I’m curious to thoughts, as my grandfather was a brakeman and then engineer for over 30 years with the VGN. 1) Would it have maybe lasted to 1964 before N&W mergered NKP and Wabash, then gone to N&W? 2) Would Chessie or Seaboard Systems have benefitted from merger if VGN lasted to the 70’s?, 3) Would MP, UP, or SP have extended VGN track from WV/Ohio to the Mississippi River to give “them” access to Norfolk and the Atlantic Ocean? 4) or some other scenario? Thanks.
History has been written and acted upon account the economics of the time.
It seems the most likely alernative merger partner would have been the NYC which connected with the VGN at Deepwater, WV.
The Virginian Rwy operating in the N&Ws ‘neighborhood’ was constanly, beset with poor financial interactions with the bigger N&W. Its major connection outside that sphere was as has been stated in the Norfolk Port area with C&O. Itwas in the early 1930’s when VGN built a bridge over the Kanawah River, in the area of Mullins,W.Va. That gave VGN access to the NYC, and changed it from just a coal carrier to potentially, a bridge route from the midwest to the port of Norfolk.
It is somewhat interesting that monies for its construction came from individuals who had gotten their wealth as investors in Standard Oil Co. Money was not a problem for its building, and the railroad was well engineered and laid with heavy rail from its start. As wa the 134 miles of electrification from Mullins to Roanoke. Its neighboring road was very well aware of the VGN and gave it financial problems at every opportunity.One way was car exchange rates, kept high for VGN by N&W. It is of some interest in the late 1920/30’s era the VGN was sometime know as “…The richest little railroad in the world…” Here are a couple of links that may be o
One likely outcome would have been the electric operation lasting longer.
… and then vanished faster than the PCE of the Milwaukee.
I am still not quite certain how N&W was permitted to acquire VGN; surely the merger had anticompetitive effect both in coal and in potential bridge traffic to tidewater.
The electrification would surely have had ‘legs’ far longer had the merger not occurred and directional running then been implemented; every source I’ve read on the subject says the reason for dropping the electrification was the effective deadheading required. This was an 11kV AC system, not 3000VDC with no upgrade path in two separated islands with stuff on wooden poles to maintain, so I have to wonder if much of the expedient argument for de-electrification in the late '60s to early '70s would apply; I expect it would have been preserved after the OPEC embargo at least long enough to get to the era of Conrail-style dual-mode-lite or road-slug-plus MU if there were an advantage to running consists through as MILW discovered there was with modern diesels.
On the other hand, I have to wonder how many of the aspects of the Tumbler Ridge electrification were common to VGN operations. Probably no few.
Think of the fun of a fleet of 4483s in VGN colors… with all the mod cons of the era.
NYC? Hummm…then 20 years later VGN is with Conrail.
“I am still not quite certain how N&W was permitted to acquire VGN; surely the merger had anticompetitive effect both in coal and in potential bridge traffic to tidewater.”–Nor am I, but when government regulatory agencies get involved common sense takes a back seat to politics. Don’t forget: N&W was still a subsidiary of the Pennsylvania in 1959. Penn probobly had a lot of political muscle back then.
“Think of the fun of a fleet of 4483s in VGN colors… with all the mod cons of the era.”–I’d like to think the VGN of 2018 would look like NS’s VGN heritage model. Can’t beat the bunblebee colors.
I’m sure electrification would have lasted longerr, too. It was an effecient and effective method of moving coal over Clarks Gap.
Thanks; very familiar w/VGN Wiki site. I was curious as to what kind of creative thinkers are out there.
VGN’s electrification was in better shape in the late 1950’s than the Milwaukee’s (most of the motive power was post-WW2), the electrical system was capable of handling more HP per train. VGN was also in a bit better financial shape than the Milw. Had it made it past 1973, it would have likely lasted to the 80’s.
OTOH, had the N&W been told “NoWay” to the merger ca 1956, the N&W steam may have also lasted a bit longer as well.
“Had it made it past 1973, it would have likely lasted to the 80’s.”–That’s my feeling as well. Nice to have it validated. Where do you see VGN going in the 80’s?
I still feel that MP/UP/SP (Maybe even BN) would have extended VGN’s rails to the Mississippi River so one of them could have had a true (ie…direct) transcon from the Pacific to the Atlantic on one roads rails.
At first blush thought of SOU RR acquiring VGN. Unfortunately SOU’s coal traffic could not easily have gained access to Tidewater coaling ? That is unless SOU got some kind of track rights from N&W Norton to Roanoke ?
Even the NYC of the post-proxy-fight Young years wouldn’t have had the money to acquire and run VGN effectively. Its value in any case was in providing an end-connection to allow VGN to operate bridge traffic effectively, which presumably would have been preserved through both PC and Conrail. There is little presumption that VGN would have been in such parlous state by the Seventies as to be incorporated in the 3R Act planning, particularly if the modern electrification was panning out.
It may bear mentioning at this point that the last Virginian motors (which ultimately became E33s) were geared for 65mph, and presumably any follow-on units, including dual-modes, would be comparable. That leaves the prospect of effective high-speed bridge traffic without massive energy-cost penalty in the ‘Trailer Jet’ age … the problem being that bridge traffic to the tidewater ports as they were then (and perhaps now) isn’t exactly a major part of freight. Perhaps a coordinated effort to develop ports either in Hampton Roads or the Sewalls/Sewells Point area, after the manner of Prince Rupert BC recently, would have enhanced traffic “alternative to coal”. That might have made deepwater facilities attractive to the prospective generations of very large container carriers that would have trouble, say, negotiating the Delaware all those miles to reach an effective rail connection.
SOU RR makes alot of sense; crazy I hadn’t thought of them. Their lines could have easily tied into VGN’s lines in western VA and SE WV and given them direct access to Norfolk. I wonder why SOU never pursued VGN?
Thanks. That’s alot to think about and very on point to the type creative RR guys I knew were on this forum. I’ll have the NS VGN heritage SD70ACe unit to look at for memories (at least until the 1st repaint takes it to NS B&W).
SAL or ACL crossed the VGN as well as the SOU. I’m not familiar enough with then to know what, if any traffic would be diverted to Norfolk to go overseas.
Both the ACL and SAL crossed the Virginian on their ways from Richmond to the Carolinas and farther south. Also, both railroads entered the Portsmouth area; one from from Rocky Mount, N.C, and the other from Norlina, N.C.
Johnny, What are your thoughts on why the SOU didn’t merge the VGN to get access to Norfolk? Any thoughts on why MP/UP/SP didn’t merge with and extend VGN tracks from WV/OH to the Mississippi River to have a true direct Transcon?