Under hearings into WMATA management, the technical competence of various managers is taking a beating. Such as using parts to repair the custom train control system from a different manufacturer that are not designed for the use to which they are being put. Damningly this situation occurred at the site of the fatal accident.
WMATA ? Can you elaborate on this, and put it in context for me? Thanks
I wonder if this is a systemic thing. Something that has “Save the $$$$” written all over it.
Hearings = political theatre in the U.S. - Toyota today, WMATA tomorrow . . . [:-^] But who is going to really do anything constructive to correct/ improve the situation ? Exactly what will they do ? With what money ? By when ? Often, these things are well-known beforehand, at least to those on the inside - who then have to struggle to try to accomplish the mission - until something goes wrong - then the scape-goating begins . . . [:-^]
Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts
I wonder about that as well. When managers are trained is the issue of OEM parts even mentioned anymore? I remember that we got this clobbered into our heads that ALL equipment that is used in our field must be repaired with OEM parts—and et cetera and et cetera and…[banghead]
sheeesh[:(]
There are people that I have as clients with who know this by heart. And we have “properly qualified” managers who have to be told again and again that ------[soapbox]
[quote user=“Paul_D_North_Jr”]
Hearings = political theatre in the U.S. - Toyota today, WMATA tomorrow . . . 
But who is going to really do anything constructive to correct/ improve the situation ? Exactly what will they do ? With what money ? By when ? Often, these things are well-known beforehand, at least to those on the inside - who then have to struggle to try to accomplish the mission - until something goes wrong - then the scape-goating begins . . .
Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ? Who of us isn’t, at least informally, and likely more strictly as part of training and policy, etc. ? If not, why were said managers even hired in the first place ? And who’s responsible for that ?
Were the repair parts even available from
This makes me think of Philco’s practice in designing radio circuits, back fifty and more years ago… All other manufacturers, so far as I knew, used resistors and capacitors with standard values, but Philco did not–and its radios worked well with the non-standard values. Of course, Philco wanted the user to take his radio to a Philco dealer when a part failed, but from time to time, someone would br
WMATA appears to have a ‘corporate culture’ of a urban bus transit company, more than anything that is rail related. From the accident reports of Metro incidents I have read, it appears that Metro train operations personnel generally start their employment through the bus side of the organization and then get ‘promoted’ to the Metro train side of the operation. Their maintenance personnel also seem to progress from the bus side of the operation to the rail side.
I get the feeling, that Metro’s safety emphasis is more in tune with the ‘relatively’ forgiving nature of bus accidents that occur with a relatively high frequency and relatively low injury rates, rather than a rail based safety emphasis where most accidents end up with potentially catastrophic results.
[quote user=“Paul_D_North_Jr”]
Did the managers know about the importance of Original Equipment Manufacturer parts quality and performance certification requirements, and the like ?
Performance certificatio
I would definitely reserve judgment on the OEM parts issue. As some one else has already pointed out, the issue about using non-OEM replacement parts for the signal system came from a representative of the company that sells the OEM parts. That company has an obvious financial interest in suggesting that the products of other manufacturers are inferior to their own. Also, as the company responsible for the original signal system, it also has a strong interest in suggesting that the cause of the signal problems was something they are not responsible for. Now, maybe they are right. But I’ve learned to be a little cynical in situations like this. Let’s see what NTSB has to say.
The part of the testimony I didn’t like was the affidavit submitted from the WMATA technician who installed the parts and then when they didn’t work properly went to his supervisor who couldn’t offer any advice. They finally got the circuit to work by boosting the power input. What would be the effect on the track circuit impedence bonds of operating at higher power than designed? In any case the Ansaldo parts were clearly not drop in replacements.
There may be nothing wrong with non-OEM parts, but you better be sure - more than taking the vendor’s word for it - before you decide to use them. I used to vet non-OEM pars for locomotives, but they were not safety related and the vetting process was more about avoiding a disaster rather than determining the absolute equivalence of the part.
Barry:
I think you may have nailed the issue/problem… MONEY always seems to be not only the excuse, but the systemic problem that leads to use of “the cheaper the better” as a resolution for problematic availibilities of OEM parts.
Washington,D.C. seems to be the epicenter for this kind of thinking. [X-)]
Political correctness running amuck.[2c]
There…fixed it.
When it comes to money, the epicenter of the money world is Wall Street and their cheaper is better bring it to the bottom line THIS QUARTER thinking. This carries over to the public sector (WMATA) where they are expected to accomplish $100M of project with $50M of funding. The pressures of funding occur in all levels of all institutions, both public and private. The trade offs between OEM and After Market parts are done in all levels of all projects. When done, however, the vetting process must insure that the After Market part does have the same function, on all levels, as the OEM parts.
This is NOT a case of “aftermarket” parts being substituted. Here’s the situation on the bonds according to the testimony I’ve read (and we might want to move this thread to the Transit forum).
There is an ongoing project to replace the 40-year-old ATC equipment made by GRS (Alstom) with new equipment made by US&S. There are bonds and modules. First the ATC crews replace the bonds with US&S bonds and try to get them working, this often can only be done by raising the current in the GRS module. The US&S bond has a different impedance than the original GRS bond. Then, at some future date, the CIC crews replace the old GRS module with a new US&S module. Their idea was to keep ahead of the US&S replacement crew because they evidently need the entire room to work.
On top of all this, there are no checks/balances, no feedback loop to management, and most chillingly NO DOCUMENTED PROCEDURE on how to test the US&S bond with the GRS modules. There are several lines that use US&S modules with US&S bonds with no problems.
The accident is apparently in a place where the GRS bond was replaced with a US&S bond and was then replaced again with the original GRS bond. There is some confusing and conflicting testimony on that, as it implies it’s possible the GRS bond couldn’t handle the power-up that the US&S bond required of the GRS module (which was not yet replaced). It’s all messed up.
Alstom (now owner of GRS) has expressed verbally and in writing that this should not ever have been done. The ATC crews were actually out there with voltmeters and ohmmeters trying to get the GRS module to recognize the US&S bond, with someone at the module turning a pot to “up” the current. Unbelievable. The workers themselves say “this is wrong, we must stop” but management says “shut up.”
BaltAC:
OK! I stand corrected. I can live with that as well! I guess I was trying to say away from the PC mine field…Thanks.
P.S. Love that Cat![bow]
Remember WMATA is Government in a government town. US&S and GRS are both reputable signal manufacturers.
[quote user=“aegrotatio”]
This is NOT a case of “aftermarket” parts being substituted. Here’s the situation on the bonds according to the testimony I’ve read (and we might want to move this thread to the Transit forum).
There is an ongoing project to replace the 40-year-old ATC equipment made by GRS (Alstom) with new equipment made by US&S. There are bonds and modules. First the ATC crews replace the bonds with US&S bonds and try to get them working, this often can only be done by raising the current in the GRS module. The US&S bond has a different impedance than the original GRS bond. Then, at some future date, the CIC crews replace the old GRS module with a new US&S module. Their idea was to keep ahead of the US&S replacement crew because they evidently need the entire room to work.
On top of all this, there are no checks/balances, no feedback loop to management, and most chillingly NO DOCUMENTED PROCEDURE on how to test the US&S bond with the GRS modules. There are several lines that use US&S modules with US&S bonds with no problems.
The accident is apparently in a place where the GRS bond was replaced with a US&S bond and was then replaced again with the original GRS bond. There is some confusing and conflicting testimony on that, as it implies it’s possible the GRS bond couldn’t handle the power-up that the US&S bond required of the GRS module (which was not yet replaced). It’s all messed up.
Alstom (now owner of GRS) has expressed verbally and in writing that this should not ever have been done. The ATC crews were actually out there with voltmeters and ohmmeters trying to get the GRS module to recognize the US&S bond, with someone at the module turning a pot to “up” the current. Unbelievable. The workers themselves say “this is wrong, we must stop” but management says “shut up.”
That e