports, they would not have lasted as long as they did. There vast network of low density branch lines became a major financial burdon, while lines like the ex WP line to the bay area (with few branches) became efficiant competitors. In the end they were sustaining the railroad by selling off the ‘family jewels’ (prime urban real estate, communications networks, oil & lumber holdings, ect.) and using union busting ploys (Golden West railcar rebuilding, Morrison Knudsen loco rebuilds) while the light density branch line dispositions draged on and on.
In the very end, ex IC man Edward Moyers was hired and was making a decent headway twards a turnaround (making such contravercial moves as removing the original #1 track over Donner to expand Sunset route double track) When the BN-SF merger was announced (in 95?). In reaction the UP had no choice but to marry the SP (after a failed bidding war against the BN for the SF).
A colleague was looking over your post (just above), and mentioned Southern Pacific was just one entity of a large holding company that saw no value in the railroad. UP grabbed SP without an alternative in response to the BNSF merger. UP more or less reoriented the SP, and had the money to do so. But now, one gets the impression UP is straining the nat.
My colleague says UP (as well as the other railroads) could be much more profitable if they kept their rolling stock moving instead of idle in classification yards. Sounds simple enough to me! But, he is almost anti-railroad now because of the railroad’s ‘know it all’ stance. (Didn’t SP sort of think like that, the glaring point of your post, Chad?) But, who is going to buy UP if it runs into financial trouble? The China Pacific Railroad? Can you imagine yellow locomotives with a corporate headquarters in Beijing?
And, then, someone will say, “Wasn’t there a topic once at the TRAINS website about NP and SP … and how SP had so much arrogance?”
I believe the original proposal from the Northwestern’s President would have included the Rock Island as well. It included selling the Rock’s lines south of St. Louis to ATSF (which I suspect would have caused even more problems with the ICC)…